Abbas in Ankara: What would Erdoğan do if he criticizes Hamas?

A recent claim has set diplomatic circles abuzz. Ömer Önhon, Türkiye’s last ambassador to Damascus before ties were severed, suggested in an Arabic newspaper El Mecelle that President Erdogan might arrange a meeting between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leadership in Ankara. Abbas is scheduled to address the Turkish Parliament on August 15. While not unprecedented as Abbas met Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Ankara just last year in July, the current context is markedly different.

Haniyeh was killed in Tehran and his replacement by the hardline Yahya Sinvar, who have spent his years in Israeli prisons, have shifted the landscape. Meanwhile, the U.S. has ramped up its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, citing potential Iranian retaliation against Israel. Congress has just greenlit another $20 billion in military aid for Israel.

Abbas is aware of these developments.

Post-Haniyeh: Hamas and Gaza

Major Western powers Britain, France, Germany and Italy, are firmly backing Israel with their full diplomatic, military, and intelligence might. Hamas leadership, sheltered in Qatar—home to the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East—is caught between seeking vengeance and guarding against potential Israeli strikes. The toll in Gaza continues to mount, with Palestinian casualties from Israel’s military operation since October 7 now exceeding 40,000.

Abbas hasn’t forgotten how Hamas, after winning the 2006 elections, forcibly expelled his Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from the territory. He’s also cognizant of U.S. Secretary of State Blinken’s recent overture to Türkiye, urging it to persuade Hamas towards an agreement with Israel.

Given these circumstances, and with Türkiye-Israel communication channels largely severed, (we don’t know about the intelligence) it’s questionable whether Hamas -now led by the uncompromising Sinvar- would view Türkiye as an effective mediator.

The same question applies to Abbas.

Erdoğan’s diplomatic misstep

Erdoğan’s recent public rebuke of Abbas for declining an invitation, demanding an apology, was ill-advised. It not only broadcast Türkiye’s diminishing influence in Palestinian affairs but also failed to consider the immense pressures on a leader whose people face daily existential threats.

At the time, Abbas was engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Egyptian, Qatari, and U.S. officials, desperately seeking to halt Israeli aggression. The source of the ceasefire, be it Erdogan, Sisi, Biden, or Putin, was immaterial to him.

Now, Abbas comes to Ankara via Moscow, having met with Putin at his dacha, Novo-Ogaryovo, a venue reserved for high-priority diplomatic engagements (similar to US Presidents’ Camp David).

The public statements from the Moscow meeting were predictably bland. Russia was on Palestine’s side, favored a two-state solution, would do everything possible to ensure a ceasefire, and so on.

Abbas: A Seasoned Diplomat

The mere ordinariness of Putin and Abbas’s statements actually hints at more substantive private discussions.

Few may realize that Abbas speaks Russian. After his higher education in Damascus, where Israel exiled his family in 1948, he completed his postgraduate and doctoral studies at the Peoples’ Friendship University (also known as Patrice Lumumba University), which served to increase the Soviet Union’s influence in third world countries during that era. Or that he long served as Fatah’s diplomatic conduit to Moscow, which he co-founded with Yasser Arafat?

In addition to these connections with Moscow, Abbas has been at the forefront of those within Fatah (and the PLO) who argue that reconciliation is in the best interest of the Palestinian people. He was the first politician within the PLO to propose that they should talk with Israel.

This won’t be Abbas’s debut at the Turkish Parliament. He previously addressed the assembly during President Gül’s tenure, sharing the platform (albeit separately) with then-Israeli President Peres.

As Erdogan plans to attend Abbas’s upcoming speech, a pivotal question emerges: Will Abbas critique Hamas, either explicitly or implicitly?

A Window for diplomatic reset

Actually, with Abbas’s diplomatic experience and capacity that could outmaneuver most diplomats, I don’t think he’ll say anything that would put Erdogan in a difficult position in front of his own people. Instead, he’ll likely seek to rebuild bridges with Erdoğan.

Since 2006, Türkiye has increasingly aligned itself with Hamas in Palestinian affairs, a stance that has proven problematic.  It wasn’t right to declare Hamas, and only Hamas, as Palestine’s liberation movement, as if the PLO had no history or struggle. While this approach resonated with domestic sentiment against Israeli actions in Gaza and earned plaudits from Hamas, it eroded Türkiye’s historically nuanced role in the Palestinian issue that it had been building since the 1970s.

Currently, the U.S. views Türkiye’s role primarily as a potential mediator to bring Hamas to the negotiating table—a significant narrowing of Türkiye’s previous influence.

It would be prudent for Erdoğan to reciprocate Abbas’s outreach by re-engaging with him, meaning PLO.

Türkiye’s multifaceted stake in the Palestinian issue -historical, geographical, political, and moral- demands a more balanced approach rather than exclusive reliance on Hamas.

Abbas’s visit presents a crucial opportunity for recalibration. It’s an opening that Türkiye would do well to seize.