MHP’s Deputy Speaker Celal Adan did not intervene this time to stop DEM Party Spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan’s Kurdish speech at the Parliament podium. The pace of Kurdish affairs has accelarated on two fronts: first following the Öcalan initiative and with Assad’s fall from power in Syria.
The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Kurdish-issue focused DEM Party continue to confound their adversaries – and I mean this in a positive sense. Kurdish affairs have entered a new phase, particularly following the regime change in Syria. The most recent example of this shift was witnessed in the Turkish Parliament on December 17.
DEM Party Spokesperson and Şırnak MP Ayşegül Doğan took the floor during the 2025 Budget deliberations. She turned to MHP’s Deputy Speaker of Parliament Celal Adan with a warm smile and politely said, “Thank you, Mr. Chairman,” then continued: “I extend my respects to the General Assembly. Though I presume I’m not allowed to welcome Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz in my mother tongue, am I?”
A transformation
Let’s pause here for two important points of context: Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz had just entered the Assembly, prompting Doğan’s wish to welcome him. Additionally, Vice President Yılmaz’s mother tongue is also Kurdish. Celal Adan, a prominent figure in the MHP and Turkish nationalist, is from Ağrı and is well-versed in both the Kurdish language and Kurdish issues, having been involved in recent developments.
A reminder: On February 22, 2024, when Adan was presiding over the General Assembly, he cut off the microphone twice when DEM Party Mardin MP Beritan Güneş spoke Kurdish during World Mother Language Day. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli later characterized this as separatism.
With this backdrop, exchange continued like this:
– “I assume I can’t welcome Yılmaz in my mother tongue, can I?”
– “Go ahead, please do…”
(Overlapping voices)
– “May I say ‘Hun be xer Hatîn,’ Mr. Chairman?”
– “Yes, of course…”
– “Well then, hun bi kher hatin.”
Yılmaz smiled, DEM members applauded, and the moment passed without incident.
Kurdish affairs gain momentum
This scene in Parliament hasn’t been recorded in the official minutes yet; instead, it was marked with “…” and noted as “non-Turkish expressions were used.” Perhaps the parliamentary bureaucrats are protecting themselves with “just in case” thinking, although there’s no requirement in the Internal Regulations.
The Kurdish issue has gained new momentum not only following MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s Öcalan initiative but also accelerated after the fall of Bashar Assad’s Baath regime in Syria.
I deliberately use the term “Kurdish affairs” rather than “Kurdish problem” or “terror/PKK problem.” Because the issue now intersects with Türkiye’s domestic, foreign, security, and legal spheres.
President Tayyip Erdoğan’s approach to this issue mirrors itself both in Türkiye and Syria.
In Türkiye, he seeks the DEM Party’s full integration into the system, contingent on the PKK’s unequivocal renunciation of armed conflict. However, he hasn’t formally announced this as his policy; instead, he demonstrates it through his support of his ally Bahçeli’s statements. The current strategy appears to be inclusive toward DEM while maintaining a hardline stance against the PKK – at least for now.
Paradigm shift in Syria
Erdoğan pursues a parallel strategy regarding Kurdish affairs through Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Intelligence Chief İbrahim Kalın.
While demanding recognition and citizenship rights for Kurds from HTS, he seeks to exclude the PKK/PYD from this framework while ensuring no interference with anti-PKK operations. Currently, this campaign isn’t being conducted through direct Turkish military operations in Syria but rather through the SMO, seen as Türkiye’s proxy force and ally in Syria.
It’s worth noting that even before the Syrian civil war, Erdoğan was urging Bashar Assad, then referred to as “my brother,” to recognize Syrian Kurds’ citizenship rights; the Baath regime had denied Kurds even basic identification documents. This policy direction isn’t new.
What is new is the PKK’s expansion during the Syrian civil war under U.S. protection and support (particularly following the U.S. establishment of the SDF in 2015).
Kobani: The strategic pivot
Recent developments in Kurdish affairs signal more significant changes ahead in Syria. The Turkish military’s removal of border wall sections near Kobani (Ayn el Arab) coincides with SDF leader Mazlum Abdi Şahin’s initial concession proposing to “demilitarize Kobani.”
The critical question remains: How will HTS leader Ahmed “Golani” El Shara, who now holds sway in Syria, respond? Will he accept continued SDF control over the oil-rich regions?
Following the Damascus visit by MIT Chief Kalın and Qatari intelligence chief Halfan El Kaabi to meet Shara, British diplomats have now also engaged in discussions with him.
Türkiye, HTS, and U.S. Dynamics
In a related development, Justice Minister Yılmaz Tunç has, for the first time, provided a rough timeline for the DEM delegation’s meeting with Abdullah Öcalan in İmralı Prison: “after the budget discussions.” Given the parliamentary recess following the budget period, this means January at the earliest, providing Ankara additional time to navigate the Syrian situation.
Of course, there’s also the threshold of Donald Trump officially taking over the US Presidency – for the second time – on January 20. Will this milestone, closely watched by global capitals, also influence the timing of the DEM delegation’s İmralı visit? The future configuration of Kurdish affairs, if it’s to benefit all parties, depends both on Erdoğan’s direct engagement and Trump’s post-inauguration stance.
Following Ankara’s denial of backing HTS, Trump’s assertion that “Türkiye is there. They’ve taken over Syria. They hold the key” has unsettled AK Party circles. AK Party Spokesperson Ömer Çelik has refuted these claims. Trump appears to be simultaneously flattering Erdoğan and positioning Türkiye as a potential scapegoat should circumstances deteriorate.
Türkiye now faces a historic opportunity, spanning both government and opposition: resolving Kurdish affairs could both enhance Türkiye’s regional political and economic influence and strengthen its democratic foundations.
From the parliamentary utterance of “Hun be xer hatîn” to these broader developments, Kurdish affairs continue to evolve with new dynamics.
