HTS leader Ahmed “Golani” al-Shara is changing his external appearance and rhetoric to convey the message “We are not who we used to be,” but how genuine this is will be demonstrated by his actions during the transition period. Türkiye must carefully avoid the pitfall of assuming total responsibility by remaining mindful of potential adverse developments.
Intelligence suggests that the operation to overthrow Assad’s regime in Syria was meticulously planned for over a year, with coordinated involvement from Türkiye, the United States, and several other nations. Through various statements by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, HTS leader Ahmed “Golani” al-Shara, and YPG commander Mazlum Abdi, it has become clear that Assad’s departure resulted from an intricate web of agreements between virtually all stakeholders. We have now entered a crucial transition phase.
Syria’s transition: Regime collapse and the rise of new powers
The disintegration of Assad’s military forces can be attributed to both the shifting geostrategic landscape and the exhaustion from a seemingly endless conflict, particularly among his traditional support base, most notably the Alawite community.
In the post-Assad landscape, two organizations have emerged as pivotal players: HTS and YPG.
HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), an organization that evolved from Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra, has effectively administered Idlib since 2017 through its “Salvation Government.”
Despite its designation on international terrorist lists, HTS has managed to establish communication channels with Türkiye, the United States, and various Western nations.
HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara, known as Golani, has adopted a more moderate public persona and rhetoric.
Al-Shara has emphasized the necessity of “transitioning from revolutionary thinking to statecraft” and “establishing a nation founded on legal frameworks and institutions to ensure lasting stability.”
Currently, HTS maintains de facto control over Syria and clearly intends to preserve its administrative role beyond the transition period.
While HTS is actively working to rebrand itself with the message “We’ve transformed from our past,” the authenticity of this transformation remains to be proven through concrete actions.
Strategic silence and shifting alliances
During this transitional phase, notable entities including the Syrian Interim Government, Syrian National Council, Syrian National Army, and various armed opposition groups have maintained a silence or deliberately lowered their profiles.
The YPG has consistently demonstrated versatility in managing relationships with multiple powers (U.S., Russia, Iran, and the Assad Regime).
Following Assad’s fall, and under pressure from Turkish military operations, the SNA’s territorial expansion, and Donald Trump’s Syria policy, the YPG demonstrated strategic flexibility by accepting the new Syrian flag.
YPG leader Mazlum Abdi has confirmed reaching an understanding with HTS and initiating Türkiye negotiations through U.S. mediation.
Media reports and social media channels indicate significant Turkish Armed Forces and SNA military positioning along YPG-controlled areas. Defense Minister Yaşar Güler’s recent statements have reinforced this strategic posture, suggesting that military action remains a viable option should diplomatic efforts fail.
The YPG situation in Syria cannot be divorced from broader regional dynamics, including the PKK presence in Türkiye and Kandil, recent diplomatic initiatives labeled as “new openings,” and the underlying domestic political calculations driving these developments.
Critical transition priorities
Syria’s immediate transition priorities have crystallized around three key objectives:
- Maintaining state functionality and public order while ensuring essential services
- Constructing a viable new political and administrative framework
- Systematically dismantling armed groups and implementing comprehensive weapons collection programs
The Syrian public rightfully demands accountability for the systematic torture and executions, like Sednaya Prison. It’s imperative to ensure justice without descending into indiscriminate retribution or collective punishment against specific communities, particularly the Alawites.
Interim governance structure
The establishment of Syria’s new political framework is proceeding through carefully planned phases:
- An interim government has been established, staffed entirely by members of the former Salvation Government that administered Idlib, including the Prime Minister. This administration’s all members are from HTŞ, with no representation from women, opposition groups, or minority communities (Alawite, Druze, Turkmen, Kurdish, or Christian).
- While this interim administration, scheduled to serve until March, acknowledges its limitations in inclusivity, there are commitments to address these deficiencies in the subsequent transitional government phase.
- Constitutional reform remains a critical priority, with key decisions pending regarding administrative structure (centralized versus decentralized governance) and the role of religious law versus civil administration.
- The process is intended to culminate in multi-candidate elections, allowing Syrians to determine their leadership democratically.
Economy at rock bottom
Syria faces the monumental task of economic revival, following an 85 percent contraction between 2011-2023. Conservative estimates place reconstruction costs at minimum $300 billion.
While international support, particularly from Gulf states, is anticipated, it will likely be limited in scope. Syria must develop sustainable internal revenue streams through taxation, foreign investment attraction, industrial revival, export promotion, and effective natural resource management.
Oil, Syria’s primary natural resource with pre-conflict production of 380,000 barrels daily, remains under YPG control. The organization currently sells oil at deeply discounted prices to fund its operations. Returning these resources to national control for the benefit of all Syrians represents a critical priority.
Syrians eagerly await sanctions relief, though this appears contingent on meeting specific political and legal benchmarks.
Potential risk scenarios
Donald Trump, poised to assume office on January 20, has expressed reluctance to engage in Syria, though complete disengagement appears implausible. There are hopes for more constructive policies that avoid creating additional complications for the U.S., Syria, and Türkiye.
Several concerning scenarios warrant attention:
- The potential imposition of strict Salafi ideology on Syria’s political and social structures
- YPG obtaining the autonomous structure they call “self-administration” in Syria and attempting to expand it further
- The risk of minority communities (Kurdish, Druze, and Alawite) becoming focal points for territorial fragmentation (Israel’s recent emphasis on minority protection, particularly regarding Kurds and Druze, appears strategically significant)
- Possible attempts by Assad to reclaim power with Iranian and Russian backing
- The risk of Syria relapsing into chaos and civil conflict
Current success with caveats
The AKP government has effectively created a success story, at least for now, from the Syria issue, which was their most criticized area after economic issues.
The reopening of Türkiye’s Damascus embassy on December 14, led by Islamic philosophy professor Burhan Köroğlu as interim chargé d’affaires, marks a significant diplomatic milestone.
Türkiye’s international standing has reached unprecedented heights over the past two weeks, being emerged as the key player in Syrian affairs.
The international community increasingly looks to Türkiye to play crucial roles across multiple domains: supporting Syria’s political transition, facilitating reconstruction, preventing ISIS resurgence, and managing refugee return.
However, mismanagement of the transition process could rapidly transform current advantages into strategic liabilities.
Excessive triumphalism, prioritizing optics over substance, or raising regional concerns about Turkish dominance replacing Iranian influence could generate tensions with both Syrian and Arab stakeholders.
Moreover, positioning Türkiye as Syria’s primary power broker carries the inherent risk of being held accountable for any subsequent negative developments within Syria.
