Democrats celebrate their historic victory over President Donald Trump in the US midterm elections.
The Democrats scored a landslide victory in the US midterm elections held on November 3, while President Donald Trump suffered a crushing defeat in a vote that had also turned into a referendum on his presidency. The Democrats secured a commanding lead in both chambers of Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Although results are still outstanding from some states, the Democrats have already secured 225 seats in the House, where 218 are needed for a majority, and 54 seats in the Senate, where the threshold is 51. They also won traditionally Republican strongholds such as Texas, Kansas and Ohio.
American voters have thus reduced President Trump to what US politics calls a “lame duck” – a president effectively unable to get legislation passed. Trump, unwilling to take personal responsibility for the defeat, declared, “If my name had been on the ballot, we would have won for sure.” Although he has threatened to veto every piece of legislation passed by the Democrats and govern the country through executive orders during the remaining two years of his presidency, this is not a sustainable option. Trump will nevertheless have to reach compromises with the Democrats on every measure he wants to push through Congress.
The results will have implications not only for US policies towards Europe, Russia, China and the Middle East, but also for Türkiye-US relations.
The Democrats will also be able to use their majority in Congress to launch investigations into Trump, including one into the Epstein files.
Why did Trump lose?
There appear to be three main reasons behind Trump’s historic defeat:
• The rising cost of living: Trump was elected in 2024 on a promise to bring prices down. But first, his constantly changing tariff policies, and then the prolongation of the war he launched against Iran, drove up oil prices and, in particular, the costs of food and transportation. The diesel deal he signed with Russia over the past two weeks failed to turn things around. Voters punished Trump for the rising cost of living.
• The war with Iran: Trump was also elected in 2024 on a promise, under the slogan “America First”, to prioritise the needs of the American people rather than military interventions abroad. The war with Iran, which he launched after being drawn in by Israel, fuelled inflation and the cost of living crisis, undermining the Republicans’ economic message. His announcement, just one day before the election, that the additional $4 billion he was sending to Israel would be the last such aid package failed to change the outcome.
• Immigration policies: Trump’s resort to authoritarian measures to prevent illegal immigration, ICE raids and, in some cases, the deployment of the National Guard alienated Hispanic voters who had supported him in 2024, as well as younger voters whose anger at the system had been growing. Trump’s arrogant rhetoric and actions, particularly his favouritism towards the tech oligarchs, provoked a backlash among younger voters.
In short, the rising cost of living, war and arrogant aggression brought Trump a crushing defeat.
F-35 and KAAN hopes may be shelved
Türkiye-US relations, which had deteriorated during the Democratic administration of Joe Biden, had begun to recover, partly thanks to President Tayyip Erdoğan’s “leader-to-leader diplomacy” approach and his personal relationship with Trump. Trump’s statement that he attended the NATO Summit in Ankara “out of respect for Erdoğan” was proof of this. The prospect of Türkiye returning to the F-35 programme, the lifting of CAATSA sanctions and approval for the export of engines for the KAAN fighter jet had all been raised.
Trump’s crushing defeat could once again cool Türkiye-US relations, particularly in three areas:
• F-35 and KAAN: A Congress under Democratic control could block or significantly slow Trump’s efforts to lift CAATSA sanctions and bring Türkiye back into the F-35 programme (or secure engines for advanced weapons programmes such as the KAAN, Türkiye’s National Combat Aircraft). It could impose new conditions through the influence of ethnic lobbies, particularly pro-Israel and Greek lobbies, legal obstacles, congressional oversight and potential vetoes.
• The Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean: Even if the personal Erdoğan-Trump channel at the executive level continues – including regional diplomacy, mediation efforts over Ukraine and coordination in the context of the Mecca Alliance – congressional pressure over human rights, democracy and regional policies (Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, etc.) could generate new friction in bilateral relations and produce a more transactional balance.
• Greater emphasis on strategic autonomy: The confrontation between the US president and Congress, coupled with new restrictions targeting Türkiye, could prompt Ankara to place greater emphasis on regional balancing mechanisms: the Mecca Pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, initiatives involving Libya and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). This could also encourage Türkiye to expand its room for manoeuvre independently of the United States within the framework of its NATO alliance.
If a government in Israel that includes Arab parties emerges as a possibility, the US could return to negotiations with Iran, while regional projects could gain importance.
