Turkish President Erdoğan meets the US President Trump again after five years at the NATO Summit for “1-1.5 Hours”
After five years, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had the opportunity to meet face-to-face again with U.S. President Donald Trump, whom he calls his “friend,” at the NATO Summit held in The Hague, Netherlands, on June 24-25. However, unlike Erdoğan’s meetings with leaders from Germany, France, the UK, or the host Netherlands, which were held with national flags and official delegations, there is no image shared by the Presidency suggesting a formal meeting. The photo we shared above gives the impression of two friends pulling aside for a chat in the lobby of the summit venue. Still, Erdoğan stated that he spoke with Trump for 1-1.5 hours; perhaps we should focus on the substance rather than the form.
During Joe Biden’s presidency, Erdoğan expressed a desire to meet the U.S. President several times but was unable to do so officially in Türkiye or the U.S., with interactions limited to frameworks like NATO or G20 summits. Considering the lack of courtesy shown to leaders like the Ukrainian or South African presidents in the Oval Office, it’s debatable whether being invited to the White House by Trump at this time would be beneficial.
What Has Happened in Five Years?
During his presidency, despite Trump’s overt insults toward the Turkish President and various hostile actions against Türkiye, he hosted Erdoğan at the White House several times.
Five years have passed, and the global balance has completely shifted.
The Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Gaza massacre, the regime change in Syria, and most recently, Israel’s (followed by the U.S.’s) attack on Iran are among the first things that come to mind. According to a statement from the Communications Directorate, President Erdoğan supported the Israel-Iran ceasefire, which Trump claimed to have facilitated, and emphasized the importance of dialogue in the Gaza and Russia-Ukraine conflicts.
However, when it comes to Türkiye-U.S. relations, we learn from the same statement that no progress has been made in five years.
• The sale of F-35 and F-16 jets still hasn’t materialized, and unpublicized de facto embargoes in other military areas continue.
• Support for the PKK-affiliated SDF in Syria, under the pretext of fighting ISIS, persists.
• Ankara’s demands for joint energy investments and the removal of trade barriers remain unaddressed.
• And Erdoğan’s goal of increasing bilateral trade to $100 billion remains unachieved.
Trump’s View of Türkiye
One of the most significant indicators of how Trump’s perspective on Türkiye has evolved after five years is his appointment of Tom Barrack as both the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara and the Special Envoy to Syria.
The U.S. Embassy in Ankara has long been involved in Iran-related matters. One of its most important sections is the “Regional Affairs” department, with offices located closest to the Ambassador’s. By making the Ankara Ambassador responsible for Syria—almost with the authority of a colonial governor from the British era until a U.S. Embassy opens there—Trump is assigning Türkiye a role that extends beyond its borders.
When we add the Russia-Ukraine and Azerbaijan-Armenia files, which Barrack emphasized in his Senate presentation with the phrase “If we can resolve it with words, there’s no need for the whip,” we can see the U.S.’s shifting perspective on NATO member Türkiye in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caspian, and Persian Gulf regions.
Erdoğan Will Get Along Well with Trump
So, what is Türkiye’s interest in this equation?
As noted earlier, no progress has been made on the Türkiye-U.S. agenda compared to five years ago.
However, Trump seems to have accepted that Erdoğan is the best leader he can work with in Türkiye. The decline in the AK Party’s electoral support and the internal conflicts within the social democratic CHP (perhaps “radical leftist” by current White House standards), even if its support grows, are positive developments from the perspective of the Trump administration.
Getting along well with Trump benefits Erdoğan both in foreign and domestic politics.
No matter how much CHP leader Özgür Özel pushes for elections on November 2 (notably, the AK Party came to power on November 3, 2002), Erdoğan’s plan appears to be securing an early election decision from Parliament a few months before his term ends in May 2028, allowing him to run again. To achieve this, he seems to be relying on the Kurdish-problem-focused DEM Party’s parliamentary support, alongside efforts to disarm the PKK.
This leaves one major issue between Trump and Erdoğan: the Türkiye-Israel dispute.
I believe you can do the math from here about the future of Turkish-Israeli relations.
