A ground operation against Hezbollah’s Lebanese organization could trigger a complex situation that could have profound effects on the security, economic and political balances of many countries in the Middle East. This could alter the balance of power and cause international actors to reassess their interests in the region
Following the assassination of Hassan Nasrullah and 17 other senior Hezbollah leaders, Israel has launched a limited ground operation targeting the organization’s military infrastructure and leadership in Lebanon, which could significantly alter the geopolitical and security balance in the Middle East. As Iran’s most powerful proxy, Hezbollah plays a critical role in maintaining Tehran’s influence over Lebanon, Syria and Israel. An operation targeting Hezbollah’s leadership could increase regional instability and lead to a wider conflict that would involve other key actors, such as Türkiye, Syria, Iran and the Gulf states.
Regional weaknesses and Lebanon
Lebanon remains a fragile state, marked by a weak central government, a deep economic crisis, and ongoing sectarian tensions. Hezbollah, with its paramilitary strength and political influence, has long exploited this instability. An Israeli ground operation would likely exacerbate Lebanon’s internal divisions, leading to further unrest and a potential humanitarian crisis. The already strained infrastructure and governance could collapse under the weight of intensified conflict, leaving Lebanon vulnerable to deeper political fragmentation or civil unrest.
Furthermore, Hezbollah’s capacity to retaliate would lead to significant civilian and military casualties on both sides, further destabilizing the already fragile balance in Lebanon. A prolonged conflict could erode Lebanon’s social fabric, potentially forcing Hezbollah to tighten its control over the country or creating space for other extremist groups to exploit the chaos.
Given Hezbollah’s extensive operations in Syria, an Israeli offensive in Lebanon could easily lead to the conflict spilling over into Syrian territory. Iran’s investment in Syria, through Hezbollah and other militias, makes it likely that Tehran would encourage further escalation in Syria if Israel attacks Hezbollah in Lebanon. This scenario could destabilize both the Assad regime and the already fragile ceasefires in parts of Syria, leading to broader instability in the Levant.
Ongoing power struggles in Syria
Such a development would complicate the ongoing power struggles in Syria, particularly with regard to Turkish, Russian, and U.S. military operations in the region. Israeli strikes could also prompt retaliatory attacks on Israeli interests from Iranian-backed militias stationed in Syria, pushing Israel into a multi-front conflict.
A direct assault on Hezbollah would severely damage Iran’s regional influence, particularly in Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah is the crown jewel of Iran’s proxy network and its most formidable deterrent against Israel. If weakened, Iran would lose a critical tool for exerting pressure in the Levant and would face challenges in projecting power through the so-called “Shia Crescent” that stretches from Tehran through Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut. A reduced Hezbollah presence would also leave Iran more vulnerable to Sunni extremist groups in the region, potentially opening new fronts of instability that Iran is ill-equipped to handle amidst its own economic difficulties.
Risk of a broader regional war over Lebanon
Hezbollah’s vast stockpile of rockets and its capacity for asymmetric warfare make a direct Israeli ground operation into Lebanon inherently risky. A significant Hezbollah retaliation, potentially targeting Israeli cities and infrastructure, could turn a limited operation into a wider regional conflict. Iran’s other proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen could launch coordinated attacks on Israeli interests or U.S. military assets in the region, opening multiple fronts.
In such a scenario, Israel could face attacks not only from Hezbollah but from Iranian-backed militias across the region. This, in turn, would likely drag the United States further into the conflict due to its commitments to Israeli security. The potential for Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to become involved would also grow, as Iran might seek to destabilize these countries as a form of indirect retaliation.
A ground operation would polarize the region, deepening the divisions between Iran and its allies on one side and Gulf states, Israel, and possibly Western powers on the other. Iran’s regional supporters, including the Houthis in Yemen and various Shia militias in Iraq, could engage in proxy warfare to protect Tehran’s interests. However, regional powers such as Russia might attempt to act as mediators, seeking to preserve their own interests in Syria while avoiding direct conflict with Israel or the United States.
Impact on Türkiye
Türkiye’s relations with Israel have already deteriorated to the point of mutual withdrawal of ambassadors, largely due to Ankara’s vocal opposition to Israeli genocidal actions and policies in Gaza and the Palestinian territories. Turkish President Erdoğan has positioned himself as a staunch opponent of Israeli actions, frequently condemning Israel’s policies as genocidal, most recently at the UN rostrum, just before the death of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah. Should Israel engage in a direct confrontation with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Türkiye’s government would likely intensify its anti-Israel rhetoric, mobilizing international opinion against Israel, particularly in Muslim-majority countries.
Türkiye’s adversarial stance could further damage any prospects for Turkish-Israeli reconciliation. Erdoğan may seek to rally international bodies such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to push for sanctions or other punitive measures against Israel. This could result in further isolation of Israel on the global stage, particularly in Muslim-majority countries, while reinforcing Türkiye’s leadership role in defending Palestinian rights.
Türkiye’s complex relationship with Iran, however, could lead to some level of coordination, particularly in opposing Israel’s military actions. While Ankara and Tehran have conflicting interests in Syria, their shared opposition to Israeli operations in Lebanon may lead to temporary alignment on this issue, further complicating Türkiye’s relations with Western allies.
Lebanon, security and economic concerns
Türkiye’s security concerns would be heightened by any spillover of conflict from Lebanon or Syria. With its military operations already engaged in Syria, Türkiye could find itself in a precarious situation if Iranian-backed militias begin to target Turkish forces in northern Syria. The potential for further refugee flows into Türkiye—already hosting millions of Syrian refugees—would strain Türkiye’s social and economic fabric, adding to its internal challenges.
On the economic front, regional instability could disrupt energy supplies and trade routes, particularly if hostilities affect critical infrastructure in the Levant. Türkiye, already struggling with inflation and economic stagnation, could face additional economic shocks if the conflict intensifies.
A successful Israeli ground operation against Hezbollah would be a strategic disaster for Iran. Since Hezbollah is Iran’s most important military and political ally in the region, its weakening would seriously undermine Iran’s regional influence. This would weaken Iran’s power projection in Lebanon and Syria and cause Iran to reconsider its defense strategy. Moreover, Iran may be forced to mobilize its resources to support other proxy forces to replace Hezbollah, which would increase Iran’s military and financial burden and make it strategically vulnerable.
Asymmetric warfare and the quest for revenge
In response to Hezbollah’s weakening, Iran could turn to asymmetric warfare. Through other militias in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, Tehran could seek revenge by launching attacks against Israeli and US targets. Such attacks could take place through indirect confrontation with the enemy, rather than through direct military engagements. In addition, Iran could seek to increase instability in the region through cyber-attacks, propaganda and financial support against its enemies.
The weakening of Hezbollah could also have important domestic implications for the Iranian government. There is growing frustration and dissatisfaction in Iranian society with the regime’s over-investment in foreign policy, particularly in proxy forces in the region. An attack on Hezbollah could seriously undermine Iran’s influence in the region, making the government’s rhetoric of “resistance” and “regional power” questionable.
Relatedly, the domestic opposition could strengthen its arguments that the regime’s focus on foreign interventions has failed to address the economic needs of the population. This could lead to growing discontent in Iranian society against the government and wider protest movements.
Long-term strategy adjustments
In the long term, Iran would likely recalibrate its regional strategy, seeking to expand its influence elsewhere in the region. This might include strengthening ties with other non-state actors in Iraq, Yemen, or even Afghanistan, while continuing to escalate its missile and drone warfare capabilities. Tehran could also pursue deeper military cooperation with Russia and China, further entrenching itself in the geopolitical struggle between East and West.
A potential Israeli ground operation would exacerbate existing tensions in Lebanon, changing the security dynamics in the region and could lead to a wider conflict. In addition to Hezbollah, Iran and other regional actors, the impact on Türkiye is of great importance. While Türkiye may be in a position to worsen its already strained relations with Israel, this could also threaten Türkiye’s national security and internal stability.
Iran, on the other hand, risks losing its regional influence and faces the threat of domestic destabilization.
A potential conflict in Lebanon is not only a local problem, but could trigger a complex situation that could have profound effects on the security, economic and political balances of many countries in the Middle East. This could alter the balance of power in the region and cause international actors, especially the United States and Russia, to reassess their interests in the region.
