As the administration and balance of power in Syria change, “dummy variables” such as ISIS and the SDF—both products of the civil war—are being removed from the Middle East matrix. (Graphic: kayiprihtim.com)
In mathematics, when solving systems of equations with multiple unknowns, there is the concept of a “temporary variable,” or in the terminology of statistics and economics, a “dummy variable.” If the number of equations you need to solve exceeds the number of variables, you invent variables to fill the gaps in the matrix. Once a solution is reached, those “dummy” variables that were added later lose their meaning and can be discarded. The two steps taken by the United States on 20 and 21 January to remove both the SDF and ISIS from the Middle East matrix resemble this method of calculation.
Products of the Syrian Civil War
Both ISIS and the SDF are products of the Syrian civil war that began in 2011.
An armed group that split from al-Qaeda in Iraq declared itself the “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham” (ISIS) in April 2013. It quickly expanded into Syria. In January 2014, it seized Raqqa from -then under the control of the Jabhat al-Nusra and the Türkiye-backed Free Syrian Army. In June 2014, ISIS stormed Turkish Consulate General in Mosul, Iraq, taking 49 people hostage.
The turning point in the fight against ISIS came in September 2014, when the group besieged Ayn al-Arab—better known as Kobani—located across from the Akçakale district of Şanlıurfa and controlled by the PYD/YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK.
Up to that point, the United States and Türkiye had worked together in Syria. They diverged, however, over intervention in Kobani. The Barack Obama administration chose to work not with NATO ally Türkiye, but with the PKK, despite the group being designated as a terrorist organization by the United States. Since it could not officially cooperate with PKK-linked groups, Washington requested the creation of a new organization. As later disclosed by the U.S. Special Operations Command in 2017, the SDF was established in October 2015 for this purpose, with the participation of some Arab tribes.
HTS Enters the Stage
Despite the trauma of the 15 July 2016 coup attempt—which Ankara attributes to U.S. backing—Türkiye launched a military operation in Syria just five weeks later, in August 2016, targeting both ISIS and the PKK. This first operation altered both Türkiye’s Syria policy and the balance on the ground.
A few months later, in January 2017, an armed group led by Ahmed al-Sharaa—using the nom de guerre Mohammad al-Golani—broke away from al-Qaeda and began fighting simultaneously against the Bashar al-Assad regime, al-Qaeda, and ISIS. In the same year, the Türkiye–Russia–Iran Astana Group was formed, focused on Syria.
Türkiye consistently called on the United States to sever its ties with the SDF, warning that it was an extension of the PKK. In reality, by that time, U.S. Central Command no longer needed the SDF. However, Kurdish formations backed by Israeli and Greek lobbies in the U.S. Congress sustained support by arguing that ISIS militants were being held in prisons guarded by the SDF, and that their departure would result in the militants’ release.
HTS’s takeover of Damascus on 8 December 2024 and Bashar al-Assad’s flight to Russia once again shifted the balance.
Dummy Variables Removed from the Matrix
In fact, HTS and the FSA (and its successor, the SNA) were also products of the Syrian civil war. Yet with the change of administration in Syria, both dissolved themselves on the same day—29 January 2025—and joined the Syrian army. As the solution in the Syrian matrix drew closer, some of the “dummy variables” removed themselves from the matrix by aligning with the winning side.
Meanwhile, in Ankara, the AK Party–MHP alliance launched an initiative in October 2024 under the banner of a “Terror-Free Türkiye,” seeking a parliamentary solution to the Kurdish issue on the condition that the PKK lay down its arms and dissolve itself. Less than two weeks after PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, imprisoned on İmralı Island, expressed support for the initiative on 27 February, an agreement was signed on 10 March between Syria’s interim president Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi (Ferhat Abdi Şahin).
Had the SDF implemented the 10 March agreement, it could today have been a partner in Syria’s governing structure.
Instead, due to miscalculations and insistence on PKK-driven maximalist demands, the United States chose not to wait any longer and severed its alliance with the SDF. Immediately afterward, it transferred the remaining ISIS prison populations to Iraq, demonstrating that it no longer needed the SDF even for its last remaining justification.
The Geopolitical Meaning of the Shift
There was no longer room for two more dummy variables in the new Syrian matrix. The SDF and ISIS—the very reason for the SDF’s existence—were rendered ineffective actors just two days apart.
With Arab tribes switching sides as the Syrian army launched the Aleppo operation—another PKK miscalculation—the SDF had effectively reverted to its roots as a YPG/PKK formation. ISIS, meanwhile, had been reduced to manageable limits, even if it might still attempt sporadic suicide attacks.
In the broader picture, one geopolitical reality stands out.
Before the civil war, Syria was governed by an Arab nationalist administration that leaned on Russia and Iran against Israel.
Today, there is an Islamist administration with no remaining Russian or Iranian influence, wary of Israel, seeking the backing of the United States, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia, and anxious to move closer to the West.
From Türkiye’s perspective, the Syria that hosted PKK leader Öcalan throughout the 1980s and 1990s no longer exists. Instead, developments may now be unfolding that accelerate the PKK’s end.
Syria’s political matrix has been completely transformed. Amid claims that the United States will also withdraw its troops, the dummy variables that facilitated this transition are themselves being eliminated.