

Ukraine’s recent attempt to attack the TurkStream pipeline represents an alarming and perilous escalation. The fact that this initiative failed should not bring us comfort; after all, a similar attempt occurred in May 2023, and there is no assurance that future attacks will be thwarted. (Photo: AA)
Ukraine’s recent attempt to attack the TurkStream pipeline represents an alarming and perilous escalation. The fact that this initiative failed should not bring us comfort; after all, a similar attempt occurred in May 2023, and there is no assurance that future attacks will be thwarted.
Should another assault take place, we would find ourselves unable to replace the 31 billion cubic meters of gas supplied by TurkStream I and II, along with 16 billion cubic meters from Blue Stream. For a nation that consumes approximately 54 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, this could precipitate a severe energy crisis in the dead of winter.
TurkStream and Blue Stream are vital pipelines that transport Russian natural gas to Türkiye, subsequently supplying Europe. TurkStream traverses the Black Sea to reach Thrace, while Blue Stream connects directly to northern Türkiye. Part of this gas supports southeastern Europe via a corridor extending to Hungary.
Mutual destruction of energy infrastructure
In the context of an ongoing war, both countries have resorted to damaging each other’s infrastructure, viewing their actions as a form of legitimate retaliation. Since 2022, Russia has systematically targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, nearly collapsing it.
On August 26, 2023, Russia launched one of its most extensive aerial assaults on Ukraine, deploying over 200 missiles and drones aimed primarily at the energy sector. Approximately 8 million households lost electricity without warning, and Kyiv experienced its first unscheduled blackout since November 2022. Since the full-scale invasion, nearly half of Ukraine’s electricity generation capacity has either been occupied by Russian forces, destroyed, or severely damaged, including significant losses among major substations.
The occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant alone reduced Ukraine’s available power generation capacity by 6 gigawatts.
In response, Ukraine has intensified its assaults on Russian energy production facilities, transmission lines, and refineries. However, when Ukraine begins to target energy infrastructure beyond its borders, threatening the energy security of neighboring countries, the situation shifts dramatically.
As we know, the Nord Stream I and II pipelines, which transport Russian gas to Germany under the Baltic Sea, have been destroyed.
Explosions occurred on these pipelines on September 26, 2022, seven months after the onset of Russia’s military activities against Ukraine. Multiple significant gas leaks were detected, rendering both pipelines unusable. A few months ago, the magazine Spiegel claimed that a group of 12 Ukrainian commandos trained by the CIA was involved, stating that Ukraine was planning simultaneous attacks on Blue Stream and TurkStream.
Not merely a bilateral conflict
Indeed, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that Ukraine attempted an attack on a Russian warship stationed 140 kilometers northeast of the Bosphorus, which was tasked with ensuring the security of the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines. Additionally, Moscow announced that it had thwarted an earlier attempt to detonate Blue Stream.
The recent attack on TurkStream, involving 11 drones over Russian territory in Krasnodar, may be considered “legitimate” under the laws of warfare; however, this pipeline is critical to Türkiye’s natural gas supply and the backbone of our energy security. Therefore, it cannot simply be viewed as a reflection of conflicts between two countries.
Through these attacks, Ukraine aims to weaken Russia’s energy capacity, obstruct the revenue streams that could finance military operations against it, and entirely disrupt energy supplies to Europe. Following the neutralization of the Nord Stream pipelines and the termination of transit through Ukraine by December 31, 2024, only TurkStream remains as a viable alternative for Russian gas supplies to Europe.
Economic implications: What is unfolding?
These attacks are profoundly affecting the international relations of the involved countries. Control over energy resources and transit routes has emerged as a critical issue in international negotiations, leading to new alliances. Ukraine’s actions have the potential to reshape not only its relationship with Russia but also its connections with Türkiye and Europe.
The assaults on Russian energy infrastructure can be interpreted as a strategy to undermine the enemy’s energy capacity while psychologically impacting its morale. This approach elicits varied responses within the international community and significantly disrupts established geopolitical balances and alliances.
Attacks on energy infrastructure pose risks not only to the targeted countries’ energy security but also to the overall economic stability and energy security of the region. In 2022, European energy prices surged by 300 percent, reaching unprecedented levels.
Due to rising energy prices and disruptions in supply security, EU countries have fallen behind in global competitiveness, with China and the US now taking the lead.
Is the US behind these actions?
It is difficult to assert that Ukraine independently conceived and executed these attacks. Just as the US and the UK have intervened in the war through weapons systems, military intelligence, training, and strategic support, it is reasonable to suggest that Washington may be influencing these recent actions, as indicated by Lavrov.
Interestingly, the timing of the attack—occurring just a week before Trump took office—raises suspicions of a collaboration between elements of the American deep state in the anti-Trump camp and Ukraine. If Trump were to foster peace, as he claims, one would expect a decrease in such attacks between Kyiv and Moscow, leading to a softening of hostilities. Yet both sides persist in their ruthless tactics, seeking to score points against one another.
It is crucial to note that when the Russia-Ukraine-Europe energy infrastructure was compromised, the primary beneficiaries were US LNG exporters. Last year, 55 percent of total US LNG exports went to Europe, with Asia receiving 34 percent and Latin America 11 percent. Türkiye also emerged as one of the largest buyers of US LNG. Thus, while Russia retained its dominance in pipeline natural gas, the US has taken the lead in LNG.
Ankara’s response: What should be done?
With natural gas supply security at significant risk, Ankara must respond decisively to Ukraine’s attempt to attack the TurkStream pipeline. The bonds of friendship and cooperation between Kyiv and Ankara should preclude Ukraine from pursuing such a course, which threatens to adversely affect Türkiye. Punishing Russia would also mean punishing Turkish households, industries, and agriculture—a scenario that is simply unacceptable.
The first course of action should be to urgently convene NATO, of which Türkiye is a critical ally with the second-largest armed forces, for a Council-level meeting focused on energy security and the protection of critical infrastructure. This meeting should yield strong condemnations of the attacks and establish a comprehensive action plan.
Russia’s assertion that the US is behind this attack necessitates that Türkiye engage in high-level discussions with Washington (and London) to address the situation. Separate discussions with both Putin and Zelensky should also be pursued to seek concrete outcomes aimed at deterring further aggression from Kyiv.
Are we facing broader energy conflicts?
Moreover, I believe it is prudent to consider the deployment of the Turkish navy to patrol the security of pipelines in the Black Sea, alongside Russian naval vessels. This marks the second attempt at such an attack; there is no guarantee that a third won’t occur.
While it is vital for Türkiye to explore alternative sources for its natural gas supply security, enhance its LNG capacity, and invest in renewable energy, FSRUs, and natural gas storage facilities, the primary focus should remain on preventing and halting any new assaults.
The Ukraine-Russia conflict is likely to lead to the proliferation of energy wars—or, as Lavrov terms it, “energy terrorism.” This trend will compel countries heavily reliant on energy to devise new military and strategic methods to secure their energy security.
In this context, Türkiye must remain vigilant and prepared by reviewing its security protocols against potential attacks on its natural gas and oil infrastructure from Azerbaijan-Georgia, Iran, Iraq, and Russia, as well as on strategic transit routes, power plants, communication lines, LNG purchasing and storage facilities, and refineries. It is essential to remember that the impact of cyberattacks can be even more devastating than conventional assaults.