When the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, one of their promises was to fight against “3Ys” that are prohibitions, poverty and corruption. In the first year of their rule, certain progress was made in these areas with an expectation of strengthening relations with the European Union (EU). When the EU hopes faded, the first turning point in the fight against corruption was taken with the amendments to the tender law. Today, Turkey is the world champion in awarding public tenders to a handful of companies. While some bans were lifted, new ones came in their place. Today, we are in a shameful position in judicial independence, freedom of expression and press. The fight against poverty came to the point that a quarter of the people are dependent on state aid, and the gap between rich and poor disturbs even the rich.
One of the few areas that the AKP would claim to be successful but will not receive a response, “the numbers do not say so” in the upcoming elections, is perhaps the fight against the outlawed Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). It can be said that the last few years have been considered a turning point in the battle against the PKK.
Let’s try to analyze the issue with concrete examples, keeping the question of how this turning point might affect the Kurdish votes in the elections for the end of the article.
Preventive strike or active defense
The news that one of the illegal PKK executives, Ali Haydar Kaytan, was killed came out right after the Ministry of National Defense (MSB) announcement on November 18, 2021. In the statement, it was stated that 5 PKK terrorists were neutralized in Iraq’s Hakurk region as a result of joint work with the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (SİHA-UCAV) were used in the operation. Although there was no name in the statement, the commentators of the television channels said that this was a turning point because it was the first time that a person from the PKK’s highest level had been killed – without giving any concrete sources.
Kaytan was one of the people who founded the PKK together with Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 in the village of Fis (now Akziyaret) in the Lice District of Diyarbakır. Code-named “Fuat”, he was also a member of the Executive Board of the PKK and its front organization KCK when he was reported to have been killed. Previously his death was announced several times as it was the case with other PKK administrators Cemil Bayık, Murat Karayılan or Duran Kalkan, and revealed that it was not a correct announcement. There were no official statements in these cases. This time the announcement was published on November 22 by the Minister of National Defense Hulusi Akar. This was the first time it was happening, so it was called the turning point.
Another milestone: the deepest operation
According to another criterion, the turning point was the killing of 3 PKK members, including Taybet Bilen, one of the female militants in charge, in the operation carried out in the Kirkuk region on October 2, 2021. It was a landmark because it was the deepest operation ever done; it was carried out within 170 kilometers of the Iraqi borders.
According to another interpretation, the murder of Khalaf al-Muhammed, code-named “Sofi Nurettin”, the Syrian head of the PKK’s armed wing HPG (People’s Defence Forces), would have been considered a milestone. He was the highest-ranking PKK member, who was announced to have been killed through official channels before Kaytan. He was Syrian. When the MIT agents in Iraq detected that he was going to Syria from Qandil, Ankara evaluated the intel and took him under surveillance. Considering the risk of failure of the operation, Ankara decided to let him go to Syria, where his family was, and wait for him to return to Iraq. Thus, their contacts in Syria could also be monitored and presented to the US as new proof that the YPG (People’s Defence Units, armed wing of Syrian Democratic Forces) is an extension of the PKK. According to security sources, the operation was conducted on April 6 2021 in the Gara region of Iraq. President Tayyip Erdoğan made the statement in person after the cabinet meeting on May 17.
Other examples and their commonalities
There have been other similar examples in the last few years, as far as the media has reported. According to the records of security sources, some of them are as follows:
– İsmail Özden, member of the Executive Council, on August 15, 2018, in Sinjar.
– Diyar Garip Muhammed, the Iraqi head of the PKK, on June 27, 2019, in Qandil.
– Erdogan Ünal, a member of the PKK intelligence NLP, on July 24, 2019, in Qandil.
– Hacı Kurhan, one of the executives of the front organization TAK, took responsibility for the bloody terrorist acts of the PKK in Gara on July 30, 2019.
– Mühlis İke, the regional officer of HPG on August 20, 2019 in Iraq-Metina.
– Abdulrehman Hamo, a member of the Executive Council of Syrian origin, November 26, 2019, in Qandil.
– PKK Central Committee and Executive Council member İsmail Nazlıkul on May 26, 2020, in Asos, Iraq.
– As announced by Erdogan on June 6, 2021, Selman Bozkır, one of the former European financial officers, is responsible for the Mahmur Camp in Mahmur, Iraq.
– Engin Karaaslan, a member of the Central Committee Syria Secretariat, who previously served as the PKK Armenia representative on September 29, 2021, in Qamishli, Syria.
PKK got hit from high command
What these names have in common (apart from Kaytan) is that they are the channels of connection between the PKK’s central administration and organizational structures that will carry out the orders of action at the middle-upper level that joined the PKK between the late 1980s and the late 1990s.
Similar strikes shook the PKK, which has concentrated almost all its power in Syria under the name of fighting against ISIS in accordance with the agreement it made with the USA after Kobani in 2014 although Qandil denies it.
Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu said that during the 2022 budget negotiations, the number of terrorists in the country fell below 160.
Publishing on intelligence and security issues, the Kriter magazine wrote that in 2021, 73 PKK members, 6 of whom were on the upper-middle level, were “neutralized” at home and abroad, some of whom were on Interpol’s search list. At the press conference on January 8, Minister of National Defence Akar said, “We neutralized 2,795 terrorists in 2021”; few of them were caught alive or surrendered.
The widespread use of UCAVs and SİHAs also plays a role in this picture. However, this is only the visible part of the business.
The real turning point is at the political level
The main factor of this picture is the transition to the concept “preventing the attack at its source”, which Ankara has been saying for decades but not had been carried out.
First, the legal basis for this was prepared. There were three key turning points in the legal ground.
1- With the law published in the Official Gazette on April 26, 2014, the MIT was authorized for foreign operations. This was the most important turning point. There was a role of the scandal, known as “MIT Trucks” on the Syrian border on January 1, 2014, in which those involved were tried and convicted for their Fethullah Gülen connections. Meanwhile, the government’s indirect dialogue with the PKK had been ongoing.
2- On August 25 2017, the National Intelligence Coordination Board was transferred from the Prime Minister to the President. The end of the dialogue with the PKK in 2015, the developments after the military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and the transition to the Presidential Government System on April 16, 2017, played a role. In this way, it was aimed to eliminate the institutional jealousy between MIT and the interior intelligence that has been going on for years.
3- On July 9 2018, the MIT Undersecretariat was renamed as the MIT Presidency, and the chair was directly subordinated to the President. It was one of the first arrangements made after Erdoğan’s election as President on June 24, 2018, and the intelligence structure was gathered under one hand and command.
Three-legged strategy
After the legal ground was established, a three-pronged strategy was adopted.
– Preventive combat. The MIT’s authorization for overseas operations, the development of UCAVs, satellite and electronic intelligence capabilities allow preventive steps to be taken. Likewise, there is information that the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) also played a role in this process.
– Intelligence diplomacy. The effort, in which not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also the MIT and the MSB were involved, brought about the establishment of fruitful relations with the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government. Today, there are more than 40 Turkish military bases, large and small, in areas close to the Turkish border in Iraq. As a result of the understanding established with the USA in Syria, the USA does not speak out against Turkey’s PKK operations as long as its personnel, vehicles and operations are not damaged. This is also the case for Iraq.
– Operational transformation. With the use of intelligence opportunities and developments in military technology, the cost and duration of the operation have decreased both in terms of loss of life and financially. This means not only UCAVs such as ANKA-S and Bayraktar TB-2 but also the development of domestic solutions in military electronics and artillery/rocket technology.
Will it be a turning point in the Kurdish question?
It is always argued that the PKK problem and the Kurdish problem are not the same things. For example, despite the appearance that the PKK is heavily damaged in terms of carrying out its violent acts and the normalization trend in the East and Southeast, there is no decrease in HDP’s vote rate in the polls. On the other hand, the AKP votes started to transfer towards other opposition parties among the Eastern and Southeastern voters. This gives the impression that Kurdish voters tend to engage with the politics of the country on legitimate grounds, rather than separatist solutions that have been seen for decades, where the cost is very high. This undoubtedly means a positive contribution to the democratization process in Turkey.
This comment depends on how the main opposition CHP’s potential to attract Kurdish voters despite their alliance partner İYİ Party, which has a nationalistic inclination, as well as AKP’s potential, with its ally MHP.
