Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev welcoming his Russian guest Putin on August 19. Although Aliyev reacted to Erdoğan’s statement implying to enter Gaza “just ike Karabakh,” he still sent his only firefighting aircraft to Türkiye. (Photo: Azerbaijan Newspaper)
I first heard the phrase “Two states, one nation” from Abulfaz Elchibey. It was early 1992, just after Azerbaijan had declared independence from the Soviet Union. Elchibey was still officially banned from politics, but my colleagues Semih İdiz, Aziz Utkan, and I managed to interview him in a basement belonging to the Popular Front in Baku. Our nationalist-leaning circles in Türkiye later adopted this slogan from Azerbaijan, much like they did with the ‘Grey Wolf’ salute.
It’s an effective slogan, but note that it says “Two states, one nation,” not “One state, one nation.” It acknowledges that each state is sovereign and deserves respect, while also recognizing cultural ties. However strong these cultural bonds may be, the interests of nation-states are ultimately limited by their borders. We see this even within the European Union, history’s first major supranational project. When economic interests are at stake, national priorities often take precedence.
This principle applies even to Azerbaijan. We must remember that while we may be one nation culturally, we are still two distinct states politically.
In international relations, it’s vital to avoid acting paternalistic towards any nation, no matter how close you feel to them. A good example of learning from past mistakes is the term “Yavru Vatan” (Small Homeland) once used for Northern Cyprus. This term, which genuinely offended Turkish Cypriots, has now largely disappeared from official discourse.
Azerbaijan’s sharp response
You can probably guess where this is heading.
On July 28, President Tayyip Erdoğan addressed AKP members in Rize. Without explicitly naming Israel, he implied Türkiye could intervene militarily in Gaza, stating, “Just as we entered Karabakh, just as we entered Libya, we will do the same to them.”
I doubt Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, MIT Chief Ibrahim Kalın, and National Defense Minister Yaşar Güler thought, “This will make our jobs easier.” However, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev was clearly offended.
On August 1, an editorial in Azerbaijan’s official newspaper harshly criticized Erdoğan’s words without naming him directly. This criticism, largely unreported in Turkish media (some of which is government-controlled, some distant from Azerbaijan), revealed interesting details.
Then, on August 19, we saw Russian President Vladimir Putin in Baku. Putin, who hadn’t found time to visit Türkiye in two years, signed economic cooperation agreements with Azerbaijan. Moreover, Azerbaijan announced its application for BRICS membership.
The timing is significant. Russia had been criticizing Armenia for supporting Ukraine under U.S. and French influence, and Türkiye was engaged in normalization talks with Armenia.
‘A brother doesn’t boast’
The Azerbaijani newspaper article, which began by quoting Aliyev — “The victory belongs to our glorious army, our brave soldiers, our heroic people” — went on to criticize Erdoğan:
“The recent statements from our brother Türkiye clearly distort the realities of the 44-day war [the 2020 Karabakh War]. Worse, they play into Armenia’s hands. As our ancestors say, the right hand doesn’t boast about what it gives to the left; a brother doesn’t brag about helping his brother.
“Have we forgotten Ilham Aliyev’s months of tireless diplomatic efforts to normalize relations between Russia and Türkiye after they nearly went to war [referring to the 2015 Russian plane downing incident]?
“Thousands of Turkish engineers and workers are employed by major Turkish companies in rebuilding Karabakh and East Zangezur. Where else do Turkish firms enjoy such favorable conditions?
“However, brotherhood isn’t a one-sided game. We must remember our mutual obligations and moral duties. The victory and Karabakh belong to all of us. Let’s be sincere and honest about this.”
A firefighting aircraft as olive branch
What followed these harsh words?
On August 17, Erdoğan called Aliyev. According to Türkiye’s Directorate of Communications, Erdoğan mentioned Türkiye’s need for a BE-200CS amphibious aircraft to fight forest fires. Aliyev promptly agreed, saying it would arrive “as soon as possible,” reaffirming that Azerbaijan and Türkiye would always support each other. Erdoğan expressed his gratitude.
This was Azerbaijan’s only amphibious firefighting aircraft. As of today, it has been battling forest fires near Muğla for two days.
One has to question the wisdom of dragging Azerbaijan and Libya into a criticism of Israel during a speech in Rize.
Moreover, in military parlance, these are typically considered “covert operations.” Even if you’ve conducted such operations, the norm is to deny rather than boast about them.
For comparison, look at how Israel remains tight-lipped about the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31.
Erdoğan’s miscalculation
While Aliyev was offended, he didn’t sever ties. Instead, he’s making his voice heard on the world stage while also maintaining a visible relationship with Putin.
In that same Rize speech, Erdoğan had also lashed out at Mahmoud Abbas, demanding an apology from the Palestinian leader who was busy with diplomatic efforts while his people suffered for not coming to Türkiye. Abbas did visit Ankara and addressed the Turkish Grand National Assembly, offering thanks but also subtle criticism. However, he visited Putin in Moscow first. Subsequently, CHP leader Özgür Özel extended an invitation for Abbas to visit Palestine.
Erdoğan’s anger, though it subsides without causing lasting damage, stems primarily from his reaction to Israel.
The Azerbaijan issue follows a similar pattern. During the Karabakh War, Azerbaijan received active support not just from Türkiye, but also from Pakistan and Israel. They showcased this support by displaying drones from these countries in their victory parade.
Since then, Israel-Azerbaijan relations have only grown closer. (It’s worth noting that if not for Hamas’s October 7 attack and Israel’s ongoing Gaza offensive, Türkiye’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar would have visited Israel the next day to discuss pipeline agreements.)
Azerbaijan-Israel ties
Azerbaijan is Israel’s primary crude oil supplier, with Kazakhstan (another ‘two states, one nation’ ally) also in the top three. Conversely, Israel is Azerbaijan’s second-largest oil customer after Italy.
Azerbaijan’s oil reaches Israel via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
Erdoğan, who severed $9.5 billion in trade with Israel over its treatment of Palestinians, seems to expect similar actions from friendly nations.
However, even countries closest to Türkiye implement their own policies, not just on the Palestinian issue but also on matters like recognizing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
This isn’t limited to our ‘two states, one nation’ friends. We see a similar divergence from the ‘ummah’ that Erdoğan, in his July 14 speech, declared looked to him and the AK Party as the hope for all Muslims worldwide.
As we observed earlier, cultural proximity often takes a back seat when national interests are at stake.
It’s crucial to remember that culturally close nations and the broader Muslim ummah are still composed of separate states. We must avoid acting paternalistic or throwing past aid in each other’s faces.
