Can the NATO Summit Open Europe’s Doors to Türkiye?

The NATO Summit will be held in Ankara on July 7–8. Thanks to the summit, Ankara is also gaining a new airport.

The long-underutilized Etimesgut Military Air Base has been upgraded to international airport status under the name “Ankara Airport,” capable of accommodating even the Boeing 747 used as Air Force One by U.S. President Donald Trump. As a result, visiting foreign leaders will no longer disrupt civilian traffic at Esenboğa Airport—or the city’s road traffic.

For some time, there has been demand for more direct flights from Ankara to world capitals, particularly in the West.

President Tayyip Erdoğan’s administration has high expectations for the NATO Summit.

As a regional middle power, Türkiye wants to emerge stronger from the current period of global uncertainty.

The summit could enable Türkiye to assume a more influential military role in the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Caucasus.

Its geographical location, large and battle-tested armed forces, and rapidly developing defense industry make such a role possible.

But Ankara’s expectations from the NATO Summit go beyond security matters. It also hopes for closer political and economic ties with the European Union.

Will NATO Open the EU’s Doors?

To answer whether the NATO Summit can open the EU’s doors to Türkiye, let us start with the question that concerns ordinary citizens most: visa liberalization.

Will Türkiye’s military importance persuade Brussels to overlook the six outstanding conditions of the 2016 agreement—ranging from anti-terror legislation to data-sharing requirements—on which Ankara has not only failed to make progress but has actually moved backward?

At a time when:

• The European Parliament is considering sanctions against Justice Minister Akın Gürlek, who as Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor oversaw the imprisonment of CHP mayors, including Ekrem İmamoğlu;
• Conflicts in the Middle East are fueling anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment in European politics;
• Türkiye continues not to implement rulings by the European Court of Human Rights and even decisions of its own Constitutional Court in cases such as those of Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtaş;

does anyone seriously expect the EU to grant Turkish citizens easier travel simply because Türkiye has strengthened its defense industry?

Then again, stranger things have happened.

At Least an Updated Customs Union?

Or perhaps, taking note of the Turkish business community’s growing frustration, Europe might adjust its newly promoted “Made in Europe” strategy into a broader “Made with Europe” framework that would not further restrict Türkiye’s export opportunities.

Why, after all, is China’s BYD shifting production from Türkiye to Hungary?

And what about the Customs Union?

Would the EU persuade the Greek Cypriot government—which it admitted as representing the entire island despite the unresolved Cyprus dispute—to withdraw its veto simply because Türkiye is hosting a new NATO corps headquarters?

Why did Kazakhstan, which invited the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to the Summit of Turkic States at Ankara’s urging, award a medal to the President of the Republic of Cyprus immediately afterward?

Could increased trade with the EU have something to do with it?

Or perhaps the NATO Summit will attract more foreign investment to Türkiye?

Certainly, many investors would like to invest in Türkiye. But one wonders whether they have read reports about the state appointing trustees and taking control of major private companies. Have they followed the news that thirteen major poultry producers woke up one morning to find government-appointed administrators running their businesses?

Did they reassure themselves by saying, “That could never happen to us; besides, we can always rely on an independent judiciary”?

A New CPU* Spirit in Ankara?

Personally, I find it difficult to believe that Erdoğan—with a quarter-century of experience in governing the state—could genuinely think that Türkiye will gain easier access to Europe simply because:

• It hosts a NATO Summit;
• It has maintained its strategic geography for a thousand years;
• Its defense industry is making remarkable advances.

Even limited participation in Europe’s emerging security architecture through NATO and U.S. influence should already be considered a success.

Yet as Erdoğan’s original political circle has gradually shrunk and technocratic advisers have gained influence, a group has emerged that could be described as possessing a kind of neo-Unionist mindset.

Viewed from that perspective, one can detect echoes of the overconfidence that accompanied Enver Pasha’s decision to present the German General Staff’s strategy against Russia as a grand “Red Apple” campaign, leading tens of thousands of Ottoman soldiers to their deaths at Sarıkamış in 1915.

Interestingly, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) appears more cautious on this issue, though a similar outlook can also be observed among some circles around Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

What If Trump Becomes a Lame Duck?

Developments should also be viewed through another lens.

What happens if Donald Trump—who, encouraged by Israel, embarks on a campaign against Iran and later presents a setback as a victory—loses control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives in the November 2026 midterm elections?

Such an outcome could reshape global political balances.

If Trump becomes a lame-duck president, the European politicians he has often publicly lectured and lined up for criticism may seek their revenge.

The nature of transatlantic relations could change once again.

And European leaders unwilling to confront the United States directly might instead direct their pressure toward Türkiye.

I mention this only because it is wise to be prepared.

* CPU (Committee of Union and Progress )