PKK explores Syria exit strategy through SDF autonomy deal

On the evening of January 16, the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) Foreign Relations office made a brief but significant post on their X account. The English message was succinct: “United we stand, divided we fall. President Masoud Barzani met with SDF Commander Mazlum Abdi in Erbil.” The announcement came immediately after the meeting.

The post referenced a message from Hoshyar Zebari, a veteran Kurdish politician and KDP Central Committee Political Bureau Member known for his British connections. Zebari’s message suggested that this meeting demonstrated Kurdish unity to Damascus’s new Syrian leadership, potentially facilitating a smooth transition. His statement, “Thanks to all our allies and friends,” implied that Mazlum Abdi’s visit to Barzani was orchestrated with the help of both parties’ allies.

Shortly after these developments, Reuters reported that “a PKK official” had indicated the PKK’s willingness to withdraw from Syria if the northeastern region’s administration was handed over to the SDF.

Ankara: “Not Possible”

While the government has yet to issue an official response, my sources indicate that Ankara categorically rejects even discussing any arrangement involving the SDF in northeastern Syria along the Turkish border. Ankara and Damascus appear aligned on this issue. Recent discussions with the Syrian delegation reportedly addressed preventing SDF militants from joining the new Syrian army en masse, particularly in light of rumors about forming a separate “Kurdish brigade.”

Ankara’s position remains clear: first, all non-Syrian PKK members must leave, followed by Syrian PKK members, who can then participate in political processes only after disarming.

This aligns with President Erdogan’s stark warning: “If they don’t bury their weapons, they’ll be buried with them.”

Thawing relations between KDP and PUK

That same day, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrur Barzani met with his rival, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Bafel Talabani. Following the October 20, 2024 KRG elections, where no party secured a majority, circumstances demanded swift government formation.

Talabani is notorious in Ankara for his anti-Türkiye stance and close ties to both the SDF and U.S. forces in Syria. In contrast, Masrur Barzani had just concluded a visit to Ankara ten days prior, meeting with President Erdogan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.

Erbil-Damascus-Ankara-Washington

A day earlier, on January 15, three significant developments unfolded – two in Ankara and one in Washington.

In Ankara, the HTS administration’s Foreign and Defense Ministers and Intelligence Chief met their Turkish counterparts, focusing heavily on countering U.S. and PKK influence through the SDF, which maintains its presence under the pretext of combating ISIS/DAESH. Previously, HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara had rejected Kurdish autonomy in discussions with SDF officials.

Also in Ankara, a DEM Party delegation – including Ahmet Türk, Pervin Buldan, and Sırrı Süreyya Önder – announced plans to request a second meeting with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, who initiated this process, expressed expectations for Öcalan to call for PKK’s dissolution and disarmament during this second meeting.

In Washington, incoming Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio emphasized to Congress the necessity of maintaining SDF cooperation, citing the custody of approximately ten thousand ISIS militants.

America’s Strategic Dependency on SDF

Rubio’s position contradicts Trump’s skepticism about U.S. involvement in Syria. Yet during his first presidency, Trump’s attempts to withdraw troops not only failed but resulted in increased military presence.

The SDF’s 2015 establishment by U.S. Special Forces was specifically designed to avoid direct cooperation with the PKK (officially designated as terrorist) and its affiliate PYD/YPG (documented in CIA reports). The U.S. strategy aimed to avoid American casualties in anti-ISIS operations while maintaining ISIS detainees in unclaimed Syrian territory under SDF supervision, similar to their Al-Qaeda detention strategy in Guantanamo.

However, this arrangement faces new challenges with the HTS administration’s ambition to control all Syrian territory. Additionally, Israel’s support drives U.S. commitment to the SDF.

While Iran appears to have retreated from the Palestine-Lebanon-Syria theater following setbacks through Hezbollah and Hamas, Israel maintains its need for a forward operating base.

Rubio’s Double Standard

Türkiye’s heightened concerns are understandable amid these developments. Like all regional actors – from the SDF commander to Barzani, from Shara to Putin – Erdogan seeks to strengthen his position before Trump’s return to office.

Rubio’s criticism of “Erdogan and his intentions” while discussing Syrian “difficulties” exemplifies a striking double standard: How can the U.S., from ten thousand kilometers away, claim authority over Syrian security while questioning Türkiye’s legitimate interests as a border nation?

The question remains: Is this justifiable?