The visa facilitation granted to Iraq has led to backlash. The real story behind this is hidden in the counter-terrorism agreement signed with Iraq. In the photo, Turkish and Iraqi diplomatic and security delegations are seen in Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s office; to Fidan’s right is his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein, who signed the agreement. To Hussein’s left is Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet Muhammad Al-Abbasi, while to Fidan’s right are Turkish National Defense Minister Yaşar Güler and National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Chief İbrahim Kalın. (Photo: Ministry of National Defense)
Türkiye and Iraq signed a “Memorandum of Understanding on Combating Terrorism” on August 15. On the 40th anniversary of PKK militants launching an armed struggle against Türkiye with raids on Eruh and Şemdinli from Iraqi territory, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein signed this symbolically significant agreement. However, this agreement, which the government had been working on for years, was presented to the public mainly in terms of visa liberalization for Iraq and drew criticism.
With this agreement Iraqi citizens under 15 and over 50 would be able to enter Türkiye without a visa. While anyone can enter Türkiye without a visa if they wish, Turkish citizens cannot travel visa-free to every country they want, and obtaining visas is becoming increasingly difficult. It was clear that this visa facilitation for Iraq would provide Western countries with another excuse to make it even harder for Turkish citizens to obtain visas.
According to diplomatic sources who spoke to T24, these age groups were seen as more likely to return to their countries rather than staying in Türkiye as refugees or using it as a stepping stone to Europe. This wasn’t a convincing justification. Why was this idea only now being implemented, and why was it announced alongside a security agreement?
The real story behind the visa liberalization for Iraq
The true nature of granting – officially termed – “limited visa liberalization” to Iraq was actually hidden within that agreement.
Efforts to normalize Türkiye-Iraq relations had accelerated about two years ago when Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani took office in October 2022. Progress was being made not only in terms of security but also in oil trade and joint strategic transportation projects like the Development Road.
From Türkiye’s security perspective, the PKK’s forty-year presence in Iraqi territory was the main issue, while from Iraq’s viewpoint, the long-standing Turkish military presence on its soil was the primary concern. The Turkish Armed Forces had established observation bases in Iraqi territory to prevent PKK attacks across the border, a task that the Iraqi state structure – crippled by the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 US invasion – was unable to accomplish even if it wanted to.
On the same day the foreign ministers of Türkiye and Iraq signed the security memorandum, August 15, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler told Fevzi Çakır from Habertürk that they were nearing the completion phase of the Pençe (Claw) series of operations in Iraqi territory, which had been ongoing since 2019, and that the Iraqi government was cooperating with “the right steps.”
Sudani’s need for good news
The memorandum of understanding signed in Ankara on August 15 was one of the steps envisioned within the framework of 26 agreements signed during President Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Iraq on April 22 this year.
One of the most important elements of the signed counter-terrorism memorandum involves the Gedu base near the town of Zilkan in the Bashiqa region, about 15 kilometers north of Mosul and approximately 100 kilometers inside Iraqi territory. This base, established in 2015, aims to block the PKK’s transit routes between Iraq and Syria. The base had previously been the target of rocket attacks by both the PKK and pro-Iranian groups within the Shiite umbrella organization Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq.
With the agreement, the Bashiqa base will be transferred to Iraq but will become a joint military training base for Türkiye and Iraq. This will provide a legal basis for Türkiye’s significant military presence on Iraqi soil.
Of course, there’s no giving without taking. Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani needed to give his people some good news while telling them that this base was finally taken from Turkish administration.
It appears that visa liberalization for Iraq was one of those pieces of good news.
The visa lobby in Türkiye
Whether other concessions were made to Iraq will become clear over time. But let’s note that one of the elements added to Türkiye’s win column is the activation of a “joint operations center” in Baghdad. These are also considered part of the “normalization” process.
While we’re on the subject, it’s worth remembering that there are sectors that benefit from the visa practices that the middle class, increasingly eroded by economic crises and with diminishing opportunities to breathe, complains about so much, and they are also lobbying on the other side.
The tourism sector is not at all uncomfortable with the visa requirements imposed on Turkish citizens. The thinking is that those who can’t go abroad will spend their money domestically anyway.
Then there’s our cosmetic medical sector, for example; the hair transplant, rhinoplasty, and breast augmentation industry. For them, the more visa-free foreigners come to Türkiye, the more customers they get.
It seems the more we try to solve things, the more tangled they become…
