Dangerous scenarios in Ankara

Among the political destruction scenarios discussed in Ankara, the most dangerous one for the future of Türkiye’s political life is as follows:
• The precedent of dismissing the İstanbul Provincial Chairmanship is applied to the case for canceling the 2023 Congress of the main opposition CHP when delegates choose Özgür Özel to replace Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as the Party Chairman. This means suspending the leadership “as a precaution” while the judicial process continues.
• The loophole here is that Özel’s leadership in the CHP could activate the expulsion mechanism as a countermeasure before the scheduled court hearing on September 15, when the request for “absolute nullity” (i.e., declaring the congress void) is to be discussed. This would involve expelling key figures from party membership “as a precaution,” as in the case of Gürsel Tekin, without taking their defense or reaching a final decision.
• One of the plaintiffs could file for a precautionary measure, or be prompted to do so.
• The Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance previously rejected a former “precautionary” application due to insufficient evidence. However, if the court considers the dismissal of CHP Istanbul Provincial Chairman Özgür Çelik and his administration as “sufficient evidence,” it could open the way to paralyzing the CHP leadership under the law.
• Without waiting for September 15, the court could “precautionarily” dismiss the CHP leadership and appoint, for example, Kılıçdaroğlu, “as a precaution,” as in the Tekin case.

Political calculations in Ankara

So, could the Ankara court appoint someone other than Kılıçdaroğlu? According to journalist Nagehan Alçı’s meeting with Hikmet Çetin, he rejected the “trustee” scenarios floated after his visit to MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, stating he would “stand guard at the door” to prevent a trustee from entering the party. Recently, whispers of İlhan Kesici’s name have also surfaced. However, the Kılıçdaroğlu formula seems to be the frontrunner.
The expectation scenarios tied to court decisions by the AK Party-MHP People’s Alliance government are as follows:
• If Özel’s leadership is “precautionarily” removed from the CHP before it can make further counter-moves,
• If the court reinstates Kılıçdaroğlu and his team at the helm of the CHP,
• If internal tensions in the CHP escalate, starting with attempts to block entry to the party headquarters,
• If it becomes clear that Kılıçdaroğlu, even with new defectors, can no longer lead the CHP as a unified whole,
• If Özel and his team break away to form a new party, splitting the CHP—which became the leading party in 2024 for the first time in 47 years—through court decisions.
Those who trust these scenarios underestimate the devastating consequences they could have on society and the economy. Following the news that $5 billion was sold to the market on September 2, when the İstanbul court decision was released to prevent the CHP Istanbul decision from spiking the exchange rate again, the Central Bank’s announcement of record-high foreign exchange reserves highlights this.

With or without elections?

Another scenario being discussed in Ankara is this: Given the slim chance of overcoming the economic crisis in the short term, would President Tayyip Erdoğan and MHP leader Bahçeli call for a snap election in the spring of 2026, while the CHP is divided and the opposition is weakened? Those opposing this scenario argue that Erdoğan, with the possibility of securing an early election decision from the Turkish Parliament—perhaps with support from the DEM Party for a “terrorism-free Türkiye”—and running again just before the 2028 elections, would not take such a risk now.
On the other hand, it has been leaked to the media that the main agenda of the Erdoğan-Bahçeli meeting on September 4 was Syria and the SDF.
This brings us to another dangerous scenario in Ankara: the increasing likelihood of a spreading hot war on both Türkiye’s northern and southern borders. A well-informed source recently drew my attention to Erdoğan’s statement about completing shelter construction in all 81 provinces within 120 days, meaning they are expected to be ready by early 2026.
The calculations to “discipline” the CHP through court decisions extend to whether “free elections” will remain part of Türkiye’s future. I hope none of what I’ve written comes true.

Because this is dangerous, and this means playing with fire.