Thanks to Israel, the U.S. is no longer the Arab monarchies’ insurance policy against Iran

When U.S. President Donald Trump announces that he is about to launch the biggest attack yet against Iran, only to call it off at the last minute, that in itself has become newsworthy.

Yet what truly matters is a single sentence he uttered while explaining aboard Air Force One why the latest strike had been cancelled. That remark reveals not only how the geopolitics of the Middle East are changing, but also how Trump—whose regional policy has largely been tied to the interests of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in Israel—is beginning to move the United States away from serving as the insurance policy against Iran that the Arab monarchies have long relied upon.

Let us set aside Trump’s habitual boasts, such as his claim in the accompanying news video that “Iran is begging us” and wants negotiations. The real story lies in his explanation for cancelling the attack, when he said: “Saudi Arabia doesn’t want us to do it either.”

In fact, Trump initially hinted that “three other groups” were also opposed to an attack. Yet reporters, more interested in pressing him on why he had not struck Iran, failed to ask the obvious follow-up question: Who are they? Had they done so, they might have heard names such as Qatar, Bahrain and Jordan—or countries like Türkiye, Pakistan and Egypt, all of which have been working to prevent further escalation.

Arab monarchies’ insurance policy

One reporter did ask Trump about the possibility of withdrawing from the U.S. naval base in Bahrain, home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. No answer came.

Until recently, the Gulf monarchies viewed America’s military might as a security guarantee against Iran—virtually an insurance policy. Today, however, these same monarchies fear becoming targets of Iranian retaliation and are urging Washington not to push Iran further merely to satisfy Israeli demands.

Over the past decade, Gulf countries have purchased roughly $150 billion worth of American weapons, about $100 billion of which came from Saudi Arabia alone. Those arms purchases were, in effect, the insurance premiums the Arab monarchies paid for protection against Iran.

Now, however, the United States is increasingly unable to honor the terms of that insurance policy. Worse still, every move Washington makes under Israeli pressure leaves the Gulf monarchies more vulnerable to Iranian retaliation.

Missile attacks and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz have already disrupted Qatar’s natural gas exports. Some estimates suggest that since the Israeli-U.S. attack of February 28, combined economic losses have reached around $30 billion. Oil exports from both the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are also declining. Meanwhile, attacks by Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have turned the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—the southern gateway to the Suez Canal and a vital oil shipping route—into another high-risk maritime chokepoint.

Is the US running out of missiles?

Until recently, Gulf monarchies proudly claimed that, using American-made air defense systems purchased with petrodollars, they intercepted around 90 percent of Iranian attacks.

According to reports in the U.S. media, however, another problem has emerged: missile shortages.

American missile production is no longer keeping pace with the rate of Iranian attacks—a kind of “running out of ammunition” syndrome.

The Patriot interceptor missiles that Arab states launch almost like fireworks in response to Iranian strikes cost around $4 million each, excluding the cost of the defense system itself. THAAD interceptor missiles sold by the United States to Saudi Arabia and the UAE cost nearly $13 million apiece. An American-made MQ-9 Reaper armed drone approaches $50 million per unit.(*)

By comparison, Iran’s Shahed kamikaze drones—which have increasingly targeted U.S. bases and strategic facilities across Arab countries in retaliation for American and Israeli strikes—cost a fraction of that amount. A propeller-driven Shahed-136 costs roughly $40,000, while the turbojet-powered Shahed-238 costs around $130,000.

Each time Trump cancels another attack, he buys time for America’s defense industry—but at the cost of reducing confidence in the insurance policy itself.

A changing geopolitical landscape

The fundamental reason Washington is increasingly unable to fulfill the security guarantees for which Arab monarchies have paid through massive arms purchases is that Israel has used its political influence and lobbying power in the United States to push the American military into confronting Iran.

The turning point came after Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, which effectively provided the Israeli government with the justification it had long sought for its devastating campaign in Gaza.

According to human rights organizations, during Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s 37 years in power, roughly 70,000 people were killed in Iran through executions or the suppression of protests. Yet during the 37 months leading up to Khamenei’s death in the Israeli-U.S. attack of February 28, 2026, approximately the same number of people were killed in Gaza—half of them women, children and elderly civilians incapable of fighting.

Meanwhile, Israel eliminated much of the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah, both backed by Iran. Another major turning point came on December 8, 2024, when the Iran-aligned Baath regime in Syria was overthrown.

Netanyahu convinced Trump that once Khamenei and his inner circle were eliminated, Iran’s Islamic Republic would collapse within two or three weeks. If that happened, there would be no disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.

Israel’s broader strategy—drawing the United States into deploying ground forces in Iran based on the assumption that armed Kurdish groups could overthrow the regime—ultimately collapsed, with Türkiye playing a significant role in undermining that scenario.

Who has lost more?

Before the Israeli-U.S. attack on February 28, the Strait of Hormuz was open.

Today, it is closed.

Before the attack, Gulf countries continued exporting oil and gas through Hormuz.

Today, they are searching for alternative export routes. The insurance provider—the United States—is no longer capable of compensating its clients for their losses.

Before the attack, Trump hoped to strengthen Republican control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives in November’s midterm elections.

Now he is struggling to avoid losing both chambers and becoming a lame-duck president.

Trump would gladly end the war tomorrow. Netanyahu, however—who reportedly spoke to Trump during their most recent impromptu White House meeting as though “I’m the one in charge”—is not allowing that to happen.

Trump wants to focus on strategic competition with China in the Pacific. Netanyahu, by keeping the Middle East in a constant state of crisis, is ensuring that the United States remains deeply engaged in the region.

Iran’s regime has been shaken. Its military has suffered severe damage. So has its economy. Yet the regime remains standing.

Its uranium enrichment infrastructure has been badly damaged, but if the technological know-how survives, the facilities can eventually be rebuilt.

And the Strait of Hormuz—which once allowed free passage—is now moving toward a system under which Iran and Oman would jointly charge transit fees.

The answer to the question of who has lost more is increasingly obvious: Trump—and the United States.

What this means for Türkiye

From Türkiye’s perspective, the evolving regional geopolitics present several opportunities:

• The weakening of America’s role as the Arab monarchies’ insurance policy against Iran;
• The growing reluctance of those same monarchies to move further into Israel’s orbit through initiatives such as the Abraham Accords, despite having appeared ready to do so;
• Rising international opposition to Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians;
• The reduced likelihood that Iran, despite surviving the conflict, will ultimately acquire nuclear weapons;
• The Gulf states’ desire to reduce their dependence on both the Strait of Hormuz—and even the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—for exporting oil and natural gas to global markets;
• And, in addition, NATO’s decision at its Ankara Summit to place greater strategic emphasis on the Middle East.

Taken together, these developments could work to Türkiye’s advantage if managed effectively.

The greatest opportunity lies in promoting alternative energy corridors that would transport Gulf oil and gas to world markets without relying on routes under Iranian control.

That makes deeper cooperation between Türkiye, Iraq and Syria strategically essential.

Likewise, the “Terror-Free Türkiye” initiative—which aims to eliminate the PKK as an armed threat—also has an important place within this broader strategic picture.

For its own interests, the United States would also benefit from no longer putting all of its Middle East eggs in Israel’s basket.

Trump’s decision to appoint Ambassador Tom Barrack not only as U.S. ambassador to Türkiye but also as special envoy for both Syria and Iraq points in that direction.

Whether Trump possesses enough political strength to overcome the Netanyahu obstacle, however, remains uncertain.

Note

(*) For comparison, the Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı, which belongs to the same class as the MQ-9 Reaper, costs approximately $30 million per unit, while the TUSAŞ ANKA-2 costs around $25 million. China’s Chengdu and Caihong-5 platforms are estimated to cost roughly $10 million each.