Greece’s Statements on the Aegean and Türkiye’s Strategic Calm

The most perilous moments are not when harsh words are exchanged, but when silence lingers. In international politics, vacuums do not remain empty. They are filled by the other side’s confidence, incremental moves, and faits accomplis that, over time, harden into a new reality. This is precisely the threshold the Aegean now stands upon. As the Erdoğan–Mitsotakis summit during the High Level Cooperation Council meetings in Ankara approaches this February, before the beginning of the Muslims’ holy month of Ramadan on February 19, a pattern of carefully sequenced statements from Greek officials, juxtaposed with Ankara’s strategic restraint, is creating a psychological environment in which the risk of miscalculation is quietly but steadily rising.

“Türkiye as a Threat” Narrative

The tone was first set by Greece’s Defence Minister, Nikos Dendias, who has repeatedly and explicitly defined Türkiye as a “threat,” using this narrative to legitimise the rapid militarisation of the Aegean islands. I have heard him articulate this line not only for domestic audiences, but also in NATO forums, European capitals, and academic platforms.

This is no longer mere electoral rhetoric. It is part of a broader effort to normalize a new security doctrine built around defense arrangements with the United States, France, and Israel outside NATO frameworks, and to transform the islands into forward military outposts. The language suggests not the preservation of the status quo, but a mental crossing into preparing to alter it on the ground.

The 12-Mile Doctrine and “Marine Parks”

Greece’s Foreign Minister, Giorgos Gerapetritis, followed with remarkable clarity. In parliament, he described the extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles as a long-term state strategy, framing the recently declared “marine parks” not as environmental initiatives but as instruments of sovereign consolidation—explicit stepping stones on the road to 12 miles.

This is not only about challenging a long-standing taboo. It also implicitly reopens the legal regime of the islands whose demilitarised status is enshrined in the Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947) treaties.

“Creeping Sovereignty”

Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis then completed the chain. By declaring that “sovereignty is not subject to discussion” and that Greece would make no concessions in maritime zones, he signalled that Athens intends to approach the summit not with the language of compromise, but with the language of power.

In international law, this gradual entrenchment of new realities is often described as creeping sovereignty: exploiting periods of calm to advance incremental steps that eventually become irreversible. It is a strategy typically employed when a state believes the balance of power is shifting in its favour and the other side is distracted, constrained or vulnerable.

Ankara’s Tone: Strategic Calm

Against this backdrop, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s remarks at his recent press conference were striking in their composure. Responding to a Greek journalist, he stressed that Türkiye’s aim was not to postpone problems but to resolve them permanently:

“We will sit at the table with the will to solve existing issues and will not leave until they are resolved. Especially in the Aegean, we seek lasting solutions.”

Fidan also acknowledged a political reality in Greece: anti-Türkiye sentiment remains a powerful domestic mobilising tool, and leaders who pursue reconciliation often pay an internal price. Mitsotakis’ current electoral strength, he suggested, could represent a rare window to bear that cost.

Yet on existential issues—12 nautical miles, the militarization of the islands, and the erosion of the Aegean status quo—Ankara has deliberately maintained a low diplomatic profile. Such restraint may be intended to preserve a constructive negotiating climate. But in international politics, calm is not always read as prudence; it can also be interpreted as hesitation or weakness. And that perception can invite precisely the miscalculations that lead from crisis to confrontation.

The Legal Spine: Lausanne, Paris, and Red Lines

The Lausanne and Paris treaties are not historical footnotes; they remain binding pillars of international law. They transferred the Aegean islands to Greece under a demilitarized status. The transformation of these islands into heavily armed bases, equipped with air-defence systems and advanced platforms, sits uneasily—if not incompatibly—with that legal framework.

As for the extension of territorial waters to 12 miles, this is, for Türkiye, a non-negotiable matter of vital security and freedom of navigation. No Turkish government could accept the effective enclosure of the Aegean and the confinement of access from the Marmara to the Mediterranean under unilateral Greek control.

This is why the Turkish parliament’s 8 June 1995 resolution, declaring such an extension a casus belli, should not merely be recalled but reaffirmed—perhaps even updated—by a renewed parliamentary mandate.

The Most Critical File

In Murat Yetkin’s recent interview with Hakan Fidan, the foreign minister identified Türkiye’s three most critical challenges for 2026 as Syria, Gaza, and the Russia-Ukraine war. Greece did not feature on that list.

Yet Athens’ systematic efforts—from lobbying in the U.S. Congress to block defence sales to Türkiye, to building a security axis with Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, to promoting an encirclement narrative in EU platforms, and to eroding the Aegean status quo through incremental steps—amount to a coherent pressure strategy.

Paradoxically, it is precisely because this file is not labelled a “crisis” that it may be more dangerous. History shows that conflicts often erupt not from declared hostility, but from misjudged intentions in zones of creeping tension.

When Silence Breeds Boldness

Ankara’s desire to avoid escalation ahead of the February summit is understandable. No one wishes to provide ammunition for nationalist politics or media theatrics in Greece. Yet statecraft cannot rely solely on executive restraint. At times, the institutional voice of parliament and the clarity of national red lines must also be heard.

The message should be unmistakable—not only to Athens, but to Washington, Brussels, Paris, Tel Aviv, and NATO: Türkiye seeks dialogue.

But it does not accept ambiguity in matters of sovereignty, nor faits accompli. Strategic calm does not mean strategic amnesia.

History teaches us that wars are often born not of malicious intent, but of flawed calculations. The antidote is not megaphone diplomacy, but legal clarity, institutional resolve, and credible deterrence.

Peace in the Aegean will not be preserved by silence alone. It will endure only if dialogue is matched by red lines, and if incremental unilateral moves are met with principled, visible, and lawful firmness.