The İmamoğlu Indictment and the Questions It Raises

The indictment titled “Ekrem İmamoğlu Profit-Driven Criminal Organization” prepared by Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek—released on 11 November—is poised to enter the history of political trials worldwide. Although part of the corruption allegations rely on witness statements filled with phrases like “it happened, I heard,” often supported only by secondary data such as mobile phone signal (HTS) overlaps, there are also elements that require serious consideration. Still, these do not change the impression that the indictment was written with political intentions.

Why Does It Look Like a Political Case?

A few questions help explain the reasons behind this impression:

• The timing of the investigation

Although the allegations in the indictment date back to as early as 2019, it appears that the comprehensive investigation into İmamoğlu began only after Akın Gürlek—previously a Deputy Justice Minister, a political position—was appointed Istanbul Chief Prosecutor by President Tayyip Erdoğan on 8 October 2024. Gürlek had already been labeled “the new Zekeriya Öz” by former CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, with implied references to FETÖ. After Özgür Özel became CHP leader on 5 November 2023, he also accused Gürlek of being a “mobile guillotine,” prompting Gürlek to file a lawsuit against him.

In short, there is clear political hostility in the background.

• A chain of events triggered by CHP’s declaration

The process appears to accelerate after 11 February, when Özel announced in the CHP parliamentary group that İmamoğlu would be their presidential candidate against Erdoğan, with a primary to be held on 23 March.  Following a campaign claiming İmamoğlu’s university diploma was invalid and that he was therefore ineligible to run for president, Istanbul University invalidated his diploma on 18 March. The next morning, at around 6:00 AM, police raided İmamoğlu’s home on Gürlek’s orders. İmamoğlu, along with numerous İBB officials, employees, and contractors, was detained. On 23 March—the same day the CHP held its primary—İmamoğlu was arrested and sent to Silivri Prison, where he remains.

The picture clearly suggests that İmamoğlu’s candidacy against Erdoğan is being blocked through administrative and judicial maneuvers.

• CHP itself is targeted

The indictment claims that İmamoğlu began forming a criminal organization in 2014, when he became mayor of Beylikdüzü, allegedly to “seize control of the CHP” and “create a fund for his presidential candidacy.” Using similar reasoning and examples—such as the purchase of the Istanbul Provincial Headquarters building, highlighted in 2019 by Erdoğan with the phrase “money towers”—the Prosecutor’s Office has also filed a notice with the Court of Cassation seeking the closure of CHP for “using money obtained through criminal activity.”

In other words, the indictment does not merely aim to prevent İmamoğlu from becoming a presidential candidate; it also appears to target CHP itself.

Within CHP, the Özel leadership has, since replacing Kılıçdaroğlu in November 2023, faced internal lawsuits such as the “Absolute Nullity” case—none successful so far, though appeals continue. Meanwhile, indictments in the so-called Aziz İhsan Aktaş and Espionage cases have been submitted to court, supporting attempts like the Absolute Nullity case. These allegations appear to serve as stepping stones for a broader closure case against CHP, using the İmamoğlu indictment as a foundation.

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the indictment was drafted partly with political goals in mind, built upon several forced corruption claims.

• Political motives don’t erase the allegations

That this indictment may become a case study in the political trials of world history does not justify dismissing all allegations outright—even if some are exaggerated. The CHP leadership under Özgür Özel has, since 19 March, held an unprecedented series of twice-weekly rallies demanding that İmamoğlu and his colleagues be tried without arrest. This strategy is legitimate and serves to mobilize their base.
However, if even part of the corruption allegations are proven, the blanket-denial rhetoric could damage this legitimacy.

• The demand for release pending trial is justified

İmamoğlu and the other CHP municipal officials should indeed be tried without pretrial detention. But the riskiest political argument—legally and publicly—is the claim that “AK Party municipalities also did similar things for years.” CHP’s rise to become Türkiye’s largest party in the 2024 local elections owed partly to voters’ desire that “what they did should not be repeated.” Using such an argument risks creating the perception that CHP tolerates questionable dealings by questionable figures—and that perception is already beginning to form.

A New Political Line

Özgür Özel has shown he can engage in self-criticism—most recently in the Demirtaş example. If he wants to keep CHP in first place in the next election, he needs a more realistic and credible political discourse—not only for his party, but for the health of Türkiye’s democratic system.

President Erdoğan, on the other hand, might occasionally recall that during the Ergenekon–Balyoz trials (2008–2012) when the CHP leader of the time, Deniz Baykal brought the defendants’ rights to Parliament, he responded, “If you’re their lawyer, then I’m their prosecutor.” At that time, he politically shielded the prosecutor Zekeriya Öz, now a fugitive and an operative of the Gülenists. After the betrayal of the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan said: “May God and our nation forgive me.”

The Constitution says Türkiye is a “state of law.” Let’s not turn it into a “state of  court rulings”.