“The political landscape for 2025 became clear in the final week of 2024. The AKP will attempt to orchestrate its recovery by shifting attention from economic troubles to Syria and using it as leverage in Kurdish affairs. Meanwhile, the CHP will focus on rallying millions around their primary concern – the cost of living crisis – and convincing them that the solution lies in early elections to change the government.”
When President Tayyip Erdoğan began reciting the opening verses of Surah Al-Fath in Arabic during his Justice and Development Party (AKP) parliamentary group meeting on December 25, amid chants of “Conqueror of Syria,” I wrote in my notebook “We’re going into Syria.”
However, launching an operation against the PKK/YPG in Syria is one thing; conquest is something entirely different.
Naturally, Türkiye has no intention of conquering Syria – Erdoğan reiterated in this speech that “we have no territorial ambitions.”
Rather, the issue is attempting to placate millions who were disappointed by the minimum wage announcement by saying “But look at Syria” – particularly timely now that prospective US President Donald Trump has alleged Turkish backing of HTS.
During these same hours, the CHP leadership was meeting to decide on “street protests” after the minimum wage was set at 22,104 lira, disregarding labor unions’ demands. Upon hearing Erdoğan’s speech, CHP leader Özgür Özel would remark “We’ve seen this conquest movie before in 2011” and assert that the money spent on Syria was 400 times the amount of the denied minimum wage increase.
Erdoğan: Return to 50 percent
The political landscape for 2025 became clear in the final week of 2024. The AKP will attempt to orchestrate its recovery by shifting attention from economic troubles to Syria and using it as leverage in Kurdish affairs. Meanwhile, the CHP will focus on rallying millions around their primary concern – the cost of living crisis – and convincing them that the solution lies in early elections to change the government.
Yesterday, Erdoğan announced they were mobilizing to elevate the AKP back to the “50 percent threshold.” He’s beginning his “marathon” with the Balıkesir Congress on December 27 and Bursa Congress on December 28; following the Ankara Congress on February 7 and Istanbul Congress on February 8, he plans to reshape the party leadership at the General Assembly, and possibly later reshuffle some cabinet positions.
Özel observes that while Erdoğan maintains his presence, AKP members can now only show their faces in public during congress events. Following the minimum wage announcement, AKP members will need the Syria narrative even more to address difficult questions from the public.
When Erdoğan references the “50 percent threshold,” he’s alluding to AKP’s 49.8 percent vote share in the 2011 elections. Subsequent electoral victories at this level were achieved only with MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s support, not independently.
AKP and CHP scenarios
We can assume the AKP’s strategy looks something like this:
- The party will regroup,
- The economy will recover,
- Focus will be maintained on foreign policy (hence the need for Syria),
- The agenda will be managed through constitutional debates,
- DEM Party’s support will be secured, or at minimum, their electoral cooperation with CHP will be prevented
- Erdoğan’s re-candidacy will be enabled through an early election decision from Parliament near the normal election time, perhaps late 2027 or early 2028.
The most crucial element here is, of course, getting the economy back on track and alleviating voters’ financial hardships. And that’s also the most challenging part.
We can assume the CHP’s strategy is as follows:
- The party will consolidate, mobilizing its organization for street campaigns to energize voters,
- Attention will be redirected from foreign policy to the economy,
- Voters will be convinced that they, not Erdoğan, can solve economic hardships,
- Kurdish voters will be persuaded that the solution lies in broader democracy rather than political bargaining,
- Municipalities will be closely monitored to avoid giving the government any openings for intervention.
The CHP faces two major challenges. First, ending the appearance of multiple leadership factions and internal feuds. Second, and relatedly, convincing voters that they represent the solution.
Political struggle in 2025
Foreign and security policies are areas where the CHP believes itself strong but lacks a comprehensive vision – areas where the AKP holds the moral high ground.
So much so that while millions bear the cost of the economic crisis, attention can be diverted to Syria with rhetoric of (non-existent) conquest and claims that Jerusalem is the next goal.
This is, in a way, an attempt to mask AKP’s weakness: if they can manage 2025 and 2026 with promises of “light at the end of the tunnel,” they think they can make voters forget past hardships in 2027 through the “open the taps” policy they currently can’t implement.
Therefore, both Erdoğan’s tactic of shifting focus from the economy to foreign policy (currently Syria) and Özel’s tactic of shifting focus from foreign policy to the economy have their own logic.
Political struggle in the new year appears set to unfold along these lines.
