Is Trump’s support for Erdoğan to disarm PKK and Hamas together?

In Türkiye, as main opposition CHP leader Özgür Özel called on the masses who filled İstanbul’s Saraçhane Square despite police batons, pepper spray and threats of arrest to resist the “one-man regime”, US President Donald Trump endorsed Erdoğan as “a good leader”.

Trump gave this support during a meeting on March 25 at the White House with a group of US Ambassadors who were confirmed by the Senate. The new US Ambassador to Ankara, Thomas Barack, was also there; Trump’s real estate tycoon golf buddy and campaign supporter. He thanked the president for appointing him to Türkiye, one of the “ancient civilizations”. He seems to be the sole authority on Türkiye. Trump’s response was short: “a good country, a good leader”.

It is no longer useful to remind anyone of Trump’s letter four years ago, also when he was US president, in which he advised President Erdoğan, with the arrogance of “don’t be stupid”, to make a deal with the PKK in Syria, which dealt another blow to the economy.

A lot of water has flowed under the bridges. There is no longer any point in finding US or European “foreign powers” behind the opposition taking to the streets in Türkiye; some of them are paying the lip service and criticize the acts as anti-democratic, some are silently supporting Erdoğan, who wants to strengthen his authority even more.

In exchange for Trump’s support?

It is a false assumption that Trump is unpredictable. If you want something from Trump, you have to be ready to give something to “Make America Great Again”.

Erdoğan wants many things from Trump. He wants the US to stop supporting the PKK affiliate YPG in Syria, to allow Türkiye to return to the F-35 program (from which it was excluded by Trump due to the purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia), to complete the sale of the next generation F-16s, to put a stop to Israel in Gaza and Syria, to increase the trade volume to $100 billion… And then to receive the White House invitation he did not receive during the Joe Biden era – supposedly on the grounds of democratization and human rights record of Türkiye.

Trump did not refuse any of these demands and showed that he was ready to talk.

Erdoğan now knows very well that Trump will not give anything without getting something. He probably knows better than any of us that Trump did not refuse to discuss these demands simply because Türkiye is an “ancient civilization”, because its geostrategic position helps NATO and because he now sees Erdoğan as a “good leader”.

This is why the phone conversation between the two leaders on March 16 is important.

“Good news” after that phone call

Erdoğan and Trump had a phone call on March 16, two days before the Turkish mayor of İstanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, had his university diploma revoked. It is still subject to objection but if confirmed it can prevent İmamoğlu from preventing him from running for president against Erdoğan; Turkish constitution says only university graduates could be president.

The Turkish Presidency announced that the two leaders discussed Russia-Ukraine, Syria-PKK and F-35/F-16 issues. On March 18, hours before İmamoğlu’s diploma had been revoked, CHP leader Özel criticized the lack of mention of the Gaza tragedy and Israel in the call and said, “Don’t sell the Palestinian cause for Trump.” During the height of Gaza atrocities, Erdoğan had cut all trade links with Israel and join the South Africa application to the International Court of Justice to condemn Israeli attempts for genocide against Palestinians.

However, there was no White House “readout” was released about the conversation with Erdoğan.

The first information about the Erdoğan-Trump meeting from the US side came from Trump’s Special Envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff. In an interview with journalist Tucker Carlson on March 22, Witkoff described Trump’s meeting with Erdoğan as “amazing and transformational” and added that there were “very good news” coming from Türkiye.

Meanwhile, in Türkiye, the CHP’s reaction to İmamoğlu’s detention on the morning of March 19 was a call to masses to take the streets were on its fourth day despite the rally and demonstration bans by the governors of three big cities, İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir as the police was stepping up the dose of force intervention against the protesters.

After Witkoff’s remarks, a new traffic started.

Fidan-Rubio, Kılıç-Walz

One day after Witkoff, on March 23, the day İmamoğlu and his colleagues were arrested and put in infamous Silivri prison, Çağatay Kılıç, the Chief Foreign Policy and Security Advisor for Erdoğan, went to the US. On March 24, he met with Trump’s National Security Advisor Michael Walz and other security contacts.

The next day, on March 25, the day Trump praised Erdoğan as a “good leader” at the White House, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington DC.

In the last sentence of his “X” message after his meeting with Fidan, Rubio “expressed concerns regarding recent arrests and protests in Türkiye”. The American side said the meeting also discussed cooperation to ensure that Syria “does not become a base for international terrorism and an avenue for Iran’s destabilizing activities” and the continued fight against DAESH (ISIS).

One word inside, another outside?

I asked Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Öncü Keçeli why Rubio’s concerns, both in his spokesperson Tammy Bruce’s statement and in his own “X” message, were not among the topics of the meeting that Turkish Foreign Ministry sources shared with the media. In the complex language of diplomacy, Keçeli said that the meeting was “very positive and reflected the mutual respect between the countries”, almost said the opposite:

• “This issue was addressed differently in the meeting than what was reflected in the social media post. We estimate that the message may have been prepared before the meeting.”

Are we talking about another case of “one inside, another outside” speech, or are we talking about Rubio ignoring the text prepared in advance by the US State Department bureaucracy and speaking with Fidan in line with Trump’s support for Erdoğan, but the bureaucracy publishing the previous text.

The next day on March 27, Rubio told reporters, “We watch the same news reports everybody else sees about what’s going on. We’re certainly concerned about these protests and some of the reports”, adding that the US doesn’t “like to see instability like that in the governance of any country that’s such a close ally, especially”.

Turkish Foreign Ministry sources also said that defense industry cooperation and “visits at the level of heads of state” were discussed, which were not included in the American side’s statement. Following the phone call, Erdoğan mentioned in a meeting with the ruling AKP board on March 17 that he might visit the US in April. Terrorism (you can read PKK) and Gaza were also discussed.

PKK, Hamas, Iran, Israel

Let us point out that the Azerbaijan-Armenia agreement is an important issue that is included in the information provided by both sides, but which the public is not paying attention to at the moment. Developments in the South Caucasus are important for both Russia and Iran.

We can assume that Trump’s support for Erdoğan has a place for Türkiye in the Iranian and Russian strategy. So, what else is there?

Here again,  we return to Witkoff’s March 22 interview in which he said that the Erdoğan-Trump meeting was “transformative” and brought “good news” from Türkiye.

“A terrorist organization cannot govern Gaza – that is unacceptable to Israel” said Witkoff who has been involved not only in the Middle East but also in Trump’s US-Russia strategic talks; “What is possible, however, is for them to disarm.Then they can stay for a while and even be politically involved.”

Does this ring a bell?

Washington says Hamas can continue its political activity if it disarms.

Ankara says that if the PKK disarms, it can continue its political activity.

Who will pay the bill?

In the meantime, Israel broke the ceasefire, Trump announced talks with Hamas, Ahmed Shara in Syria announced an agreement with the PKK affiliate SDF leader Mazlum Abdi for the YPG to join the army, and Erdoğan is waiting for Kandil’s response to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s call to lay down arms and disband the organization. It should be noted that Hussein al-Sheikh, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, met with Foreign Minister Fidan in Ankara on March 19, before Fidan flew to the United States and before Witkoff said “good news from Türkiye”.

The project is good, the guns should be silenced, people should not die and peace and prosperity should come to the region; its implementation is another matter, but the idea sounds good.

This is the question: Was the AKP government efforts to guarantee Erdoğan’s re-election ticket by wearing down the main opposition CHP through İmamoğlu based on the assumption that “The winds of the US and Europe are on our side because of the Russia and Iran geopolitical card; the West doesn’t care what happens inside the country”?

Is Trump supporting Erdoğan because of his plan to get the PKK and Hamas to disarm together? And what are other “good news”?