Golani’s necktie, Ankara’s operation and crackdown on journalists

Last weekend, journalist Nevşin Mengü faced investigation over an interview, leading to her detention and subsequent release under judicial supervision with a travel ban. This weekend, journalist Özlem Gürses was investigated for a verbal slip during a live broadcast, resulting in detention, handcuffing, house arrest, and a travel ban. Additionally, news outlet T-24 came under investigation.

We can easily determine that these concerning developments share a common denominator related to developments in Syria, which became even more prominent yesterday with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Damascus (notable for Golani’s tie) and Defense Minister Yaşar Güler’s meeting preparing for operations in Syria.

The Golani’s Necktie

On December 22, while Güler was conducting a video conference with regional commanders in Kilis along the Syrian border, Fidan met in Damascus with Ahmed “Golani” al-Shara, the HTS leader instrumental in Assad’s regime’s downfall. In photographs released by the Foreign Ministry, Golani’s necktie immediately drew attention.

When HTS launched its offensive from Idlib to Aleppo on December 1, Golani projected the image of a Salafi jihadist leader, complete with turban, traditional robe, and full beard. After Bashar Assad’s flight to Russia on December 8, Golani’s public appearance transformed dramatically – gone were the turban and robe, replaced by an unadorned uniform and a meticulously trimmed, almost hipster-style beard, resembling a corporate executive.

During Turkish Intelligence Chief Kalın’s prayer visit to the Umayyad Mosque on December 12, Golani wore a suit without a tie while guiding him through Damascus. By December 22, he greeted Fidan in Damascus wearing a full suit and tie. They embraced, and Golani personally introduced Ambassador Burhan Köroğlu.

Türkiye’s PKK/YPG Priority

The previous day, following a visit from U.S. State Department officials to Damascus, the United States had lifted its $10 million bounty on Golani as a terrorist. In a written statement, Golani revealed that his primary request to the U.S. was the lifting of sanctions against Syria. His emphasis on economic revival through sanctions relief, rather than demanding Israeli troop withdrawal from Damascus’s periphery, aligns more with a politician seeking popular support than a militant leader.

As Golani moderated his rhetoric from promising to implement strict Sharia law in Syria within weeks to positioning Syria as a respected member of the international community, his appearance increasingly mirrored that of Bashar Assad. While both appearance and rhetoric serve as indicators, the crucial factor lies in examining his actions – both past and future.

As international media covered Golani’s tie-wearing reception of Fidan, Defense Minister Güler was conferring with his commanders in Kilis along the Syrian border, discussing potential operation plans. His message echoed Fidan’s Damascus statement: Türkiye stood ready to cooperate with Damascus’s new leadership under a single condition – the removal of PKK/YPG from the border region.

Operation Preparations

Realistically, Golani lacks the capability to prevent Türkiye’s military operations against PKK/YPG targets within Syrian territory. While he may make pro forma statements, it would be counterintuitive to expect him to welcome a U.S.-backed, well-trained, and modernly equipped force within the territory he seeks to control.

The only force seen as capable of deterring Türkiye from doing this is its NATO ally, the US. However, NATO’s primary need for Türkiye lies not in Syria but in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Despite President-elect Trump, who will take office on January 20, the U.S. Department of Defense has announced an increase in troop numbers from 900 to 2,000, emphasizing the absence of withdrawal plans. This may serve to reassure the SDF, which reversed its stance on a “demilitarized zone” following the removal of border wall panels near Ayn el-Arab (Kobani). The U.S. will likely attempt to protect potential Turkish targets in Syria by marking them with American flags, if such measures haven’t already begun.

Nevertheless, both Güler and Fidan emphasize that “eliminating PKK/YPG remains our priority” – a threat now taken seriously by all parties.

Erdoğan: December 27?

Türkiye appears poised to potentially launch military operations against PKK/YPG before Trump assumes office, rather than deferring action to his administration. The regional implications – beyond Syria – of any U.S. attempt to physically prevent such operations provide perspective on what might be at stake.

Signs indicate Golani will soon host Erdoğan in Damascus, potentially fulfilling Erdoğan’s ambition to pray at the Umayyad Mosque following Assad’s departure. Should he choose to attend Friday prayers, December 27 marks 2024’s final Friday.

Any reporting or commentary on Syria and operations against PKK/YPG encounters a wall of heightened sensitivity in Ankara, occasionally manifesting as paranoia about potential rifts in domestic and international public opinion. Journalists face detention and investigation over their coverage, even when lacking subversive intent.

We find ourselves in a period of critical significance.