Türkish intelligence pushes for “Influence Espionage Law”

Turkish National Intelligence Organization’s (MİT) Legal Counsel Fuat Midas explains the concept of “Influence Espionage” through examples, without naming specific countries: “Consider a scenario where someone plans to assassinate a foreign national in a third country. They’re trafficking explosives and materials through our country from another country in the East. They intend to use our country as a transit point to carry out this operation in a third country. When we detect and arrest this person, they can only be charged under Law No. 6136 for unauthorized transport of explosives.”

Midas provides another example, this time specifically mentioning a country: “Take a foreign national residing in Sweden who visits our country. While they’re here on vacation or business, another country’s intelligence service attempts to kidnap them using a local drug gang as proxies. They execute the operation by exploiting the target’s personal vulnerabilities. When we apprehend these individuals, they receive only a prison sentence of one year and twelve months. Why? Because they can only be charged with unlawful detention.”

MIT’s case for “Influence Espionage”

Midas presented these examples during the Parliament’s Justice Commission convened on October 23, 2024, to demonstrate why incorporating the concept of Influence Espionage into law is a “necessity” for both the “Organization and the state.”

The legislation is scheduled for discussion on November 12, in the Parliament’s General Assembly as part of the “Bill on Amendments to the Notary Law and Various Other Laws.” Like its passage through the Justice Commission, it’s expected to be approved with votes from the AKP and MHP.

Midas’s other examples form a conceptual framework. He argues that modern espionage has evolved beyond the Cold War-era methods currently defined in Turkish law, such as collecting and selling information and documents to foreign powers. He points out that Eastern countries particularly exploit legal gaps in Western jurisdictions by establishing front companies and manipulating local businesses and citizens. These new-generation espionage tactics damage Türkiye’s international relations and paint the country as a playground for intelligence services and criminal organizations. Since these activities fall outside the current legal definition of espionage, they’re merely treated as ordinary crimes.

Heated debates in the Commission

The Legal Counsel’s presentation sparked debate and questions from both opposition and ruling party members in the Justice Commission.

Commission President Cüneyt Yüksel from the AKP raised a pertinent question with another example: what would happen if a real estate agent unwittingly became entangled in an intelligence operation?

Constitutional law expert Serap Yazıcı Özbudun of the Future Party called for Article 16’s withdrawal, arguing that its vague definitions of crimes and punishments violate Article 2 of the Constitution.

CHP’s Cumhur Uzun offered a pragmatic approach: “If the current Turkish Criminal Code is inadequate for combating evolving forms of espionage, tell us specifically what’s needed, and we’ll address it immediately. As parliamentarians, we’re ready to act—but let’s do so without compromising our citizens’ legal protections.”

What the amendment proposes

While the term “Influence Espionage” doesn’t appear in the legislation itself, it’s commonly used in Türkiye and internationally to describe these provisions.

The contested article, which opposition MPs want withdrawn, adds a new offense to the Turkish Criminal Code’s “Crimes Against State Secrets and Espionage” section: “committing crimes against state security or political interests.”

The proposed law would impose prison sentences of three to seven years on “those who commit crimes aligned with the strategic interests or directives of a foreign state or organization against state security and domestic or foreign political interests.”

This broadens the definition of espionage beyond traditional information gathering to include criminal acts committed for espionage purposes, aiming to strengthen counter-espionage capabilities.

Critics focus on two main issues: vagueness and unconstitutionality. The term “political interests” is particularly problematic—it’s exceptionally broad and could be interpreted to serve whatever political agenda the ruling power favors. Moreover, legitimate activities like news gathering and information sharing, protected under press and expression freedoms, could be criminalized under this loosely defined category.

Press freedom and freedom of expression

Yusuf Kanlı, Vice President of the Journalists Association, representing 13 media organizations at the Commission, warned that the proposed Influence Espionage concept “strikes at the heart of free expression, rule of law, transparency, and separation of powers.” He emphasized that “This threatens not just journalists but every citizen’s fundamental right to information access.”

Kanlı further argued that the concept’s abstract definitions and weakening of democratic oversight render it unconstitutional.

Hilal Döner, speaking for Amnesty International‘s Ankara Office and representing 20 human rights organizations, cautioned that the bill’s passage would endanger everyone’s rights to information access and free expression—from civil society organizations to journalists and human rights defenders.

She warned that NGOs working on human rights violations and social issues could face criminal charges for activities arbitrarily deemed contrary to state interests.

The consensus among critics is clear: this law, as written, would further constrict Türkiye’s already limited freedoms of press, expression, and association. Like defamation laws, it appears vulnerable to abuse as a tool against civil rights.

Influence espionage: a fundamental contradiction

There’s a dangerous precedent in allowing governments to weaponize laws for political advantage through the judiciary—today’s tool could become tomorrow’s weapon when power changes hands.

MIT Legal Counsel Midas’s examples align with recent real-world cases.

Consider the Israeli intelligence operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, executed through a front electronics company in Hungary.

In his Commission testimony, Midas referenced recent operations against Israel’s MOSSAD, noting how despite numerous initial arrests, few suspects remained in custody because “traditional espionage charges don’t apply to these modern methods,” leaving only “two individuals facing possible conviction.”

While his argument has merit—legal gaps may indeed contribute to Türkiye becoming a haven for intelligence operations and criminal organizations alongside corruption and conflicting interests—the proposed solution raises concerns.

Instead of pushing the country toward a police state model with vaguely defined crimes, legislators could follow CHP member Uzun’s suggestion to make targeted amendments to the Criminal Code.

As it stands, the Influence Espionage provision seems destined for challenge before the Constitutional Court.