Turkish move in Niger as France loses influence in West Africa

In Türkiye’s busy agenda, the visit of a high-level Turkish delegation to Niger on July 17 should be read as an important stage in the Türkiye-France rivalry that has recently come to the fore in Africa, beyond extensive bilateral contacts and agreements. The oil and gas agreements signed with the West African country of Niger do not give us a complete picture.

The composition of the Turkish delegation that participated in the one-day trip to Niger may give an idea. The delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and included Yaşar Güler, Minister of National Defense; Alparslan Bayraktar, Minister of Energy; İbrahim Kalın, Director of National Intelligence; Volkan Ağar, Deputy Minister of Trade; and Haluk Görgün, President of Defense Industries.

Apart from President Tayyip Erdoğan, the entire staff that could take part in a high-level official visit. One reason for this is that Niger’s government was changed by a coup d’état a year ago on July 26, 2023; the head of state is the leader of this coup, General Abdurrahmane Tchiani. Erdoğan may not have wanted to visit the coup leader, but this is where the issue begins.

Somalia in the East, Niger in the West

What Foreign Minister Fidan said about his contacts with Niger goes beyond the “Türkiye is seeking a uranium deal with Niger” claims, which was immediately denied by the Communications Department of the Turkish Presidency; Russia was going to bring enriched uranium to the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Türkiye.

Fidan said that they discussed with the Niger administration “a number of issues including counter-terrorism, education, energy, health, trade, security and defense”, in the order he listed, and his following words draw attention:

• “As we did in Somalia, we discussed what can be done to improve the defense industry and intelligence capacity in Niger within the framework of the fight against terrorism. We also discussed what steps we will take against terrorism, which is the main source of instability in the Sahel region.”

Türkiye has long established very close relations with Somalia in eastern Africa. Türkiye has one of itslargest embassies in the world in Mogadishu. Turkish Navy protects the Somali coast for the next 10 years and a Somali Navy will be formed together. Türkiye also has oil and gas exploration and extraction rights.

Ankara is now pursuing a similar policy of extensive cooperation with Niger in West Africa.

Türkiye and recent coups in Africa

The Sahel region is boiling. Having officially lost its colonies in Africa, starting with Algeria, France is now struggling not to lose its sphere of influence.

As soon as Tchiani took over, he annulled the agreements between the US and France and Niger; there is no longer a French embassy in the capital Niamey. The French and US troops that were in the country to counter the threat from Boko Haram, al-Qaeda’s coastal branch, and JNIM, the sub-Saharan branch of ISIS, have also withdrawn – but to no avail, according to Niger officials.

A similar situation exists in Niger’s two neighbors, Mali and Burkina Faso. In Mali, Assimi Goita leads the junta, the National Committee for the Liberation of the People, which came to power in a coup d’état on August 28, 2020. Burkina Faso is led by Ibrahim Traore, who came to power in a coup d’état on September 30, 2022, overthrowing the previous coup regime.

Principles or pragmatism

The reason I mention Niger and its two neighbors is that on July 6, just over two weeks ago, the three neighbors declared the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), breaking away from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which suspended the membership of these three countries until their transition to democracy. The AES differs from ECOWAS in that it envisages both economic and military cooperation.

Fidan’s reference to “instability in the Sahel region” is a reference to this new organization. The three poverty-stricken, land-lock neighbors have no access to the sea and therefore need external support to survive.

As Türkiye seeks to strengthen Niger and the AES, it is also taking a stand against French influence in West Africa. This is a departure from President Erdoğan’s 2013 decision to cut – and now re-establish – ties with Egypt in reaction to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who seized power in Egypt in a coup d’état. This shows a pragmatist stance centered on Türkiye’s interests rather than an ideological stance, at least on this move.

Türkiye, NATO and French influence

There is one more detail. All three African countries are considering the support of Russian Wagner mercenaries in their fight against Al-Qaeda and ISIS. In other words, there is an option where French and American troops leave but NATO-member Türkiye could fill in instead of Russian mercenaries.

The most important factor that still binds ECOWAS countries to France is the use of the African Franc (CFA) as a common currency, which Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni denounces as France’s “neo- colonialist robbery” in Africa.

In other words, there is no consensus not only within NATO but also within the European Union on France’s influence over its former colonies in Africa.

Looking at Türkiye’s opening to Niger with these evaluations clarifies the picture. Türkiye wants to establish itself in West Africa after East Africa as an option that promotes itself on the basis of common interests with those countries and it is making progress.