The February 6 visit to Türkiye by EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos was portrayed in the media, with wishful optimism reflected from pro-government circles, almost as a “new spring” in Türkiye–EU relations. (Photo: EU Delegation to Türkiye)
Kos’s visit was interpreted both as a response to the government’s statements and initiatives aimed at rapprochement with the EU, and to the call made by the Turkish business community—through an advertisement published in the Financial Times in recent days—that in the new global imbalance, the EU needs Türkiye more than ever.
Updating the Customs Union
At the joint press conference Kos held with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, the proposal to update the Customs Union —an issue Brussels has repeatedly dusted off and put back on Ankara’s agenda- was welcomed with satisfaction, as if it were being announced as good news for the first time.
Kos’s charm-offensive gestures, such as organizing a meeting with “Influential Women of Türkiye” while she was already in Ankara, are being presented as signs of warming relations. Yet if that “Influential Women of Türkiye” meeting were held in an EU country, a significant portion of those women would most likely be unable to obtain a visa. Or they would end up queuing at consulate doors for a three-day visa.
The EU’s promise to work for greater Turkish contributions to European security has no real substance under the block imposed by Southern Cyprus and Greece. It is also striking that Western media portrayed Kos’s visit to Türkiye as if primarily aimed at securing Türkiye’s support for Ukraine against Russia.
I am not saying that Kos’s visit is insignificant; any dialogue opportunity is a newly opened door. At a time when Türkiye’s EU membership has turned into a futile routine—one in which no one wants to be the first to say “no”—Kos’s visit is certainly not meaningless. That Western Europe, mistreated by Trump’s United States, is once again remembering Türkiye can be seen as positive, but it is far from sufficient.
What Remains After the Visit
Realistically, we see that the only concrete outcome of this visit is the European Investment Bank’s decision to resume operations in Türkiye.
Beyond that, the picture looks like this:
-
Visa facilitation was discussed, but the condition of fulfilling the six remaining criteria from the 2016 visa agreement—including the Anti-Terror Law—remains firmly in place. The government’s apparent “stopgap measure” of turning half the population into green-passport holders seems destined to hit a wall soon.
-
It is also quite clear that Southern Cyprus, which will hold the EU Council presidency in the first half of 2026, together with Greece, is doing everything it can to prevent Türkiye from being included in the new European security architecture known by the acronym SAFE.
-
Likewise, regarding the Customs Union, it should be recognized that the promise that Brussels will make an effort just as Ankara does has no real meaning as long as the EU–Southern Cyprus veto remains on the table.
The EU should realize that it cannot indefinitely string Türkiye along while making use of its military power and geographical advantages without bearing any cost, and the Turkish government should also see that no progress can be achieved with the logic of “even if we do what is required, they won’t accept us anyway.”