Ankara’s diplomatic surge in Middle East: Beyond the PKK dimension

February 9 might mark a beginning of a new era in relations with the U.S. and Türkiye, depending on the news about the F-16 sales expected from Congress.

It would be prudent to be cautious, but the US State Department’s statement on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expected visit to Türkiye can be considered one of these signs.

“If any country is able to play a meaningful role in stopping Russia from some of its malign behavior, we certainly would welcome it,” US State Department Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel said, on Feb. 5, debunking rumors circulating in Ankara dipolamatic circles for the past few months which suggest there will be problems in US and EU relations with possible Putin visit.

Although Patel’s sentence emphasizes “any country”, Türkiye is the only NATO country that maintains relations with Russia.

Putin was expected to arrive in Türkiye shortly after President Tayyip Erdoğan approved Sweden’s NATO membership and opened the F-16 door with US President Joe Biden. Although Reuters reported that the meeting which was scheduled on February 12 is postponed for a further date “possibly April, or May”, this will be Putin’s first visit to a Western alliance country since he launched the war in Ukraine in February 2022, and it is important that he maintains a dialog with Erdogan.

Meanwhile, Ankara is increasing its diplomatic traffic with the Middle East.

Military in Iraq after MİT

In this process, Erdoğan has reduced the intensity of his reaction to Israel over the Gaza Crisis – compared to the first few months – and is once again trying to get involved in Israel-Hamas relations, and he is particularly focusing on relations with Iraq.

The head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Ibrahim Kalın, traveled to Iraq twice in a row last week and last week to Qatar to discuss the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and prisoner exchange.

This week, Minister of National Defense Yaşar Güler and Chief of General Staff General Metin Gürak are in Iraq. Güler and Gürak were in Baghdad on February 6 for high-level talks with Iraqi government officials. On February 7, they traveled to Erbil, the seat of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The two met with KRG President Nechirvan Barzani, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Massoud Barzani.

In Baghdad, Güler and Gürak met not only with their counterpart Thabit al-Abbasi, but also with President Abdullatif Rashid, Prime Minister Shiya al-Sudani, Interior Minister Kamil Shammari and Undersecretary for National Security Qassem Husseini.

The first thing that comes to mind is that this increase in traffic in relations with Iraq is a sign that Türkiye and Iraq are working on cooperation in the fight against the PKK, in which the KDP, the ruling party in the Kurdish Federation of Iraq, is expected to contribute.

Relations do not only have a PKK dimension

Abbasi, along with officials from the Iraqi intelligence apparatus al-Muhaberat, joined the delegation of his counterpart Fuad Hussein, who came to Ankara on December 19 as a guest of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and a high-level security meeting was held with the participation of Güler and Kalın.

Kalın’s trips to Baghdad, Kirkuk and Erbil, Güler and Gürak’s trips to Baghdad and Erbil could be seen as an attempt to put pressure on the PKK’s effective presence in the Qandil Mountains in Iraq’s border region with Türkiye and Iran, which has been in place since the early 1980s, due to the possibility of normalization in relations with the US.

However, this revival in relations with Iraq has other dimensions besides the fight against the PKK.

• For example, the resumption of regular operation of the oil pipelines connecting Kirkuk and Mosul oil to Adana’s Ceyhan port.
• For example, the shelving of the long-rumored project to open a new border crossing outside Habur.
• For example, the “Development Road” project, a combination of roads and railroads that would start from the Persian Gulf and cross the country from south to north to reach the Turkish border.

PKK, ISIS, Al-Qaeda: security is essential

The Development Road project, which also brings to mind the Basra-Berlin railway project before the First World War, could turn into a strategic alternative for trade relations not only between Europe and the Middle East, but also Russia-Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia via the Black Sea, if it can be realized. During Sudani’s visit to Ankara on March 21, 2023, a joint declaration of will with Erdogan was announced. Since then, developments such as the outbreak of the Gaza Crisis and the Red Sea-Suez ceased to be considered a safe trade route has opened up the possibility of the Development Road project, with its pipeline reinforcements, becoming an alternative for Gulf oil and gas.

Of course, this requires a strong security shield not only against the PKK, but also against ISIS, al-Qaeda and Iranian Revolutionary Guards proxy organizations.

Support for the Israel-Hamas initiative

Shortly after Kalın’s meeting with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Qatar, Hamas announced that it was not yet ready for a second ceasefire and prisoner exchange agreement with Israel.

Ankara, too, was hesitant about this deal, which had been matured with the mediation of Egypt and Qatar, and did not want to be left out of the picture as it had been with the first deal. In the aftermath of the Gaza Crisis, relations not only with Israel but also with Hamas were severed.

According to diplomatic sources, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, in a phone call with Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdurrahman Al Thani on the evening of February 6, expressed Türkiye’s support for the framework presented by Qatar and Egypt. Later in the day, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also expressed hope for a new agreement.
However, it is known that there are those in both the Hamas and Israeli leaderships who oppose a ceasefire and prisoner exchange.