The success of Turkish drones in recent wars raises questions of possible exports to Russia: is it possible or speculation? (Photo: Baykar)
At the recent NATO leaders summit in Washington, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea were described as the “hostile camp” to the Alliance in harsher terms than ever before, sharpening fault lines.
The decision to hold the 2026 NATO Leaders Summit in Türkiye was perhaps the most important decision for us. The joint statement also referred to the 1936 Montreux Convention, emphasizing freedom of navigation towards the Black Sea.
Another issue of interest not discussed or reflected in the statements was the quality of Türkiye’s increasingly powerful defense industry products and services and which countries they are being sold to.
I frequently face questions on this topic in London and other NATO capitals during the meetings I speak. Especially as one of NATO’s countries closest to Russia alongside Hungary, there are doubts and questions about whether there are any current or planned military sales, including next-generation fighter, training, and transport aircraft to Moscow.
Military export to Russia?
This confusion has to be clarified to avoid further speculation. The mentioned military aircraft are still under development and are being co-developed with foreign companies like BAE Systems. As you know, on such sensitive issues, American civilian and military intelligence agencies are quick to present files the moment a leaf stirs.
Türkiye’s impressive success in military technology is particularly evident in the development and deployment of advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned vehicles, and next-generation aircraft. These advances reflect Türkiye’s strategic determination to enhance its defense capabilities and secure its regional influence at a time when sanctions and military sales bans restrict its national security and foreign policy maneuvering space.
Drone warfare technology and doctrine
Türkiye has proven itself as a pioneer in drone warfare technology, achieving notable successes in Syria, Libya, Azerbaijan, and the defense against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Turkish UAVs play a significant role in reconnaissance, surveillance, and combat operations, demonstrating their effectiveness and reliability in modern warfare scenarios. Beyond UAVs, Turkey is pursuing a robust unmanned surface vehicle (USV) program and expanding its unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) capabilities.
TAI Kaan: Turkish new generation fighter
TAI Kaan, also known as TF-X (Turkish Fighter) or MMU (National Combat Aircraft), is at the forefront of Turkey’s aviation advancements. Developed by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in collaboration with BAE Systems, Kaan represents a significant leap in stealth technology and air superiority capabilities.
Designed to replace the aging F-16 Fighting Falcon fleet, Kaan aims to enhance the operational readiness of the Turkish Air Force with its twin-engine, all-weather performance. The development process of Kaan has been marked by significant milestones such as successful ground tests and its first flight in February 2024. Planned to enter service in 2028, Kaan aims to set new standards in air combat capability, positioning Turkey as a key player in the global defense market.
Turkish-Russian relations: it’s complicated
Despite historical differences and geopolitical tensions, Türkiye and Russia have engaged in various military cooperations recently. This relationship is defined by a mixture of cooperation and competition shaped by strategic interests and regional dynamics in Syria, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Libya, and the Balkans. Trade volume stands at $65 billion with Russia, compared to $42 billion with the US.
A notable aspect of Turkish-Russian military relations has been Türkiye’s purchase of Russian military equipment, especially the S-400 surface-to-air missile system. Completed in 2017, this purchase sparked debates within NATO and strained relations with the United States, leading to sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
Despite these challenges, Türkiyecontinued the S-400 acquisition, citing national security priorities and technological diversification. Beyond defense equipment, Türkiyeand Russia collaborates on energy projects, such as the TurkStream gas pipeline, which enhances energy security and strengthens economic ties for both countries. Joint ventures in nuclear energy and aviation further highlight mutual interests in expanding bilateral cooperation beyond defense.
Military exports and geopolitical implications
Despite Türkiye’s advancements in military technology, its geopolitical preferences significantly influence its export policies. Turkey’s NATO membership and adherence to US sanction regimes impose strict limitations on potential export destinations for its advanced military hardware.
Lessons from past events, such as the heavy repercussions of purchasing the S-400 missile system from Russia, underscore the consequences of deviating from NATO-aligned defense procurement strategies.
Abnkara’s strategic decision-making process, guided by presidential initiative, ensures that export endeavors align with national security priorities and geopolitical alliances.
While Turkey is actively marketing its defense industry products in global military markets, I believe exports to countries like Russia, Iran, North Korea, or China are highly unlikely due to the potential negative geopolitical and economic consequences.
Pragmatic approach in Ankara
Türkiye’s military cooperation with Russia exists within the broader context of geopolitical strategies and alignments. While maintaining NATO membership and Western alliances, Türkiye’s engagement with Russia reflects its pursuit of strategic autonomy and regional influence.
However, this relationship is sensitive to shifts in global geopolitics and requires careful navigation to balance conflicting interests and maintain international reputation.
Military engagements, tactical cooperation, and broader geopolitical interests continue to shape the course of this relationship. Ankara’s pragmatic approach reflects its efforts to secure national interests and manage international partnerships and alliances.
To avoid provocations
With ongoing developments in TAI Kaan and other domestic aviation projects, Turkey continues to enhance its self-sufficiency in defense technology.
Türkiye’s journey towards excellence in military technology, guided by a balance of innovation, strategic foresight, and commitment to international alliances, ensures it plays a significant role in shaping future defense capabilities.
Based on my recent discussions with informed individuals in Ankara, it seems unlikely that Türkiye will engage in military aircraft trade that would jeopardize its strategic alliances or provoke further sanctions.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Minister of National Defense Yaşar Güler have significant influence on any potential military aircraft sales to Russia, and I have every reason to believe that they would not view such a request favorably, even if it were made.
Not very likely
As in many other NATO countries, obtaining parliamentary approval for military sales would be much more prudent, as any sale could imply involvement in a conflict or invite counter-retaliation.
To my knowledge, there is no legal basis for such legislative approval.
I tend to believe that President Erdoğan would not want at all to delegate his authority to the parliament on overseas military sales.
In a nutshell, I believe that the current development of fighter, training, or transport aircraft and other critical military systems and equipment will not be sold to Russia or any other country considered hostile to NATO.
