Chaos in Syria: Regime hands positions to YPG, Türkiye on high alert

Opposition forces in Syria achieve unprecedented advances through offensive operations.

In my article published in Al Majalla on November 26, 2024, I explained how Bashar Assad had maintained his grip on power through the civil war with Russian and Iranian backing, gaining the upper hand against opposition forces. However, unlike his father Hafez’s decisive victory against the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Syria during the 1980s, he failed to achieve total control. Roughly 30-35 percent of the country remained beyond his reach, harboring tens of thousands of armed fighters and militants.

In a surprising turn of events, previously feuding armed groups – including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Syrian National Army affiliates, and other opposition factions – have set aside their conflicts over territory and border crossing revenues to launch a coordinated military campaign. The operation marks a stark departure from their past rivalry.

The participating forces demonstrate unprecedented professionalism, operating in standardized uniforms with military discipline. They’re well-equipped and, for the first time, employing armed drones in their operations.

Syria: Where does Türkiye stand in this?

While Türkiye officially states it has no involvement, both domestic and international observers widely believe the operation would be impossible without Turkish support.

As this report written, opposition forces have secured control of all of Idlib, nearly all of rural Aleppo, and substantial portions of Aleppo city itself.

Assad’s regime has acknowledged a “tactical withdrawal” from Aleppo.

Security sources indicate regime forces have largely ceded these territories to the YPG.

Opposition forces have captured the strategic town of Saraqib, a crucial junction where the M4 and M5 highways divide toward Latakia and Damascus.

In a symbolically significant victory, opposition forces have also taken the Shiite enclaves of Nubl and al-Zahra in northwestern Aleppo.

YPG-controlled Tel Rifaat remains under siege.

The opposition has pushed into neighborhoods of Hama, 190 kilometers from Damascus along the M-5 highway, with the city’s full capture appearing imminent.

What is Russia doing in Syria?

Russia’s support for Assad has been notably restrained this time, with Russian forces largely avoiding direct engagement, though their aircraft have conducted limited bombing runs against opposition positions.

Preoccupied with Ukraine, Russia appears reluctant to open another major front in Syria. Their strategic focus seems limited to maintaining control of Tartus port and Hmeymim air base while preserving influence over Damascus, whether through Assad or an alternative leader.

Nevertheless, Russia has likely established clear red lines in Syria, though their exact nature remains speculative at this stage.

Hezbollah dissolves while Iran…

The operation has exposed the limitations of Iran’s proxy forces, particularly Hezbollah. Many of their most agressive fighters against the opposition in Syria have returned to Lebanon to confront Israel, leaving Hezbollah – already weakened by weeks of Israeli strikes – unable to sustain operations on two fronts.

None of the major players in Syria (Türkiye, Russia, USA, Israel) appear troubled by Iran’s setbacks.

Even elements within Assad’s regime share this sentiment. While Iran provided crucial support, their aggressive efforts to expand influence and promote Shiism have generated significant internal resistance.

In short, one outcome of this operation will be the breaking of Iran’s influence in Syria.

YPG and USA

The Kurdish dimension of the operation is noteworthy.

During their withdrawal from Aleppo, regime forces transferred control of key strategic assets – including the airport, weapons depots, and water treatment facilities – to YPG units brought in from east of the Euphrates.

While the YPG subsequently withdrew from the airport, they’ve consolidated their presence in the corridor between Tel Rifaat and Aleppo. Reports indicate ongoing clashes between YPG and opposition forces in Aleppo’s Kurdish districts of Sheikh Maksoud and Ashrafiyeh.

A critical question emerges: will the opposition’s campaign against Assad evolve into direct conflict with the YPG?

Such an escalation would significantly complicate the situation and test US commitments in the region.

Washington’s muted response to HTS (a group evolved from Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra and listed as a terrorist organization) and the relatively favorable coverage of its leader Abu Mohammed Golani in American media should also be noted.

Coup claims while army dissolves

The regime’s military shows limited resistance against opposition advances, hampered by insufficient troop numbers to maintain territorial control.

Assad appears to have opted for a strategic consolidation, focusing on defending the regime’s core territories along the Damascus-Homs-Tartus-Latakia corridor, acknowledging his limited military resources.

While the opposition’s potential advance on Damascus remains uncertain, continued military dissolution could embolden such a move.

Recent unverified reports suggest internal turmoil, including an alleged coup attempt by security force elements led by Intelligence Chief Major General Husam Luka, a Sunni of Circassian background, shortly after Assad’s return from Moscow. As the saying goes, where there’s smoke, there’s fire.

Internal challenges to regime authority in Damascus wouldn’t be unprecedented, given similar episodes during both the Syrian Arab Republic’s history and Hafez Assad’s era.

Türkiye while Assad regime weakens

Despite Assad’s recent declaration that “I remain in control and we will defeat the terrorists,” his regime faces its most severe crisis since 2011.

Türkiye’s response to this chaos will inevitably prioritize its national interests.

Ankara strongly opposes any expansion of YPG influence in Aleppo and surrounding areas.

While hoping that the Turkish army won’t need to launch a new military operation in Syrian territory, this possibility can’t be ruled out.

The opposition’s territorial gains potentially benefit Türkiye’s refugee policy, as many Syrian refugees in Türkiye originate from Aleppo and Idlib regions.

This offensive might create a window for diplomatic progress, potentially leading to negotiations under terms more favorable to Turkish interests.

Astana process at a crossroads

The Astana Process partners – Türkiye, Iran, and Russia – maintain diplomatic contact through their Foreign Ministers, with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi scheduled to visit Ankara on December 2.

However, Türkiye faces several significant risks:

• Prolonged regional instability
• YPG establishment of permanent autonomous zones
• Armed opposition groups starting to fight among themselves
• Extremist groups adopting ISIS-like structures
• Possibility of new refugee flows toward Türkiye

Current battlefield momentum favors the opposition as regime forces retreat, but the situation remains highly fluid and complex. Any definitive predictions would be premature, and no party can claim decisive victory at this stage.