If Turkish opposition CHP leader Özgür Özel can draw crowds to public squares in the August heat, the release of Ekrem İmamoğlu is not the sole reason; rather, the İmamoğlu case has become a common ground, a catalyst for broader grievances. The photo (by CHP) is from Aksaray.
The Turkish opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel can mobilize people to fill squares in his protest rallies in the hottest summer in recent years, in the heat of July and August; there’s more than one reason for it.
Let’s be clear: if crowds in Anatolian cities, in cities where President Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is strong, are filling squares in August, it’s not solely due to their reaction to the detention and capture of the CHP Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu. This reaction seems to be a conduit for expressing other societal frustrations and grievances.
Everyone attending the rallies has their reasons, and CHP’s rallies—demanding freedom for İmamoğlu and early elections—provide an opportunity for people to voice their discontent with the government. The reverse is also true: city residents going to the squares to express their grievances lend strength to CHP’s campaign for İmamoğlu and early elections. These are mutually reinforcing processes. The majority of people think that the İmamoğlu trials aim to block his candidacy for presidency against Erdoğan, regardless of the corruption accusations in mainly pro-AKP media, still lacking an indictment.
The secret behind the rush to the squares
It’s hard to explain otherwise why Özel’s rally in the Central Anatolian city of Aksaray on August 1 filled a square that Erdoğan knows well to the brim. Just two years ago, in the May 2023 elections, this city voted 70 percent for both Erdoğan’s presidential candidacy and the AKP.
It’s equally difficult to explain why people in, also conservative Central Anatolian cities like Yozgat or Konya, would flock to squares chanting, “My hero, my lion” for İmamoğlu.
In the East Black Sea city of Trabzon, another AKP stronghold, explaining the packed rally solely by İmamoğlu’s hometown connection falls short.
For instance, in Aksaray—a city not just agricultural but also industrial—on August 1, when CHP held its rally, President Erdoğan postponed public workers’ strike decisions, citing national security. On August 2, Türk-İş and Hak-İş trade union confederations accepted a government wage offer they had previously called an “insult to their honor.”
The cost of living and economic hardship have become chronic issues, and they cannot be swept under the rug by facilitating Russia-Ukraine talks or condemning Israel’s aggression—starving Palestinians to death—with empty “we stand by you” clichés.
If people are taking to the streets, the root cause is their general dissatisfaction with the government’s economic and social policies.
The risk Özel took
On March 19, when İmamoğlu was detained, Özel took a risky step by calling people to the streets. The CHP base, long dormant, could have remained indifferent. Crowds might have been deterred by police measures, potential investigations, or imprisonment. Schools would close in June, the Parliament in July; the protests might not have been sustained.
But that didn’t happen. The spark caught fire. Starting from Saraçhane square, where the municipality headquarters is, Özel managed to mobilize not just CHP supporters but also non-CHP opposition groups to the squares. He established a legitimate line of demand by not asking for the dismissal of corruption charges against İmamoğlu but asking that he should be released and should not be kept in prison until he is legally found guilty of them. Beyond İmamoğlu, actions like personally burying his late friend, Manisa Mayor Ferdi Zeyrek, resonated with the CHP base as a symbol of loyalty “not just until the bargain, but until the grave.”
Through the İmamoğlu protests, Özel showcased his political leadership qualities and carved out a space for himself on the ground.
Türkiye last witnessed a similar wave of opposition, with people flooding squares despite efforts by the establishment to suppress it, in 2001-2002, when Erdoğan—despite a political ban—founded the AKP and toured cities.
Back then, Erdoğan and the AKP were underestimated, with clichés like “the state won’t allow it.”
We know the outcome.
