Can the five-party conference open the door to a new process?

Under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Türkiye, Greece, the United Kingdom, the Turkish Cypriot, and the Greek Cypriot sides will convene for a five-party conference in Geneva on March 17-18 with the purported aim of launching a new process in the Cyprus issue. However, diplomatic engagements so far indicate that this meeting carries a greater risk of cementing deadlock rather than making meaningful progress.

The parties’ firm positions

• The Turkish Cypriot side and Türkiye have firmly stated that they will not accept any option other than a two-state solution.
• The Greek Cypriot side and Greece insist that they will never negotiate any model other than a federation and that they will not take any steps that would elevate the status of the Turkish Cypriot state.

Under these conditions, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo’s talks in Nicosia, Ankara, and Athens have failed to establish any common ground. Yet, despite the absence of a basis for agreement, all parties have agreed to DiCarlo’s invitation for an “informal meeting” in Geneva on March 17-18.

Given this backdrop, the five-party conference appears to be less of a step toward resolution and more of an occasion for reaffirming existing diplomatic positions.

The UK’s low-profile representation

While Türkiye and Greece will be represented at the level of foreign ministers, the third guarantor, the United Kingdom, will only participate at the “bureaucratic” level. This has drawn attention, but it is not due to London’s disinterest in Cyprus; rather, it is the result of a request from Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side.

Türkiye and the TRNC prefer the UK to remain neutral and passive in the negotiation process. In the past, the perception that London has leaned toward Greek Cypriot positions has created a trust issue for the Turkish side. The UK’s low-profile participation is seen as a strategic move by the Turkish side to maintain control over the process.

This raises an important question: Will the UK truly play a passive role in this process, or will it attempt to influence developments behind the scenes?

Hristodulidis’ calculations for the five-party conference

Greek Cypriot leader Nikos Hristodulidis presents the five-party conference as a diplomatic success of his own making. He claims that its organization is “a result of our efforts” and that he has submitted five proposals to the UN that will positively impact the process.
However, if these proposals aim to return to the Crans-Montana process, they are unlikely to be accepted by the Turkish side. Crans-Montana was a process in which the Greek side rejected the sovereign equality of Turkish Cypriots, refused rotational presidency, and ultimately abandoned the talks in the early hours of the morning.

Hristodulidis’ primary goal does not appear to be achieving a genuine solution but rather managing the process to frame the Turkish side as the “party that does not want a solution.”

• By insisting on a return to the Crans-Montana framework, he ensures that the Turkish side will not engage, allowing him to portray them as obstructionists.
• By saying, “We presented proposals, but the Turkish side rejected them,” he aims to secure international support.
• He seeks to pressure the Turkish side by creating the illusion that the Greek Cypriots are “showing goodwill.”

At this point, it appears that Hristodulidis is using the negotiation process as a diplomatic maneuver rather than as a genuine effort to reach an agreement.

Tatar’s strategy: Becoming part of the stalemate?

Turkish Cypriot President Ersin Tatar has repeatedly stated that he will not participate in any formal negotiation process unless sovereign equality is recognized. This position reflects a shift in the discourse from “political equality” to “sovereign equality.”

However, whether this approach provides a diplomatic advantage to the Turkish side remains debatable.

• Tatar’s stance may reinforce the perception in the international arena that the Turkish side is unwilling to negotiate.
• Greek Cypriot leadership may exploit Tatar’s statements to strengthen their narrative: “Look, we want a solution, but the Turkish side rejects it.”

For this reason, the Turkish side must go beyond merely defending its position and adopt a more proactive diplomatic strategy.
Is a new process possible on the wreckage of Crans-Montana?

Both Hristodulidis and the UN appear to be seeking a return to the Crans-Montana process. However, this scenario has been categorically rejected by Türkiye and the TRNC.

What happened at Crans-Montana?

• Türkiye signaled flexibility on restructuring the guarantor system.
• The Turkish side was prepared to make significant territorial concessions.
• However, Greek Cypriot leader Anastasiadis abandoned the negotiations at dawn, effectively collapsing the talks.

Now, is it possible to restart negotiations on the same model?

The answer from Türkiye and the TRNC is clear: No.

Is there a way out? Is an “incremental” approach feasible?

If the parties cannot agree on fundamental principles, perhaps an “incremental” or step-by-step approach should be considered.

• Confidence-building measures, economic cooperation projects, and the removal of trade barriers could be initiated.
• Rather than negotiating issues that are politically unresolvable at this stage, steps could be taken to improve the daily lives of the people.

However, the biggest obstacle to this approach is the Greek Cypriot side’s tendency to frame every cooperation initiative as “a step toward federation.”

Is there hope in Geneva?

The signals so far indicate that this meeting is less about making progress and more about reaffirming entrenched positions.
In summary, the Geneva conference does not seem to be a venue for producing a solution but rather a stage where both sides will reinforce their narratives and blame each other.

Last November during the European Political Community meetings in Budapest, President Tayyip Erdoğan, accompanied by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, met informally for the first time over coffee with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Christodoulides. This was interpreted as a significant diplomatic gesture.

However, the main obstacle remains the Greek Cypriot side’s tendency to frame every cooperation proposal as “a step toward federation.”

Based on signals thus far, the five-party meeting appears likely to serve more as a diplomatic showcase where parties merely reaffirm their positions rather than make meaningful progress.

In essence, this conference seems destined to become a platform for mutual blame rather than a forum for producing solutions.