Why was Ankara’s response to Iran’s airstrike against Israel on the night of April 13 notably delayed and subdued? What is behind Turkish official’s silence?
Ankara’s response to Iran’s airstrike against Israel on the night of April 13 was notably delayed and subdued. Journalists waited for hours for statements from the Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and even the Ministry of National Defense, but received none. The first official evaluation came from Talha Köse, head of the National Intelligence Organization Academy (MİT Akademi) around noon next day. Ankara’s primary concern was the potential spread of Israel’s Gaza conflict throughout the region, followed by the fear of the Gaza tragedy fading from international attention.
Unusual silence about Iran’s attack
Ankara remained officially silent for hours, with neither President Tayyip Erdoğan nor Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan making statements. The first unofficial announcement from Foreign Ministry sources came around 3:00 p.m., stating that Fidan had advised Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to avoid escalating tensions during a phone call. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a written statement around 5:30 p.m. under the headline “regarding the recent developments in our region.”
“The risk of the war being waged by Israel in Gaza spreading and escalating,” the statement read, adding that the developments had raised concerns that the events could “quickly turn into a regional war.”
“Our President is being regularly briefed,” it ended.
There was no indication that President Erdoğan, who was evaluating the AKP’s defeat in the March 31 elections in Marmaris during the holiday, had returned early to Ankara to chair a security meeting due to the escalating tensions at the borders. There was also no information about a video conference. Erdogan’s holiday message remained the latest news on the Presidency’s website.
Later reports revealed by diplomatic sources that Fidan had conveyed the same message to UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
Ankara was also anticipating the situation
Iran’s airstrike against Israel was not entirely unexpected, given Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s declaration on April 10 that Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus on April 1 would not go unanswered.
On the same day, President Erdoğan and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed the issue during a “Ramadan Eid” phone call. On April 11, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken informed Fidan of the impending crisis, reportedly requesting a measured response from Iran.
On the same day, General Michael Kurilla, commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), visited Israel for two days of joint defense planning with military officials. The US Navy announced plans to send additional ships to the region. US media reports began suggesting an imminent attack, with April 13 being mentioned as a possible date.
According to defense sources that spoke to YetkinReport, Ankara warned both Iran and Israel against actions with unpredictable consequences, indicating a desire to avoid further escalation.
Theatre or chess?
Meanwhile, Ankara considered the possibility of Iran indirectly targeting Israel through proxies like Hezbollah.
It would be naive to assume that Iran overlooked the possibility of drones being intercepted before reaching Israel. Almost all UAVs and cruise missiles were destroyed in Iraqi, Syrian, and Jordanian airspace, and the remainder were intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome. Iran’s statement during the ongoing airstrike that they would not retaliate if Israel did not strike again led to speculation of theatrics, but this was a strategic move. Mehmet Ali Bayar wrote in YetkinReport that at least 7 ballistic missiles fell on the Nevatim airbase from where the planes that participated in the attack on Damascus took off.
It would also be naive to assume that President Erdogan’s cabinet was unaware of these developments, which even journalists could follow from open sources, through intelligence and diplomatic channels.
Ankara’s late and cautious response to Iran’s attack
So why did Ankara respond so late and cautiously to these significant developments on its doorstep?
In summary:
- Ankara was primarily concerned about the potential spread of the conflict and secondarily about the Gaza tragedy being overshadowed. Therefore, it did not want to attract too much attention.
- While Türkiye condemned Israel’s attack on Iran in Damascus, it did not want to legitimize Iran’s attack on Israel (even if described as retaliation). After all it is an attack by one country on another…
- Therefore, Ankara found itself in a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation and opted not to take the lead, settling for announcing its diplomatic contacts.
- Türkiye also noted the intervention of the US and the UK, which shed crocodile tears over Israel’s Gaza massacre while continuing to sell weapons. This further contributed to Ankara’s reluctance to take a proactive stance.
- Türkiye-Iran relations have been increasingly strained, especially due to support given to the PKK. Ankara is handling its relations with Tehran with extreme caution.
New era with the US
- Erdogan attaches importance to his upcoming meeting with US President Joe Biden on May 9; the invitation came for the first time in four years, after the F-16/Sweden deal. There is a noticeable tendency to avoid steps that would lead to confrontation with the US. This includes the need for external sources to overcome the economic crisis.
- After Israel targeted Hamas’s political leader Ismail Haniyeh’s three sons and four grandchildren in Gaza on April 10, CIA Director William Burns called MIT Chief İbrahim Kalın for a “ramadan” greeting. According to security sources, the ceasefire in Gaza and the issue of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas were discussed, and following this meeting, Kalın reestablished contact with Hamas leadership.
Therefore, Türkiye’s relatively low-profile stance on Israel’s Gaza War, Israel-Iran tension, and Russia’s Ukraine war should not be considered independently of its relations with the US.
