Türkiye’s cross-border strategy: Codes of Ministers’ PKK briefing

“If we had not been there, the organization’s attacks on our borders would have continued as before and we would have paid a higher price in our own cities,” Yaşar Güler said on January 16 as he and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan briefed the Turkish Grand National Assembly in response to the PKK attack to Turkish forces in Northern Iraq on January 12, in which 9 soldiers were killed.

The both ministers’ speeches can be summarized with this sentence from Güler. But that was not all they said, and when you strip out the revenge-themed reactionary statements in both ministers’ speeches, what is left is Türkiye’s new foreign and security policy – not only in terms of the PKK.

In this respect, it is possible to read Defense Minister Güler’s speech as focusing on the past and present of this security strategy, and Fidan’s speech as focusing on the present and future.

“We abolished the distinction between Syria and Iraq”

In his speech, Güler emphasized that Türkiye started conducting cross-border operations in the 1990s and explained the difference by saying that “limited targeted and periodical” military operations were replaced by “continuous and comprehensive” operations from 2016 onwards. This seems to be another expression of President Tayyip Erdoğan’s oft-stated goal of “eliminating the threat at its source.”

As Fidan emphasized in his speech, the “power vacuum and political fragmentation” in Syria and Iraq, which helped the PKK increase its influence on the southern borders, has been turned into an opportunity that Türkiye has used to its advantage since 2016.

“We have eliminated the distinction between Syria and Iraq,” says Fidan, former head of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and now Foreign Minister; “No matter where the attack comes from, we target both areas at the same time.”

These words complement Güler’s statement that there is cooperation with Iraqi authorities, but that operations will continue “even if Iraq does not meet expectations.”

PKK is loading at the crossing points

The Defense Minister told the Turkish Grand National Assembly about the analysis of the PKK’s attacks on December 22, 2023 and January 16, 2024, saying that “reaching Zap, the heart of the terrorists, caused the organization to put its last resistance seriously in the Operation Claw-Lock (Pençe-Kilit) area.”

They were resisting the closure of their passageways to Türkiye. With the joint operations of the Turkish Armed Forces and MİT, “terrorist arms and ammunition transfers into the country were brought to an end, and actions in the country were minimized.” According to Güler, this is why they were attacking the endpoints and base areas that guarded the passes in the Claw-Lock area.

Güler also said that “many base areas” were attacked simultaneously with these attacks, but others were prevented. Thanks to this “base zone strategy, a secure line with an average depth of 15 to 30 kilometers was established along the 300-kilometer-long Turkish-Iraqi border strip stretching from Sinat-Haftani to Hakurk.”

When attention turned to Gaza

Fidan said that the PKK, which “had to move its activities mainly across the border”, “has now become a national security threat to Syria and Iraq rather than Türkiye.” According to Fidan, the PKK, whose “expiration date” had expired, was reminding itself with these actions “in an environment where the attention of international public opinion was focused on Gaza.” Let us recall that before briefing the Parliament, the Foreign Minister, pointing to the escalation of tensions in the Middle East, from Yemen and the Red Sea to Iran’s attack on Iraq, spoke of the danger of “the spiral of war in Gaza turning into a vortex.”

Why 2016?

Both Güler and Fidan say that 2016 was the turning point in Türkiye’s strategy to fight the PKK, but they do not say that the main reason for 2016 was the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, which they both know very well. The beginning of the change in strategy was the Euphrates Shield operation launched in Syria on August 24, 2016, centered on Jarabulus. It was only five weeks after the coup attempt, which left the Turkish Armed Forces looking divided.

It was Türkiye’s decision to ensure its own security despite the US, which it saw as behind July 15. It was preceded by US President Barack Obama’s decision to cooperate with the PKK’s Syrian branch against ISIS in Syria in the fall of 2014, the October 6-8 events, and the violence that followed the breakdown of the dialogue with Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in 2015 over MİT (i.e. Fidan) and the HDP. A lot of blood was shed in Ankara and Istanbul in ISIS and PKK attacks, and there are traces of this in Güler’s speech.

Although 2016 is cited as the turning point, the failure to mention July 15th seems to be an effort not to escalate the issue diplomatically at a critical juncture with the US, while “stating” that the US is behind the PKK.

Gaza, PKK, NATO

Moreover, in his speech, Fidan states that Russia is also providing “technological and military equipment support” to the organization west of the Euphrates. It is noteworthy that Fidan also mentioned Sweden’s recent positive attitude.

The statements of both the defense and foreign ministers indicate that the strategy of “eliminating the threat at its source” will continue with new dimensions. Not only the PKK’s recent attacks, but also Russia’s war against Ukraine in the north, as well as the Gaza crisis – with its danger of spillover – will not end soon.

This raises the possibility that Erdogan will risk fulfilling US President Joe Biden’s promise of F-16s by getting Sweden’s NATO membership approved by Parliament in the near future. Erdoğan and his cabinet may be calculating that such a decision would reduce the burden on the diplomatic front, even if it increases the domestic political burden a bit, ahead of the March 31 local elections.