“One thing is clear: The political system has, after decades, accepted and been compelled to recognize the presence of a leftist Kurdish party in the Turkish Parliament. The MHP’s acceptance of this reality, if genuine, is of strategic significance.”
On the same day that the Chief Legal Advisor to the Turkish Presidency, Mehmet Uçum, said “the state does not repeat a process that fails to yield results,” journalist Amberin Zaman, known for her deep Kurdish and American sources, made an intriguing claim on the Al-Monitor news site.
According to her report, which she claims to have confirmed from three separate sources, Turkish government had facilitated a meeting between imprisoned founding leader of the outlawed Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, and the current PKK leadership based in Iraq’s Qandil mountains, urging them to lay down their arms.
In essence, Al-Monitor’s sources suggest that this “process” had already begun even before Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli extended an olive branch to Kurdish-issue-focused People’s Democracy and Equality Party (DEM Party) members at the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on October 1, stirring a debate in Türkiye.
When I inquired about this news from a high-ranking security source, they responded, “It’s not accurate.” They denied any contact between Öcalan and Qandil. I then asked if there had been any discussions about Öcalan meeting with someone under conditions of secrecy, but received no response to this query. Sources from the Ministry of Justice also stated they had no such information.
However, there’s logic in what Uçum told Habertürk TV. It had become evident that the 2012-2015 talks with PKK would not lead to a solution, given the PKK’s involvement in the Syrian civil war and the subsequent U.S. intervention in 2014 with the Kobani/October 6-8 events. It’s clear that repeating the same approach won’t be effective.
Syria-US-Israel-PKK dynamics
The PKK finds itself in a contradictory situation. On one hand, they’ve received U.S.-NATO training and weapons for tens of thousands of militants over the past decade as part of the American train-and-equip program in Syria. On the other hand, Ankara, in coordination with Baghdad, now counters attacks on the Iraqi side of the Turkish border and conducts precision strikes against PKK cadres in both Iraq and Syria through MIT-TSK collaboration. While the PKK appears to be bolstering its militant resources, it’s simultaneously losing operational capabilities.
The balance of power in Syria and Iraq is also shifting due to developments involving Israel.
Turkish security sources report that Hezbollah militants in Syria are evacuating Aleppo to move into Lebanon. According to Ankara’s intelligence and analysis, the U.S.’s overt support for Israel in Gaza and Lebanon has unsettled Kurdish and Arab groups in Syria and Iraq who have ties with the U.S.. Ankara is closely monitoring how Israel’s support impacts the PKK and its Syrian offshoots, but it’s noteworthy that the DEM Party, like other parties in the Turkish Parliament, opposes Israel’s actions against Palestine and Lebanon.
This stance reflects the fact that the DEM base, which has historically empathized with Palestinians in the face of Israeli aggression, is guided more by conscience than by the PKK’s position on Israel, given the latter’s partnership with the U.S.
There’s also a need for research into how the DEM base views the impact of a non-conflict environment on their children’s survival prospects.
Kurdish question and DEM-PKK relationship
One of the most apt descriptions of the relationship between DEM (or its predecessor parties) and the PKK was articulated by Ahmet Türk: “We share the same social base.” This implies that while not every HDP or DEM voter is a PKK member, it’s fair to say that PKK sympathizers tend to vote for DEM.
This context helps in interpreting the recent statements by Bahçeli and Uçum, and in understanding what they mean by a “new era.”
First, chronologically, after shaking hands with DEM Party lawmakers on the opening of the parliament on October 1, Bahçeli stated: “The hand I extend is an invitation to become a party of Türkiye, to stand against terrorism, to unite in our thousand-year brotherhood.”
The timing of Bahçeli’s outreach to DEM in relation to the “Freedom for Öcalan” rallies, which seemed to reinforce the PKK’s base by endorsing an unrealistic demand is also important.
Then Uçum said: “In essence, it’s about freeing DEM from terrorist tutelage and removing this influence from Parliament.”
While this statement could be misinterpreted as it is spoken words rather a written statement, the broader context of his remarks suggests that Uçum aims to eliminate not DEM itself, but rather the PKK’s influence over it.
One thing is clear: The political system has, after decades, accepted and been compelled to recognize the presence of a leftist Kurdish party in the Turkish Parliament. The MHP’s acceptance of this reality, if genuine, is of strategic significance.
The next phase appears to be an attempt to separate this political representation from armed struggle. Only time will tell if this approach will succeed.
