How Is the Türkiye–Libya Agreement Changing the Equation in the Eastern Mediterranean?

 

The Libyan House of Representatives’ unanimous ratification on 20 October of the maritime jurisdiction memorandum signed with Türkiye in 2019 marks an important turning point not only in Türkiye–Libya relations, but also in the political balance of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The significance of the decision lies not simply in the fact that an agreement signed seven years ago has now also been accepted by the parliament in eastern Libya. The same parliament rejected the agreement in 2020 and voted to sever political relations with Türkiye. Today, it has reversed both decisions. A political structure that only a few years ago was among Türkiye’s fiercest opponents in Libya has now endorsed the agreement that forms one of the foundations of Ankara’s Eastern Mediterranean policy.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that the EU did not recognise the Libyan parliament’s decision and reiterated its solidarity with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. From another perspective, this can also be read as marking the end of Türkiye’s expectations regarding “Made in Europe”, although the prospects had already diminished considerably following the latest decision on the automotive sector.

Greece’s intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent this outcome also failed. It would therefore be incomplete to read what has happened merely as a development in Türkiye–Libya relations. The real question is how Türkiye managed to achieve this in an Eastern Mediterranean equation in which Israel, Greece and Cyprus are major actors, and what comes next.

Why Could Greece Not Prevent It?

For years, Greece has argued that the Türkiye–Libya memorandum is contrary to international law. Athens maintains the same position today and, following the latest decision, once again stated that the agreement produces no legal effect.

Yet Greece’s difficulty arose less from its legal argument than from political developments inside Libya. Over the past few years, Ankara has systematically built relations with eastern Libya, with which it was militarily opposed in 2019 and 2020. While maintaining its presence in Tripoli, Türkiye opened a new channel with Benghazi. The contacts of National Intelligence Organisation (MİT) chief İbrahim Kalın, the diplomacy conducted by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and the relationships developed with the Haftar family were all parts of this transformation. Indeed, Kalın was in Libya on the day the agreement was ratified.

Türkiye has thus moved from being the supporter of one side in Libya to becoming an actor capable of working with both of the country’s main centres of power.

This transformation was precisely what Greece was unable to prevent. While Athens opposed the Türkiye–Libya agreement and sought to cultivate close relations with actors in eastern Libya, Ankara offered those same actors a broader package combining security, energy, trade and political relations. For Libya, the value of relations with Türkiye consequently came to extend well beyond maritime jurisdiction. The latest decision is also a product of that shift.

From a Battle over Maps to a Struggle over Energy

The more important development, however, is that the Türkiye–Libya relationship is no longer simply a dispute over maritime boundaries. In February, for example, while President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis were discussing the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean in Ankara, it was announced that the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) had acquired new oil exploration rights in Libya. A struggle that in 2019 was conducted largely through maps and legal arguments is increasingly taking shape through energy investments, seismic surveys and infrastructure projects.

The same dynamic can be seen in the resumption of survey work for the approximately €1.9 billion Great Sea Interconnector, the EU-backed subsea cable project intended to connect the electricity grids of Greece, Cyprus and Israel. Türkiye argues that parts of the planned route intersect its continental shelf and that the work therefore requires coordination with Ankara. Greece rejects the claim that Türkiye has such authority. The United States strongly supports the project. The next phase of the contest will therefore not be confined to Türkiye and Greece. Cyprus, Israel, the United States and the European Union will become increasingly involved in the equation.

What Has Ankara Actually Gained?

Türkiye’s most important achievement so far is not that it has pushed its rivals out of the Eastern Mediterranean. That would not be possible in any case. Israel, Greece and Cyprus are permanent actors in the region, while the European Union and the United States will continue to influence regional energy and security projects. Ankara has achieved something different: it is making it increasingly difficult and costly to construct an Eastern Mediterranean order that excludes Türkiye.

Libya is critical in this respect. One of the strongest political objections to the 2019 memorandum was that it had been rejected by eastern Libya. Now the same parliament has unanimously endorsed it. This does not eliminate Greece’s legal objections, but it weakens an important source of political support for Athens inside Libya. Moreover, the relationship between Türkiye and Libya has moved beyond simply preserving the agreement. Energy fields, oil exploration and security ties are creating an increasingly broad network of interests around the maritime jurisdiction agreement.

The Future of the Türkiye–Libya Agreement

What comes next will be more difficult. Energy activities south of Crete, the Great Sea Interconnector and new seismic surveys could once again raise tensions between Ankara and Athens. How Israel positions itself within this equation will also be important.

Yet the situation today is different from that of 2019. At the time, even the political future of the Türkiye–Libya agreement inside Libya was uncertain. Seven years later, the Libyan camp that had opposed the memorandum most strongly is now also standing behind it.

The 20 October decision is therefore not merely the belated ratification of an agreement signed years ago. It is an indication that Türkiye’s strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean is beginning to produce results. Ankara’s next test will be whether it can turn this political advantage into lasting gains in energy, trade and diplomacy.