Türkiye’s new constitution debate masks deeper conflicts

We can no longer consider the new constitution discussions as merely a ploy to divert attention from the people’s economic struggles. These debates, tiresome even before being officially announced, have taken on a life of their own.

The public is largely indifferent to the new constitution; there’s a widespread belief that the real motive behind it is to clear the path for the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s fourth term. Meanwhile, millions are grappling with the cost of living crisis. As a new week dawns, do you really think millions will be discussing the overblown weekend debate about the Constitution’s third article?

Instead, millions are talking about ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Parliamentary Group Chair Abdullah Güler’s proposal to deduct what’s essentially an unnamed tax from credit cards.

Constitution discussions: Futile attempts at misdirection

Politics is a game of perception. The announcement about the new bill stipulating additional fees for the Defense Industry Support Fund from credit cards, real estate and vehicle transactions, and even electronic watch purchases came suspiciously close to Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş and President Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements about Israel supposedly eyeing Türkiye.

It was obvious that anyone opposing this measure would face low-blow accusations like “Are you against national defense?” Yet, citizens connected the dots, concluding that the Israel threat was being wielded to push through this tax-in-all-but-name.

Few bought into the Israel threat anyway. The idea that Israel, known for bullying its neighbors, would suddenly target Türkiye didn’t add up. Rightly or wrongly, people saw through it as the government’s clumsy attempt to shift the narrative.

And now, we’re back to debating the Constitution.

It started with Hüda-Par, the anti-Republic and anti-secularism member of the People’s Alliance, calling for changes to the first four articles. The nation bristled. Leading the opposition, as he should, was Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş.

Now, a tempest in a teapot over the third article has erupted, triggered by one of Kurtulmuş’s speeches.

High-level discord

Kurtulmuş’s October 10 speech at Gazi University flew under the radar at first—perhaps because everyone was fixated on the credit card tax—only to explode onto the agenda on October 12, with reactions pouring in by October 13.

The Parliament Speaker suggested changing the phrase “the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation” to “the indivisible integrity of the nation with its state and territory.”

This phrase is enshrined in the Constitution’s third article, a fact the media was quick to highlight.

The irony? Kurtulmuş had just days earlier shut down any discussion of altering the first four articles. Opposition parties, led by CHP leader Özgür Özel, and Bar Associations were up in arms, but the most eyebrow-raising response came from the Presidency itself.

Erdoğan’s Chief Legal Advisor, Mehmet Uçum, took to his “X” account, declaring that even opening discussions about changes to the phrase “the indivisible integrity of the Republic of Türkiye with its territory and nation” was “both inappropriate and problematic.” He asserted that this, like other core principles in the first four articles, was off-limits for debate.

Who’s behind the “perception operation”?

Kurtulmuş quickly backpedaled during a visit to Turkish associations in Geneva, claiming his speech never touched on the Third Article and dismissing the controversy as a “perception operation.”

But with the Presidency already having weighed in, one has to wonder: could this whole affair be an elaborate diversion tactic?

On one front, the AKP, now with MHP’s backing, hints at a new approach to the Kurdish issue, framing it within the context of a new Constitution. Simultaneously, a debate that the MHP would normally oppose vehemently is playing out in the media.

Moreover, this controversy is heating up just as rumors swirl about Erdoğan’s plans for major shakeups in both his cabinet and AKP leadership. It’s clear that Erdoğan is preparing to hold certain individuals and factions accountable for the March 31, 2024 election setback, after months of deliberation.

Constitution or AKP’s internal dynamics

If there is indeed a “perception operation” as Kurtulmuş claims, odds are it’s an inside job.

Perhaps some within the AKP are uneasy about Kurtulmuş’s emerging role as a moderating force. Yet, surely no one forced Kurtulmuş to argue—even if he didn’t explicitly mention the third article—that changing its wording was necessary.

There’s a stark contrast between CHP and AKP when it comes to internal affairs. In CHP, dirty laundry is aired publicly. In AKP, fear of Erdoğan usually keeps things under wraps—until they explode unexpectedly, as we’re seeing now.

What initially appears to be a mere distraction often reveals deeper, more complex conflicts simmering beneath the surface of Türkiye’s ruling party.