Turkish Presidential Communications Directorate announced on December 21 that President Tayyip Erdoğan congatulated Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Es-Sisi on his election for the third term. At first glance, it appears to be a routine courtesy call, but Erdoğan had for years called Sisi a “coup plotter”, bringing Egypt-Türkiye relations to a freezing point.
Before I get to Erdoğan’s call, which is an example of another Turkish foreign policy u-turns disguised as rational manoeuvres in response to shifting political circumstances, I would like to tell a political joke that never gets old.
As the joke goes, then US President Bill Clinton envied Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s ability to win every election with ninety percent of the vote. Before the 1996 election campaign, he asked him the secret. “It’s easy,” said Mubarak, “I tell Omar Suleiman, he runs the campaign, he takes care of it.” Omar Suleiman was then the head of Egypt’s national intelligence organization Al-Muhaberat. “Can he help us too?” said Clinton. And Mubarak sent Suleiman as an advisor to Clinton. When the election results were announced in the US, it was seen that Mubarak won the US presidency with 90 percent of the vote.
Sisi won the last election with 90 percent, sorry 89.65 percent.
Celebrating which Sisi?
Mubarak ruled Egypt for years with the support of intelligence and the military, while Sisi was the youngest member of the Supreme Military Council. Mubarak lost his 30-year rule in 2011 during the Tahrir Revolution when the army refused to suppress the people. He was replaced by the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Mohamed Morsi in Egypt’s first free elections in 2012 (the turnout was 51 percent).
One of Morsi’s first acts was to replace Mubarak’s Chief of General Staff, Hussein Tantawi, with Sisi, whom he thought could do no harm because he was religious. In 2013, Sisi overthrew Morsi in a coup supported by Saudi Arabia with the tacit approval of the US.
Erdoğan declared that he would not recognize the Egyptian government; both countries declared each other’s ambassadors persona non grata. Sisi was elected president with 97 percent of the vote in the 2014 elections with 40 percent turnout. He secured another democratic victory in the 2018 elections, again with 97 percent.
The year 2019, September 25. Erdoğan protested against US President Donald Trump’s dinner for the leaders in Nev York for the UN General Assembly and did not attend when he saw that Sisi was at the table of honor.
On September 25th, 2019 at US President Donald Trump’s dinner for international leaders in New York for the UN General Assembly, Erdoğan refused to attend the meeting in protest when he noticed Sisi at the table of honour.
He reacted against Gül
On October 9, 2019, about two weeks after he protested Trump’s reception as a protest against Sisi, on the very day Türkiye launched Operation Peace Spring against YPG/PKK forces in Syria, Erdoğan received an insolent letter from Trump. In the letter, a black mark in Türkiye’s diplomatic history, the US President called the Turkish President “fool” and “tough guy”. The letter would have dealt another blow to an already shaky economy.
But Erdoğan’s electoral congratulations to Sisi also reminded us of his 2014 outburst against then President Abdullah Gül over Sisi.
At that time, Gül – in consultation with the State Department – sent a cold message to Sisi that did not even contain the word “congratulations” and wished the Egyptian people well on the election. Erdoğan reacted against Gül at the time, calling the message “meaningless” and unacceptable.
Not only with Egypt and Sisi
Türkiye’s relations with Egypt were strained for ten years. Egypt mended its relations with Greece, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and whoever else Türkiye had a bad relationship with at the time. It built the largest LNG terminal in the Mediterranean on the back of Türkiye-Greece antagonism. Türkiye and Egypt fought a war of proxies in the Libyan civil war on the side of opposing armies.
It was Hakan Fidan, then head of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and now foreign minister, who mastered the Libyan situation, who started to build bridges of reconciliation with Egypt.
Then Sheikh Temim, the Emir of Qatar, who is highly favored by Erdoğan, stepped in, invited them both to the World Cup opening ceremony and reconciled them. In the meantime, Erdoğan had already reconciled with the Emir of the UAE, Mohammed bin Zaid, whom he called the financier of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt; and with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, whom he called the instigator of the murder of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi in the Istanbul Consulate. Suddenly, the pro-government media started to report 20 billion dollars from the UAE and another 20 billion from Saudi Arabia. Although it was just rumors, it was convincing as a justification for the u-turns.
As the u-turns multiplied
Erdoğan recently went to Greece and met Greek Prime Minister Kiryakos Mitsotakis whom he had recently said “he is over for me. We can come suddenly one night” (with flights over the Aegean on the negotiating table) with messages of friendship. Friendship is good. Indeed, US President Joe Biden spoke positively about his visit to Greece in a phone call to Erdoğan on December 14. In the same phone call, we learned from Erdoğan that Biden said, “You pass Sweden’s NATO membership through the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and I will pass the F-16 through the Congress.”
Of course, Erdoğan’s congratulatory phone call to Sisi for winning the elections can be justified with a legitimate justification such as stopping Israel’s massacre of civilians in Gaza and delivering aid to the Palestinians.
But we also need to ask the question, “Should it have been like this?” Not only because of the phone call to Sisi. But also on all the issues where a u-turn was made. From Egypt to Greece, from the US to the EU, as more and more of these hard-line outbursts that are later reversed, Türkiye’s foreign policy claims are beginning to be met with “let’s see if it can do it”.
Erdoğan’s congratulatory phone call to Sisi is therefore a summary of this foreign policy line.