Uneasy Turkish Silence on the U.S. Muscling in on Venezuela

The reactions—both spoken and unspoken—of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Türkiye’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) following U.S. President Donald Trump’s abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro reveal more than diplomatic caution. They point to deep unease in Ankara’s relations with Washington.

Trump’s recent posture—issuing implicit threats to countries from Iran to Cuba, Colombia to Mexico, and even demanding Greenland from NATO and EU member Denmark—has raised serious questions about Washington’s commitment to the very alliances it leads. After the European Union failed to issue a unified response, Spain, together with five Latin American countries, openly condemned the United States.

For Türkiye, whose strongest institutional link to the West remains NATO, this is not a distant issue—particularly since, as of January 3, Türkiye’s name has begun circulating in U.S. political discourse in connection with Maduro’s forced removal.

Unanswered Questions

Ankara has yet to clarify a central issue: whether Türkiye was approached as a potential destination for Maduro.

On January 4, I asked Presidential Communications Director Burhanettin Duran whether U.S. officials—or Trump himself—had conveyed to Turkish authorities a proposal suggesting Maduro could relocate to Türkiye, as claimed by U.S. media.

Subsequently, U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham stated publicly that “if Maduro had accepted Trump’s offer, he could be in Türkiye right now,” a claim Trump silently confirmed by nodding. What was initially dismissed as speculation thus became a matter of record. No response has been given yet.

Criticizing the Opposition, Not U.S.

Türkiye’s first official reaction came from the Foreign Ministry hours after the intervention. The statement avoided mentioning the United States, instead calling on “all sides” to exercise restraint and offering mediation—language more typical of civil conflict than an external intervention.

The first comment from the presidential palace came from Erdoğan’s legal adviser, Mehmet Uçum who spoke in theoretical anti-imperialist terms without naming the U.S. but condemning “rogue” methods.

Only after the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel accused Erdoğan of remaining silent out of fear of Trump did senior AKP figures respond—directing their criticism not at Washington, but at the domestic opposition. From the vice president to party spokespeople and ministers, the pattern was consistent: condemn the CHP, avoid the United States.

Even Erdoğan, speaking after a cabinet meeting, said he had emphasized Türkiye–Venezuela friendship to Trump—but stopped short of condemning the U.S. intervention. Instead, he criticized the opposition.

The impression left was striking: as if the coup in Venezuela had been carried out not by the United States, but by Türkiye’s main opposition party.

Oil, Gold, and Power Politics

Notably, AKP’s ally, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli, openly condemned the U.S. action and compared it to the failed coup attempt in Türkiye on July 15, 2016.

Meanwhile, renewed discussion of Türkiye–Venezuela gold trade—particularly following visits by a senior Venezuelan official to Türkiye after the failed 2019 coup attempt against Maduro—has added to domestic political discomfort.

According to U.S. Southern Command chief General Laura Richardson, the true drivers of U.S. interest in Venezuela were beyond democracy or narcotics, but oil reserves, gold and rare earth elements. Trump’s first move after the intervention was to grant oil access to U.S. companies. This fits neatly into what many describe as a “Monroe Doctrine 2.0,” aimed at reasserting U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere—now spilling into the Middle East through Israel.

A Delicat Balance with Washington

Türkiye’s reluctance to confront Washington must be seen in the context of a fragile and highly transactional bilateral relationship. Ankara is juggling the Russia–Ukraine war, the Gaza conflict, U.S. support for SDF, forces affiliated with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); Ankara seeks a political solution to Kurdish problem through disarming of the PKK as the key part of its “Terror-free Türkiye” policy.

At the same time, Türkiye is seeking progress on F-16 and F-35 issues tied to its purchase of Russian S-400 systems, as well as U.S. jet engines for its KAAN fighter program.

Behind-the-scenes diplomacy—including hypothetical arrangements for Maduro—may well have taken place. Such discretion is normal in statecraft. But democratic accountability still matters. The Turkish public and parliament have a legitimate right to know, within reasonable limits, what role—if any—Türkiye was asked to play.

Russia, often assumed to be Maduro’s backer, has also remained conspicuously quiet. The Kremlin’s response has been no stronger than Ankara’s—though former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, now chairing Russia’s National Security Council described Trump’s Venezuela action as “illegal, but consistent,” a phrase that resonates uncomfortably with the logic underpinning Russia’s own actions in Ukraine.