In the Türkiye Syria meeting held with the mediation of Russia, all three sides expressed their stance, and it was decided to continue the negotiations. Türkiye’s possible ground operation is suspended unless the PKK/YPG attacks. In the photo (from left to right) Türkiye’s Ambassador to Moscow Mehmet Samsar, Minister of National Defense Hulusi Akar and MIT Head Hakan Fidan are seen at Moscow’s Vnukovo airport on 28 December. (Photo: Ministry of National Defence)
First, let’s give some good news to President Tayyip Erdogan. He will be able to pray at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus soon, even if it is ten years late, but as the guest of Assad himself, not as the guest of the armies he hoped would overthrow Bashar Assad. Because of the push from Russian President Vladimir Putin, peace between Türkiye and Syria seems imminent.
Another concrete step was taken in this direction with the meeting of Minister of National Defense Hulusi Akar and Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan with the Syrian Minister of Defense and the head of intelligence under the mediation of Russia on December 28 in Moscow.
Next is the meeting of the foreign ministers, and then, if things go well, the presidents.
Akar and Fidan’s meeting with Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmud Abbas and General Intelligence, “Mukhabarat,” chief Ali Mamluk, hosted by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Foreign Intelligence Service (FSB) Head Sergey Naryshkin, was the first contact in 11 years at the ministerial level.
Türkiye became a party to the Syrian civil war that started in 2011, on the side of overthrowing Assad, and relations were severed.
Three issues between Türkiye Syria
The Türkiye Syria meeting in Moscow was held under three topics, according to the information that YetkinReport obtained from sources that preferred to remain anonymous.
1- The course and solution of the Syrian crisis,
2- A solution to the problem of Syrian immigrants,
3- “Extremist groups” and the fight against terrorism.
It is understood that the negotiations did not continue in the form of negotiations; everyone has expressed their sides.
For this reason, it can be said that the most important result of the negotiations was the decision to continue the negotiations.
First, it is the most general problem, but it also means that Erdogan has given up on his goal of supporting the overthrow of Assad. In fact, UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which Ankara has recently brought to the fore, envisages a transitional period to be established between the Syrian regime and its opposition.
Secondly, Syrian refugees are an issue on which Erdogan wants to get results, even if they are symbolic, especially before the election. Assad, on the other hand, had made it clear that he did not want to give Erdogan an election gift. Putin is pressing Assad on this issue as well; Moscow sees that millions of Syrian refugees will be a point against Erdogan in the election. Ankara, on the other hand, is of the opinion that “Assad’s amnesties do not convince Syrians to return, encouraging action is needed.”
Operation conditionally suspended, diplomacy active
Although the fight against terrorism is not as short-term as the immigrant problem, it is a strategic issue for both Ankara and Damascus.
The most important thing for Ankara is border security and the absence of a PKK-led and US-backed Kurdish state on the Syrian side of its borders.
According to Damascus, the most important points for them are Salafi jihadists among Türkiye-backed groups organised under the Syrian National Army (former FSA) and the military presence of Türkiye and the United States.
As Russia is involved as a mediator, the common denominator is the unease caused by the presence of the United States in Syria.
What about Türkiye’s ground operation?
At the press conference on December 24, Akar answered the question of whether Russia would open the airspace under its control in Syria and talk with Moscow:
“We will talk, we will meet. We will try to resolve things in a reasonable and logical way. It’s fine if it happens. But if it doesn’t happen, then we’ll make our own decision,” he said.
After the Türkiye Syria Russia meeting, the situation is as follows: first, wait for the diplomacy to yield results, but in the meantime, the operation will be kept on the table in case of a PKK/YPG attack. In other words, the operation is suspended unless the PKK attacks.
USA, Russia, Ukraine, Syria
A detail: Akar, Fidan, and the Turkish delegation were actually expected to be in Ankara on the night of December 28. But when the Ukrainian airspace could not be opened, the delegation completed the two-hour journey around the Black Sea in five hours via Georgian airspace and reached Ankara in the early hours of December 29.
Ensuring Türkiye Syria rapprochement with the intervention of Russia is actually one of the by-products of Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Türkiye’s continuation of its relations with both Ukraine and Russia, the chemistry of Erdogan and Putin, Türkiye’s opening of a regularly functioning channel between Russia and NATO brought many developments, from the grain agreement to the prisoner exchange.
It is clear that Erdogan has made a series of foreign policy maneuvers, from the United Arab Emirates to Egypt, from Saudi Arabia to Israel in search of foreign economic resources ahead of the election.
It would be insufficient to explain the situation with Russia only by postponing natural gas debts. The removal of Syrian pressure on Russia and making the US presence in Syria more debatable are not small political victories.
Why was Türkiye involved in this war?
In some perspectives, it is also possible to read the Türkiye Syria rapprochement as a “solidarity show” between Erdogan and Putin on the Ukraine-Syria axis. Some might say bargain, but this is beyond bargaining.
It is also possible to ask the question “Why did we enter this war?” and to examine the Turkish-Syrian peace that is coming 11 years later in terms of costs and possible consequences.
Türkiye currently hosts around 3.8 million Syrian refugees. The official number of expenditures on the refugees, in Erdoğan’s words, is above 40 million US dollars. The effect of this spending on inflation and the cost of living in the country we live in is neither talked about enough nor calculated. Will anyone take responsibility for the political and financial costs of the Syrian policy?
What would have happened if Erdogan had not been a party to the Syrian civil war in anticipation of the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood? For example, the USA might not have taken sides with the PKK/YPG to fight against ISIS. Türkiye’s entire land trade ties with the Arabian peninsula might not have been cut. Relations with Egypt could not be broken.
But history and politics cannot be written or interpreted with “if” or “if only.”
Now we have to look ahead.
