“The wave of joy and excitement won’t last long. Once calm sets in, post-Assad Syria will face a new series of challenges: power struggles among various groups, reconstruction of infrastructure, efforts toward political reconciliation, and competition among international actors.” (Photo: AA)
Assad is gone, but I believe toughest challenge for Syria is just beginning. Israel has virtually obliterated the country’s military capabilities and occupied the Golan Heights and surrounding water and agricultural resources. The civil war has crippled infrastructure and production facilities. The Sunni majority, fractured into dozens of factions, has claimed power and prayed in the Umayyad Mosque. However, minorities like the Alawites, Druze, and Levantine Christians are deeply anxious about their future.
The collapse of Assad’s regime, following years of civil war, has naturally been a cause for celebration. Yet this does not automatically signal peace and stability for the country. On the contrary, once the brief euphoria subsides, post-Assad Syria will encounter a complex web of challenges: power struggles among various factions, the rebuilding of infrastructure, efforts to achieve political consensus, and competition among international actors.
As one chapter closes, shaping Syria’s future will require a much more intricate and comprehensive effort. In this process, establishing a unified national army, ensuring a fair and democratic political transition (embedding a culture unfamiliar to jihadist factions), and addressing Türkiye’s critical role as a leading power will be paramount.
One of the most significant steps for Syria’s future is to consolidate the fragmented structure of the country by establishing a unified national army. Under Assad’s regime, the military structure was controlled by an elite predominantly composed of Alawites. Integrating Syria’s armed groups now represents a formidable challenge but is essential for the reconstruction process.
This is not merely a military project—it requires profound political and social consensus to build a structure where diverse armed groups and ethnic and religious communities can coexist.
Bringing together groups like HTS, PYD, and the Syrian National Army under a single umbrella is both critical and incredibly challenging. The PYD fears losing its dominance in the areas it controls if it disarms and seeks to limit this to Kobani. Similarly, U.S.-backed groups in the south face similar risks. Additionally, there are thousands of foreign fighters, including Uzbeks, Uighurs, Afghans, and Chechens. What role, if any, will they play in the new Syria? Will granting them citizenship or integrating them into the national army provoke resentment among Syrians?
The U.S. could take steps like removing HTS from its terrorist list and lifting sanctions on Syrian National Army commanders. However, such moves might come with preconditions, such as limiting Damascus’ intervention in PYD-controlled areas. For the West, including the U.S. and EU, it is in their interest to support Syria’s reconstruction and democratic transition.
Meanwhile, apart from Qatar, the Arab world remains skeptical of the new administration. For lasting peace, Türkiye must leverage its current dominance on the ground while ensuring active roles for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE in the Syrian equation.
Türkiye, with its past experiences, could play a key role in forming a unified Syrian national army. If requested, under the leadership of the Turkish Armed Forces and with NATO’s training support, a professional army could be established. This would impose additional burdens on Türkiye beyond its current borders, but avoiding this responsibility may not be realistic in the current geopolitical context.
Rebuilding Syria is not just a military feat but an economic transformation. Decades of conflict have caused severe infrastructure losses and a collapsed economic system.
Syria’s reconstruction requires immense financial resources, both economically and humanitarianly. Rebuilding essential sectors like infrastructure, health, education, energy, industry, and housing will demand significant investment to restore the country to its pre-war state. This cannot be achieved with Syria’s internal resources alone; it requires international aid and external financing.
As of 2023, Syria’s GDP stands at approximately $10 billion—a stark contrast to its pre-war level of $60 billion in 2010. The war has dealt a significant economic blow, leaving the country with limited resources, devastated infrastructure, and a massive refugee population.
Estimates suggest that Syria’s reconstruction will require investments ranging between $250 billion and $400 billion. These figures encompass rebuilding infrastructure, repatriating displaced millions, reestablishing education and healthcare systems, modernizing industries, and restructuring other critical sectors.
Reconstruction cannot rely solely on external aid but must be supported by internal reforms. This requires a comprehensive reform package covering governance and legal frameworks. It is crucial to involve all segments of Syrian society, empower local governments, and create a system responsive to public demands.
By March 2025, the interim prime minister must establish a governance system, even if slowly, leaning toward democracy rather than Sharia law, which would alarm both international supporters and Syrians. Transparent and competent teams reflecting Syria’s diverse makeup must manage reconstruction efficiently to sustain external support and funding.
A new constitution must be drafted, reflecting Syria’s shared values and laying the foundation for manageable democracy and institutions. Ideally, fair and transparent elections under international observation should establish a new government by 2025.
Türkiye played a critical role in Assad’s swift ouster within 12 days, a fact acknowledged even by its critics. Expectations remain high for Türkiye to contribute to Syria’s reconstruction.
Türkiye’s involvement extends beyond border security and managing the refugee crisis. It is expected to be an active player in ensuring Syria’s long-term peace and stability. However, taking on roles beyond its capacity in Syria’s internal affairs might not serve Türkiye’s interests, as it already hosts over 4 million Syrian refugees, most of whom have no intention of returning.
The international community’s tendency to delegate the bulk of responsibility to Türkiye, particularly Arab states and the West, risks further straining Ankara. Any missteps in reconstruction or stability efforts could disproportionately burden Türkiye, both economically and politically.
The restructuring process in Syria is likely to place significant economic and social strain on Türkiye. As such, collaboration with the international community and burden-sharing are of vital importance for Türkiye’s success.
Moreover, Türkiye’s role in Syria is not merely an outward-looking strategic maneuver but also a responsibility that must carefully balance domestic dynamics. This responsibility will affect not only Ankara’s aspirations for foreign policy success but also the stability of its internal politics.
Without the necessary political and social consensus and without rapid international assistance, new problems in post-Assad Syria will inevitably arise.
The forces united against Assad may turn on each other after the regime collapses, fighting for power and resources. Such conflicts could lead to further fragmentation and destabilization in Syria—a scenario that serves no one’s interests.
A fresh wave of refugees, heightened border security issues, and the costs of reconstruction could further burden Türkiye, which already carries a heavy load in the region.
The conflicting interests of the U.S., Russia, Iran, Israel, and other Arab nations—alongside efforts by Iran and Russia to reassert themselves once the dust settles—could hinder stability in Syria, deepen conflicts, and postpone the normalization we aim for to an uncertain future.
Therefore, Türkiye must develop a realpolitik strategy that considers not only the current challenges in Syria but also the societal and economic dynamics that will impact Türkiye over the next decade.
In essence, Türkiye should avoid taking long-term risks for the sake of short-term gains. Unilateral efforts could disrupt regional balances and harm Türkiye’s own interests. The active involvement of the Arab world and the international community must be ensured in Syria’s reconstruction process, even if they are not particularly enthusiastic about the democratization of the political system.
During the post-Assad period, Türkiye should undoubtedly act as a key player supporting and guiding the transition process in Syria. However, it must avoid taking overly ambitious roles that exceed necessary involvement and insist on shared international responsibility to ensure that the financial and political burden does not fall solely on its shoulders.
Ankara must present a long-term national strategic vision before engaging in fragmented efforts or deploying its resources recklessly. It must decide on the role it wants to play in Syria’s reconstruction and political transition and the type of Syria it envisions on its southern borders 25 years from now.
To this end, Türkiye could lay the groundwork by hosting an international conference on “Reconstruction and Governance in Syria” in collaboration with Damascus and other relevant parties.
If the right steps are not taken today within a coherent strategy—if the first button is fastened incorrectly—there is a significant risk of Syria descending into chaos once again.
The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Kurdish-issue focused DEM Party continue to confound their adversaries…
Intelligence suggests that the operation to overthrow Assad's regime in Syria was meticulously planned for…
As a diplomat, businessman, and traveler, I have visited 135 countries. In many of them,…
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan disclosed that Bashar al-Assad's departure from power came following direct…
Three powers continue to make advances in Syria. The first is forces under HTS leadership.…
While his loyal deputies of his oligarchic regime awaited an address from Bashar Assad, he…