The right-wing politics in Turkey has changed its course in the last 20 years under AKP rule. Secular, democratic, republican, center-right politics is melting. President Erdoğan appears with Supreme Court of Appeals President Akarca and Religious Affairs President Erbaş at a ceremony. (Photo: TCCB)
Evaluating domestic and foreign affairs of countries separately does not lead to healthy conclusions. Without fully understanding the internal political phases of a country such as Turkey, it is not possible to make a rightful judgement on how these phases shape the country’s foreign policy and its consequent impact on international strategic changes.
The analysis of the evolution of internal politics of the modern Turkish Republic, founded in 1923 on parts of the Ottoman Empire, would give us an idea on the validity of the above claim. A salient point here is that the right-wing governmental power, except for short-lived left-wing governments, has dominated the internal politics of the young republic on the bumpy road of democracy for the past 100 years. The interphases the consecutive right-wing governments caused the Turkish foreign policy to navigate generally on the right direction. [1]
Thus, the foreign policy of the right-wing governments that partially dominated the internal politics of the Turkish Republic for the past century affected the developments in America, Western Europe, the Balkans, Black Sea, Southern Caucasia, Central Asia, the Middle East, the Gulf and North Africa, the Arab world, and Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, it was extensively affected by the important political, economic, and cultural developments, insecurity, and instability in these regions.
In the aftermath of the transition to multi-party system, the right-wing governments until 2000s, including even the first era of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) were by-and-large loyal to the fundamental principles and traditional practices of the Turkish foreign policy.
At this point, emphasizing the significant characteristic of the Turkish center-right politics might be useful.
Governments with center-right tendencies, having conservative and nationalist inclinations, nevertheless with their secular, pro-Republic and modernist structures did not deviate from the fundamental targets and priorities of the Republican era foreign policy, up until the AKP. The will to participate the European integration movements since 1950s, despite the opposition from the Republican people’s Party (CHP) and other left-wing tendencies in 1970s has become permanent in Turkish political life until mid-2000s in the leadership of parties that we would define as right-wing.
New Turkey was founded, by the will of the Turkish National Grand Assembly elected by the free votes of the people living in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, as a republic with modern institutions based on laic (secular) and equal citizenship as a result of an independence war that came with great self-sacrifice in 1923 upon the ashes of the Ottoman Empire that was destroyed at the end of WWI.
The Old Turkey, on the other hand, was a multi-national, multi-religious, multi-sectarian, multi-linguistic empire composed of a religious majority based on Shariah that lasted for more than 600 years in a large territory extending over Anatolia, the Balkans, Caucasia, Mesopotamia, and North Africa. Because it lagged the norms of the modern age, the empire lost its first economic, later political, and finally military power since the 17th century, which was followed by her loss of independence and territories. In the end, it was invaded and erased from the historical stage.
The founding principles of New Turkey in 1920s, in essence, were based on territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty concepts that reflected the minimum modern mentality of early 20th century. Principles such as laicism (secularism) and equality of women, which were ahead of its time, became part of our life in the first years of the republic and the founding articles in our legislation. Particularly in the field of women’s access to political rights, the fact that the Turkish Republic led the way for the modern world has a significance for world history.
Modern individual rights and liberties that are phases of the natural development of these basic principles have gradually found their place in the new system following the declaration of the republic. New Turkey was also open to embracing the concepts of -then new political rights and liberties. As free-elections based multi-party systems became ‘sine qua non’ characteristics of the modern democracies in the latter part of the 20th century, Turkey adopted and kept up with those.
However, the conservative religious tradition of Old Turkey that has been historically feep-rooted in social life has started to affect the modern structures of the New Turkey from head to toe in real life, primarily in education and particularly in the last 20 years, disconnecting a considerable part of Turkish society from rationality and science.
Governments based on the principles of pluralist liberal democracies and individual liberties such as laicism, human rights and political freedom formed the standard criteria of modern civilization since WWII. New Turkey limited her target of “catching up with contemporary civilization and further progressing” with the values of early 20th century despite the clear path of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Thus, the Republican reforms implemented reflected understanding of early 20th century modernity.
While the modern world has, with its social structure based on secular democracy since the second half of the 20th century, enriched its intellectual infrastructure with incredible progressive moves in education, research, science and technology, implementing modern concepts of freedom of thought, expression, the press and academy, individual rights, human rights, minority rights, independent judiciary, liberal democracy and today gender based identity rights. In this way, it has also come a long way in accessing economic and social welfare.
Turkish society, because it failed to see the significance of the priority of laicism which was the base of the Constitution of the Republic (meaning laicism comes before democracy as a prerequisite) for many years, failed to implement universal rights in the country. Hence, it could never be a state ruled by fully-fledged democracy.
A genius democratic system can only work with a governance in which laicism dominates. That is only possible with the the non-mixing of the spiritual world and the temporal world. Otherwise, secular education, basic rights and liberties, independent judiciary and justice cannot be realized. Furthermore, a non-secular system does not accept reform. Necessary developments in political, social, cultural, and scientific areas cannot be reached. Due to the erosion of laicism in theory and practice, Turkey after Atatürk relatively lagged the progress of the modern world, and entered the 21st century having fallen behind. In the past 20 years, this fall is consolidated.
When we look at the recent history of Turkey briefly, we see that mostly Sunni/Hanefi religious, conservative electorate as the carrier of the Old Turkey tradition has been a prominent force on Turkish political stage from 1950s on with the election of the Democrat Party founded by Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes.
It may be necessary to keep in mind that one of the underlying reasons of this situation was that the One-Party government times while implementing the essential principles and the reforms of the republic could not overcome the effects and depth of the religious structures that had formed the identity and life style of the society for centuries.
With the devastating impact of the war years, large social segments had already left CHP of One-Party rule and were looking for a new political outlet by 1950. It is not that possible to what kind of social and political turmoil the republic would have been dragged, had İsmet İnönü, with great foresight and common sense, not spearheaded the transition to multi-party system in 1950 and had there not been the Democrat Party founded by cadres emerging from the mainstream of the republic itself.
Yet, it is debatable to what extent Turkey would have been able to protect herself from the events taking place in primarily Egypt and the Middle East in general, and the impact of the Soviets in the less developed countries surrounding itself had it not transited to multi-party system. Those who founded the Democrat Party -all being the cadres that founded the republic and close to Atatürk- perceiving this situation followed liberal policies in the economy and politics and socially more conservative than the CHP.
This traditional, conservative mass of people consisting of a considerable portion that prioritized the concept of Umma also harbored a nationalist stream that followed the tradition of Kuvva-i Milliye (National Forces). Partially due to this reason, an influential political movement called the Turkish-Islam synthesis, having roots in the pre-Republic İttihat ve Terakki (Union and Progress) Party became active in Turkish politics under Nationalit Movement Party’s (MHP) Alpaslan Türkeş’s leadership sticking with the secular principles.
Yet, the impact of these tendencies was relatively low due to the widespread support of the masses to the modernist, industrializing, pro-European integration Justice Party (AP) of Süleyman Demirel from the latter half of 1960s on and Turgut Özal’s reformist politics that sought integration with the world economy in the aftermath of September 12 (1980).
Nevertheless, the ideological branch that this tendency of Turkish-Islam synthesis held onto in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980s against the rise of leftist politics of the 1970s, has increased its weight in Turkish politics. Under Özal rule between mid-1980s and early 1990s, it has gained power and leaned towards the Center.
This tendency from 1990s on moved away from the foundational understanding of laicism of the republic towards an increasingly daring stance and eventually evolved towards Ummah. The underlying cause behind this development is the erosion of center-right politics resulting in its gradual disappearance.
The religious, conservative voters whom the secular parties failed to reach came to power through democratic means, dominated much of right-wing politics under different names and descriptions, and gradually strengthened their positions. They have remained as an agent of change in Turkish political life.
The first serious challenge to the modern Turkish Republic on the democratic level was the National Order Party (MNP) of Necmettin Erbakan (founded on January 26, 1970 and closed on May 20, 1971) representing political Islam based on the idea of Ummah, which was outside the laic Turkish-Islam synthesis. Subsequently, it continued under the leadership of Erbakan’s leadership under different parties and on the basis of Milli Görüş (the National View).
The AKP led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born out of this movement and came to power in 2002 elections. It is still in power.
The National View perspective, different from the Turkish-Islam synthesis with the slogan of “Just Order”, followed a political line that openly challenged laicism and the fundamental principles of the republic. It embraced the global movement of political Islam (Umma) beyond national borders.
In the first ten years of its foundation, the AKP seemingly remained close to the founding principles of the Turkish Republic, including laicism. After 2010 it came closer to the National View movement.
It dreamed of the leadership of Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle Eastern Arabic world and Southeast Asia. This movement lost its impact dur to its failures of the so-called Arab Spring in the Middle East and Southeast Asia towards the end of 2010s.
The principle of non-negotiability of the first four articles of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic is still valid. Yet, a considerable portion of the society lives not on the principle of laicism as the constitution envisages but on various religious orders within the AKP structure based on conservative religiosity.
It is a major concern in large parts of society that the AKP that holds the parliamentary majority after the 2023 elections will carry Turkey down a more conservative, even Islamic path. The fact that there still is no reassuring, rationalist, problem-solving, modern, socially integrated, effective and credible opposition and the frustration of the 2023 elections plays a big role.
However, it is needless to underline that the evolution of a dynamic society shaped mainly by the metamorphosis of the Right from a secular democratic government to an Islamic structure would have overwhelming consequences on global balances.
Social changes start from big cities. The vast majority of our population live in urban areas. Lives of this majority is similar to the daily lives of the people in European metropoles in many aspects. Young generations harmonious with rationality and science that Atatürk left the republic to, are educated at universities in the urban areas. Successful businessman and civil servants reside in urban areas.
If the industrialized new metropolitan society goes on to progress economically and culturally, our deficiency in basic rights will be revised in natural ways in its due course and there will be a higher probability towards more accord and similarity between the Western life style and ours.
Two crucial developments that gained significance in the past 20 years make it difficult to sustain optimism in terms of the progress of our metropolitan culture towards Western style progressive democracy.
The first of these developments is the cultural and political penetration of religious orders in our cities; the second is the refugee problem (roughly of 15 million and more)[2].
Both are problems that challenge the Turkish people’s opt for Western style progressive democracy. If this option disappears because of these two and the like problems, Turkey’s movement away from science and rationality altogether and the devastation of the global and huge earthquake triggered with the breaking of this fault line will rise as a self-fulfilling prophecy facing humanity.
The only way that will prevent the rise of this disaster scenario from theory to practice can still be found in the claim of the Turkish youth for Western democracies. Much of the Turkish youth have indeed proven, though mostly individually, their abilities to compete in science, arts and sports.
This is not only a personal wish but a call of Atatürk in the unforgettable ‘Address to the Turkish Youth’ that extends to today.
Translation: Prof. Dr. Seda Ünsar
[1] The phases of change in CHP, SHP, and other pro-labor parties and the role that their respected leaders played in the republic are out of scope for this article. [2] It is highly debatable whether or not religious orders in Muslim societies serve to understand Islam, and in case the refugee number in any liberal society exceeds a particular level, whether this situation paradoxically serves to fuel ethnic racism.On October 30th, the European Commission published its annual report assessing the candidate countries' progress…
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