Playing a role secondary to that of the US in the Ayria, SDF deal. Türkiye supports it on the condition “full implementation”. The photo shows Turkish President Erdoğan with Foreign Miniister Fidan (middle) and intelligence (MİT) Director Kalın (left) in a conference.
The agreement announced on March 10 on the Kurdish-base Syrian Defense Forces, SDF joining the Syrian army was brokered by the US, with Ankara playing a secondary role. Nevertheless, Ankara does not want to bind itself to the agreement, saying it is “cautiously optimistic” and will observe whether it is implemented by both the Ahmed Shara administration and the SDF. This is reflected in President Tayyip Erdoğan’s emphasis on the “full implementation of the agreement”, even though he supports the general framework, seeing “every effort to cleanse Syria of terrorism as a step in the right direction”.S
Ankara has questions to answer about the agreement signed by Ahmed Shara and Mazlum Abdi, which it has conditionally supported by saying “we will look at the implementation”.
SDF: US created it, US finished it
First, let us list the positive aspects of the agreement for Ankara:
1- The attempt to establish an autonomous or independent Kurdish state in Syria on the borders of Türkiye and Iraq (Rojava) seems to have failed. Mazlum Abdi, in an interview with the Arabic-language London publication al-Majelle published after the agreement, said that they agreed on “the territorial integrity of Syria, that Syria should have one army, one state, one capital and one flag”.
2- Based on the same interview, we understand that the SDF will also cease to exist with the emphasis on “one army, one flag”. The SDF was established ten years ago, in 2015, by the US Special Forces in order to appear on paper not to cooperate with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its Syrian extensions, the PYD/YPG. Now we are witnessing its disbandment, again at the initiative of the US.
To summarize, for Ankara, the glass half full developments are that a PKK-influenced Kurdish state will not be established in Syria and that the SDF will dissolve itself and join the Syrian army.
US shuttle diplomacy
US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael ‘Erik’ Kurilla seems to have played a special role in the chain of events leading to the agreement.
Between February 26 and March 2, Kurilla held talks in Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Syria. Then on March 4, together with Mazlum Abdi, he inspected al-Hol and other camps near the Turkish and Iraqi borders where DAESH (ISIS) militants and their families were being held. The next day, March 5-6, we see Kurilla in Israel again, March 6-7 in Jordan and March 7-8 in Saudi Arabia. On March 9, he met again with Abdi and Abdi was flown to Damascus in an American aircraft.
It is possible to infer that the SDF was not the only topic discussed during Kurilla’s contacts; the first round of contacts included Gaza and the second round included the killing of Alawite civilians in Latakia.
On March 9, the foreign and defense ministers and intelligence chiefs of Türkiye, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon were meeting in Amman to discuss the fight against DAESH. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan brought the killing of Alawite civilians in Latakia to the agenda. President Tayyip Erdoğan announced that he had urged the Shara administration to be inclusive of all elements.
However, there was no talk of a Shara-Abdi deal in Ankara.
Öcalan’s letter
Ali Rahmun, the SDF’s Damascus Officer, told Rudaw that the agreement was actually reached on March 9 (when the Latakia events were still ongoing) and announced on March 10 (when the Latakia events calmed down), emphasizing that the contacts started a month and a half ago.
If we go back a month and a half from the end of February, when Kurilla began his shuttle diplomacy, we come across US Undersecretary of State John Bass’ meetings with Turkish officials in Türkiye on January 9-11 and with Saudi Arabia on January 11-13; the subject was Syria.
On January 22, the DEM Party delegation held its second meeting with Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the PKK. On February 17, DEM Party Spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan confirms the news that Öcalan sent three separate letters to the PKK’s organizations in Qandil, Europe and Rojava.
DEM Party Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan tells Cansu Çamlıbel in a T24 interview that they are not aware of the content of the letters, but that “the state probably knows the content”.
Following DEM’s third visit on February 27, Öcalan’s call for the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve itself (in the exact words suggested by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli).
Öcalan’s letter to Rojava, sent with Ankara’s knowledge, appears to have played a role in the Damascus-SDF deal.
Questions Ankara seeks answers to
1- How will the SDF join the Syrian army? Previously, it was understood that the decision of the pro-Iranian Hashd al-Shaabi forces to join the Iraqi army was only an articulation, preserving their own chain of command.
2- Article 6 of the agreement states that the revival of the ousted Assad regime and the fight against Salafist movements will be “supported” without mentioning them by name. It seems contradictory to say “one army” on the one hand and to talk about support as an external element on the other.
3- What about the non-Syrians in the SDF and where will they go? In the Majelle interview, Abdi says that the number of these “Kurdish brothers” is in the hundreds, not thousands, and that they can return to their home countries, which means Iraq and Türkiye.
4- The agreement explicitly states that SDF-controlled military and civilian institutions, border crossings, airports, oil and gas fields will be transferred to Syrian government control. However, even before the ink is dry on the agreement, SDF spokespeople are saying that this is out of the question. Border crossings are particularly important for security
These are the main reasons for Ankara’s support for the US-brokered deal, in which it played a secondary role, on condition that it be “fully implemented”.
US intimidated with Turkish military action
On the other hand, Abdi’s interview with Majelle reveals that the main factor in the US convincing the SDF leadership to agree to this deal was the possibility of a new military operation by Türkiye into Syria targeting the PKK and the YPG. The US told the SDF that an agreement with Damascus would ensure Türkiye’s compliance with the 2019 agreement.
In other words, both the US, Syria and the SDF accept that this agreement eliminates the possibility of a new Turkish military operation in Syria; the condition of “full implementation of the agreement” is also important here. On the other hand, the Damascus deal makes a Turkish incursion into Syria against the YPG more difficult, politically speaking.
Agencies are now reporting that Kurilla is now mediating between Israeli and Lebanese officials.
All this may be a sign that US President Donald Trump will not do as Joe Biden did in Afghanistan, but will clean up the pollution that he has contributed to in the region and withdraw. But it is too early to jump to that conclusion.
