HTS: Wolf in sheep’s clothing or the West’s new “Moderate Islamist”?

While his loyal deputies of his oligarchic regime awaited an address from Bashar Assad, he reportedly fled to Moscow with his family.

At the Doha press conference on December 8 when questioned about this, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s response was telling – rather than saying:

“We don’t know,” he stated “I cannot comment, he’s likely outside Syria.” The answer suggests that Assad might have traveled to Russia via Türkiye with special authorization.

As he made his way to Moscow, some of his loyal deputies had already begun collaborating with the HTS leadership on transitional governance.

Ladies and gentlemen, welcome back to the Middle East.

HTS and Jolani: A remarkable Ttransformation

Ahmed al-Shara, just 42 years old, known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (or Golani, named after his family’s origins in the Israeli-occupied Golan) established Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) by breaking away from al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate in 2017.

His CNN International interview during the advance on Hama, following Aleppo’s capture, revealed a striking transformation gone was the turban and unkempt beard of his past appearances.

Instead, he appeared as if professionally styled, bareheaded with an almost “hipster-like” trimmed beard. His rhetoric about respecting religious and sectarian diversity signaled a potential shift from takfiri ideology toward mainstream political Islamism.

Yesterday evening, journalist Dilek Zaptçıoğlu posted on X: “I’m currently watching German television extol Jolani’s virtues.” Apparently, his organization HTS is now portrayed as “woke and green” and tolerant of Christians – quite a transformation for a UN-designated terrorist organization and its leader, who still has a bounty on his head.

Are we witnessing the emergence of a manufactured Islamist?

The “Moderate Islamist” narrative revisited with HTS?

Is Jolani truly deceiving everyone, or is he the latest iteration of the “moderate Islamist” archetype frequently constructed by Western strategists, particularly American ones?

Let me be direct: During the early years of the Afghan war, the mujahideen receiving training and equipment through US-Saudi-Pakistani intelligence cooperation against Soviet occupation were also labeled “moderate Islamists.” Both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda emerged from their ranks.

The Fethullah Gülen Movement was similarly celebrated as an example of “interfaith dialogue” and “moderate Islam” – we all know how that ended. In American political discourse, “moderate Islamist” typically denotes organizations temporarily aligned with Western interests. Is HTS being positioned as the newest “moderate Islamist” group?

Another possibility exists: Could Jolani be a pragmatic politician who views Islamism as a disposable political garment, something to be worn or discarded as circumstances demand, while telling each audience exactly what they want to hear?

Is President Erdoğan’s cautious optimism about Syria’s regime change solely due to Türkiye’s lack of full control over HTS, or does it also stem from doubts about Jolani?

Erdoğan among the victors

The privilege of offering prayers at Damascus’s Umayyad Mosque following Assad’s fall wasn’t granted to Erdoğan or Ahmet Davutoğlu – instead, it went to HTS leader Jolani, or Ahmed Shara.

Nevertheless, it’s evident that Erdoğan will eventually pray there and leverage this achievement against the CHP and other opposition parties.

In Western perception, Erdoğan is currently viewed as the architect behind Assad’s overthrow through HTS.

Several key messages of Foreign Minister Fidan’s statements in Doha was particularly important. He called for the HTS administration to be “inclusive” and “avoid revenge”. This amounted to a request to incorporate not only Türkiye-allied Arabs and Turkmen into the administration but also Kurds and select figures from the fallen Baathist regime, including Alawites.

The Minister also addressed Syrian refugees in Turkey, indicating they “can now return to their homeland.” The initiation of these returns would significantly ease the pressure on Erdoğan.

While in the Middle East no defeat is absolute and no victory complete, Türkiye and Erdoğan currently appear to stand among the beneficiaries of these developments.

Russia and the United States

After Assad and his family, Iran heads the list of those who lost ground. Following Israel’s decimation of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership, Iran’s influence has been curtailed not only in Palestine and Lebanon but also in Syria. It’s certain, at minimum, that the HTS administration will have no need for Iranian advisers.

Russia might retain its military bases under the HTS administration through negotiations – potentially involving the Ukrainian front – albeit with restricted operations. However, it’s clear that Russia’s freedom of action in Syria will be significantly diminished compared to before.

Shortly after Donald Trump, who will assume the US Presidency on January 20, reverted to his stance from four years ago questioning American involvement in Syria, CENTCOM executed an operation against ISIS targets “in central Syria” using B-52 strategic bombers and A-10 attack aircraft. This represented one of the most intensive anti-ISIS campaigns to date, notably occurring right after Syria’s regime change. As ISIS/DAESH weakens, the priority of combating it diminishes correspondingly.

As for Britain, it maintains its characteristic role of treading lightly and leaving no traces – a perfectly understandable position.