Mark Rutte greets a group of engineers from ASELSAN during his visit to Türkiye. His remarks stand in contrast to those of Ursula von der Leyen. EU elites appear to be closing ranks amid concerns that Türkiye could emerge stronger from the current turmoil so long as it stays out of the wars. (Photo: X/ASELSAN)
Recent developments over the past week indicate a concerted effort to disrupt the delicate balance of “active neutrality” that Türkiye has been trying to maintain within the US–EU–NATO triangle, against the backdrop of what increasingly appears as a US-backed Israel–Iran war. The cards are now being played face up; there is little need for concealment as the stakes—and the potential gains and losses for all parties—continue to rise.
We are entering a period in which efforts, particularly within the EU, to sideline Türkiye are intensifying. In this equation, Türkiye’s most significant leverage in terms of international alignment appears to be its NATO membership—alongside its ability to carefully balance national interests with the US–Europe dynamic.
A panoramic view of the past week reveals several key pressure points.
The US–EU–NATO Triangle
• Ursula von der Leyen, the head of the European Commission, speaking on the evening of April 19 at the anniversary event of the German newspaper Die Zeit, warned that unless Europe stands firm, Russian, Turkish, and Chinese influence would grow. Although she later attempted to walk back her remarks, her public statement was clear: she views Türkiye—still a long-standing EU candidate—as a source of threat comparable to Russia and China, reflecting a persistent fixation on keeping Türkiye outside not only the EU but Europe more broadly.
• Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO, met President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara on April 21. The main agenda for the NATO Summit to be held in Ankara on July 7–8 was collective defense against a China-backed Russia, with a particular focus on European security. In parallel, whether US President Donald Trump would attend the summit remained a key concern for both host Erdoğan and Rutte, who is striving to hold the alliance together.
• Having visited Türkiye in November 2024 and inspected Turkish Aerospace Industries facilities, Rutte went on to visit ASELSAN (leading Turkish military electronics company) on April 22. He described Türkiye’s recent advances in the defense industry as a “revolution,” emphasizing their importance for collective European security—remarks that stood in contrast to von der Leyen’s stance.
Greece–France–Cyprus–EU Axis
• On April 23, UK Home Secretary Yvette Cooper and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan signed a framework agreement in London for strategic cooperation. While grounded in NATO, the agreement goes beyond it, envisaging bilateral deterrence-based security cooperation in the region. Both countries’ significant military presence in Cyprus—the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean—and their cooperation during the regime change process in Syria should not be overlooked.
• On the same day, EU leaders held an “informal” summit in Southern Cyprus. It marked the first time since 2004—when the Greek Cypriot administration was admitted to the EU despite objections from the Turkish Cypriot north—that EU leaders convened collectively on the island. The message against the so-called “Turkish threat” was unmistakable.
• On April 24, it was announced by Nikos Christodoulides and Emmanuel Macron that Greece would deploy a tank unit to the island, while France would also station troops in Southern Cyprus alongside Israeli missile installations. Macron assured Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, stating, “We stand with you in case of attack.” The implicit question—who would attack Greece? Iran? Russia?—was answered by Macron himself: he was referring to a perceived “threat from Türkiye.”
Not Only Israel’s Influence
Several factors underpin the developments that have become visible over the past week:
• The cooperation memorandum was reached on December 23, 2025, in Jerusalem between Israel, Greece, and Southern Cyprus. In what is yet another attempt to exclude Türkiye from the Eastern Mediterranean, this time the distinguishing factor is the deployment of Israeli missiles—reportedly aimed at Türkiye—on Cyprus and Aegean islands. Fidan warned on April 20, a day before Rutte visits Ankara, that this cooperation constitutes “a threat to Türkiye and the region.”
• Trump is seeking to draw NATO—particularly its European allies—into Israel’s war with Iran, threatening to withdraw support. The EU remains divided. While EU elites led by von der Leyen take an openly pro-Israel stance, governments such as Spain, Sweden, Ireland, and, more recently, Italy—mindful of their electorates—have resisted.
Islamophobia or Anti-Türkiye Sentiment?
Trump’s pressure on Europe to bear the cost of setbacks in Iran is also producing divergent reactions across the continent. Germany appears to be pursuing a dual-track approach—seeking cooperation with Türkiye while simultaneously trying to keep it at arm’s length. France, meanwhile, is openly attempting to capitalize on the situation. Following recent elections, Hungary’s shift toward an anti-Israel position has further complicated matters, pushing EU elites—already constrained by internal and external NATO contradictions and reluctant to confront the US—toward targeting Türkiye, a country they have historically regarded as an adversary.
The tendency within the ruling AK Party to attribute this stance primarily to Islamophobia contains certain inconsistencies. Von der Leyen’s framing of Turkish influence alongside that of Russia and China suggests that the issue goes beyond Islamophobia. Rather, it reflects a deeper inability to reconcile with the Republic of Türkiye—established through the War of Independence—despite the passage of a world war and the Cold War.
After all, EU elites have shown little discomfort with non-secular, non-democratic Muslim regimes; on the contrary, they have been able to exclude them sociologically while continuing to engage economically.
If Türkiye manages to stay out of the region’s wars, it stands a strong chance of emerging from this turbulence in a strengthened position. That, ultimately, appears to be the underlying concern of some European powers.