What the U.S. strike on Iran might unleash — from the Gulf to Ankara

In the theater of Middle East geopolitics, a U.S. strike is rarely just a regional act — it’s a signal to markets, rivals, and allies alike that the temperature just went up. But let’s be clear: this wasn’t a bold initiative from Donald Trump. It was, somewhat predictably, the next act in a script sketched out by Benjamin Netanyahu. Trump played his part — flamboyant, transactional, politically theatrical — not out of strategic vision but as a man driven by his personality and the tides of U.S. domestic politics.
Will Trump try to extract global leadership credentials from this? Of course. But let’s not kid ourselves — he didn’t steer this train. He rode it.

Iran’s probable pre-strike calculus

For its part, Iran likely anticipated some form of American-induced escalation. It wouldn’t be surprising if it had already moved parts of its enriched uranium stockpile to safer locations. Facilities like Fordow are buried so deep — over 80 meters underground — that even the U.S.’s most powerful bunker-buster, the GBU-57 MOP (Massive Ordnance Penetrator), which only reaches around 60 meters, might not have rendered it inoperable. The site could still be partially operational and functional if entrances and exits aren’t substantially destroyed.
The same strategic redundancy may apply to the new facility at Natanz.

May Russia come to Iran’s rescue?

Highly unlikely.
Despite the seemingly solid and frequent dialogue between Putin and Tehran, Moscow is in no position to offer Iran any meaningful security guarantee. Instead, the Kremlin probably sees an opportunity, not to resolve the crisis but to prolong it just enough to keep Washington and the world distracted, thereby easing pressure on its front in Ukraine. From that vantage point, a slow-burning standoff serves Russian interests far better than a quick resolution.

The response game

Now comes the dilemma for Tehran: respond to the U.S. strike or restrain?
A direct attack on U.S. assets would be politically necessary to maintain regime credibility, but strategically ruinous, which brings us to the real weapon in Iran’s arsenal: oil.
Iran controls the flow of oil, or at least one of the major chokepoints. Roughly 20 million barrels per day pass through the Strait of Hormuz. And another 4 million barrels — already halved compared to 2023 levels — move through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait near Yemen. That second route is increasingly vulnerable, especially with the Houthis (Ansar Allah), Tehran’s last semi-functional proxy in the region.
Slowing or stopping maritime oil traffic in either of these lanes would be Iran’s most effective non-kinetic retaliation.

Oil as leverage, not just fuel

Globally, approximately 75 to 80 million barrels of oil (both crude and refined) are shipped by sea daily. Any disruption in Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb would jeopardize over 30 percent of that flow. That’s not just an oil shock — that’s a global macroeconomic tremor. Higher energy prices mean slower growth and hotter inflation.
Could that pressure Washington to de-escalate? Not single-handedly. But it could weigh meaningfully in the final calculus.

A new oil order

Let’s zoom out.
Two dynamics should not be underappreciated here.

First, the U.S. is no longer the oil-thirsty behemoth it once was. Since 2010, it has become a net exporter in most hydrocarbon categories. So rising oil prices, while inflationary at home, could paradoxically help its current account balance. It all hinges on the balance between inflation pain and trade gain.
Second: Just how high will oil prices go?

Third: How will the U.S. dollar perform relative to other currencies in the medium term? Because that, too, will reshape America’s trade math.

The Turkish tightrope

Interestingly, this strike came just as Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was visiting Türkiye. There might be a signal here. It shows that perhaps Türkiye is actually not positioned to play much more than a symbolic facilitator role at this stage — and frankly, that goes for most global actors right now.
Still, Türkiye cannot afford to sit this one out. The unfolding drama could reshape its neighborhood in ways that directly affect its economy and security.

Risks for Ankara

If Iran retaliates to the strike as expected — asymmetrically, and through oil choke points — prices could spike to $120–130 per barrel. The ultimate figure will depend on how long and far the confrontation escalates. Potentially, every $10 increase in the price of a barrel can worsen Türkiye’s current account deficit by $4 to $5 billion. That’s a number that keeps economic officials in Ankara up at night.
Add to that the likelihood of a strengthening U.S. dollar (DXY), and the net economic effect for Türkiye may become doubly negative.
There’s also the risk of a new migration wave out of Iran — an issue that carries significant political costs for the Turkish government.

Iran’s internal fractures

Centrifugal forces may begin pulling at the seams if this strike weakens Iran’s central authority. Speculations have swirled around whether the long-term U.S. strategy supports such fragmentation for years.
But even setting conspiracy aside, a weakened and fragmented Iran could reignite dangerous ambitions. One scenario that would understandably concern Ankara is the emergence of another Kurdish statelet. One only has to remember that the only historically relevant Kurdish state in modern times was established on Iranian soil. The short-lived Mahabad Republic in 1946 remains a potent symbol.
Türkiye would watch such a development with extreme caution.

The Kurdish factor

Given the established Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, the PYD-PKK presence in Syria, and the murky outlines of what role they might play in that country’s future, a similar scenario in Iran could open the door to new legal and political interpretations and aspirations for Kurdish factions. Under such circumstances, even the dissolved status of the PKK could be reinterpreted by remnants of the group and certain factions within the Kurdish political sphere, not as a settled issue, but as a precedent-opening moment, ripe for legal and strategic reexamination.
Should those groups come to believe that accepting the current “state-sponsored” peace process, namely the “Terror-free Türkiye” project, makes them the only Kurdish movement in the Middle East to have settled for the minimum, the political ground could shift beneath the feet of all the relevant actors.

Strategic narratives matter

And there is also the narrative vacuum. Türkiye lacks a compelling strategic story that decouples it from regional chaos and presents a picture of long-term resilience to global investors.
In a world of escalating disorder, stories matter — especially the ones that enable positive differentiation. Right now, Ankara needs to think not just tactically, but narratively. In the eyes of international investors, Türkiye still lacks a compelling narrative that sets it apart — positively — from the turmoil of its region and the individual stories of its peers. And when chaos surges, the countries with the clearest stories tend to write the future.
That absence makes these challenges not just serious but also defining for Ankara.