French President Emmanuel Macron chairs the weekly cabinet meeting at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France October 17, 2018. Francois Mori/Pool via REUTERS
Recent developments in Paris point to a noticeable shift in Europe’s understanding of security. On Friday, 18 September, Emmanuel Macron brought together political party leaders and figures expected to play prominent roles in the next presidential election at the Élysée Palace. Yet politicians were not the only people around the table. Senior representatives from domestic and foreign intelligence, military intelligence, the national security bureaucracy and the energy sector were also present. The Élysée’s explanation was equally striking. The “rapid deterioration of the international situation” is now being discussed not simply in relation to the war in Ukraine, but alongside energy security and France’s domestic resilience.
It would be too simplistic to interpret this as evidence that “Europe is preparing for war.” What is clear, however, is that European capitals are increasingly thinking about war, energy, critical infrastructure and the credibility of American security guarantees within the same strategic framework. NATO officials continue to say that they do not see an imminent threat of a direct attack on the Alliance, but assessments suggesting an intensification of Russian hybrid activities are becoming increasingly prominent.
Paris is by no means an isolated case. Recent statements by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk offer one of the clearest examples of this broader shift. Tusk has warned that the autumn and winter months could become one of the most critical periods of the war so far, while revealing that Polish intelligence is assessing the possibility of hybrid attacks involving drones and missiles against countries supporting Ukraine.
This is not merely rhetorical. During Russia’s large-scale missile and drone attack on Ukraine on 17 September, Poland scrambled fighter aircraft and temporarily closed several airports. No violation of Polish airspace was detected, but the episode once again demonstrated just how close the war has come to NATO’s borders.
Another development that has become increasingly significant in recent weeks is Germany’s decision to expand its military presence in the Baltic region. Berlin’s plan to make its brigade in Lithuania fully operational by the end of 2027 is not a temporary precaution. It rests on the assumption that relations with Russia have become a long-term security challenge.
One of the most important dimensions of this emerging picture is the future role of the United States in Europe. Following his meeting with Polish President Karol Nawrocki, Donald Trump announced that progress had been made towards establishing a permanent US Army base in Poland. No final decision has yet been taken, but the fact that such a possibility is once again being seriously discussed sends an unmistakable political message regarding NATO’s eastern flank.
At the same time, however, the Trump administration is reassessing the wider American military presence in Europe and demanding that European allies assume a greater share of responsibility for their own defence. This dual dynamic complicates Europe’s security calculations and suggests that some of the tensions now emerging are unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Washington may strengthen its presence in frontline states such as Poland while simultaneously insisting that Europe expand its own military capabilities. The likely result is greater pressure, more defence spending and a further increase in military capacity across the continent.
Yet the developments now unfolding are not limited to the possibility of conventional conflict. Energy-related economic risks have also become central to Europe’s security thinking. The participation of senior energy officials in the Paris meeting is significant for precisely this reason. Paris is no longer drawing a sharp distinction between war and energy security. The possibility that conflicts in the Middle East could disrupt energy supplies, push up prices and fuel inflation has become part of Europe’s broader strategic assessment. Security can no longer be measured simply by the number of tanks, missiles or troops a country possesses.
At first glance, this environment creates important opportunities for Turkey. As a Black Sea state located on NATO’s southeastern flank, capable of maintaining direct channels of communication with Russia while simultaneously deepening defence ties with Ukraine, Turkey could see its importance within the Alliance increase further. The role played by the Montreux Convention throughout the war has already demonstrated that Black Sea security cannot be designed without Ankara. Following the most recent NATO Summit in Ankara, Turkey’s launch of the Mecca Defence Partnership with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan also extends, in one sense, NATO’s broader strategic influence into the Middle East.
These dynamics remain highly relevant. Europe’s efforts to expand its defence capacity may also create new opportunities for the Turkish defence industry. In areas such as drone systems, ammunition, armoured vehicles, electronic warfare and joint production arrangements, Turkey is no longer simply a NATO country that contributes military personnel. It is increasingly becoming an actor capable of supplying defence products, technologies and industrial capacity.
Yet this picture is not composed of opportunities alone. If security tensions between Europe and Russia harden further, the balancing strategy Ankara has pursued for years may become increasingly costly. Turkey is attempting, on the one hand, to fulfil its NATO obligations while, on the other, avoiding a complete rupture with Moscow because of energy, trade and diplomatic considerations. If grey-zone activities evolve into a more explicit NATO-Russia confrontation, maintaining both tracks simultaneously will become significantly more difficult.
A further sharp rise in energy prices would also create a serious economic risk for Turkey. The country is already feeling these pressures directly through changing fuel prices. If tensions in the Middle East were to push oil and natural gas prices permanently higher, the consequences for the current-account deficit, inflation and the exchange rate could be felt very quickly. Such pressures would place a heavy burden on the government both domestically and in foreign policy.
Ultimately, the picture stretching from Paris to Warsaw does not tell us that Europe is about to go to war tomorrow. What matters more is that European governments increasingly believe that the grey zone between war and peace is expanding, and they are beginning to prepare accordingly.
For Turkey, therefore, the central question is not simply whether its geopolitical value is increasing. The more important issue is whether that rising value will actually widen Ankara’s room for manoeuvre, and how far Turkey can continue to sustain its balancing act between Russia, NATO, Europe and the Middle East in an increasingly unforgiving security environment.
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