As developments in Syria continue to take dramatic turns, President Erdoğan has issued five key directives to the Foreign Ministry. (Photo: Presidential Office)
Three powers continue to make advances in Syria.
The first is forces under HTS leadership. Yesterday (December 10), they entered Deir ez-Zor city in southern Syria, west of the Euphrates. Earlier that day, US CENTCOM commander Erik Kurilla had visited SDF headquarters (his first visit since August 2023). The SDF, whose backbone consists of PKK/YPG, had announced their capture of Deir ez-Zor the previous day, leading to speculation in Türkiye that “The US is planning to establish a Kurdish region under PKK control in Syria.”
However, before the day was over, the US had withdrawn SDF forces from Deir ez-Zor to the east of the Euphrates, and HTS moved into the city.
Kurilla characterized the situation as an effort to “prevent ISIS from exploiting the current situation,” while emphasizing that “USCENTCOM remains committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS.” The US was effectively extending credit to the HTS administration that had overthrown Assad, conditional on their cooperation in fighting ISIS.
Israel and “Safe Zones” in Syria
The second is Israel. Between December 7-10, Israel announced it had taken advantage of the power vacuum to destroy Syria’s military infrastructure.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denied any intention to capture Damascus, despite forces advancing to within 25 kilometers of the capital. However, he warned they would use force if the HTS administration allowed remaining Syrian army weapons to fall into the hands of pro-Iranian militias or Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Like the US, Israel was extending conditional support to the HTS administration.
When announcing new force deployments in the Golan Heights (occupied since 1967) and beyond, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz introduced the term “sterile defense zones.” This terminology closely parallels Türkiyey’s concept of “terror-free safe zones,” which it has sought to establish beyond its Iraq and Syria borders for approximately two decades.
The key technical distinction is that Israel maintains an official occupation force in Syria.
Turkey’s “Proxy Force” SNA
Turkey is the third power consolidating its position in Syria.
Turkey’s advances are being achieved through territorial gains by the Syrian National Army (SNA); it would be accurate to characterize the SNA as Turkey’s proxy force in Syria.
This is analogous to how the SDF serves as the US proxy force in Syria, and how Hezbollah functioned (in Lebanon and Syria – prior to Israel’s defeat) as Iran’s proxy force.
Following HTS’s capture of Aleppo, the SNA launched an offensive on December 1st, driving SDF/PKK/YPG forces first from Tel Rifaat and then from Manbij. The SDF’s claim that “They didn’t win, we withdrew” only underscores their dependence on CENTCOM’s direct orders.
The SNA didn’t stop there, however, pushing west of the Euphrates. One objective appears to be the original site of the Tomb of Suleiman Shah, which was relocated due to ISIS threats. However, fighting around the Tishrin Dam and Qaraqozaq Bridge has sparked concerns within PKK/YPG ranks that the real target might be Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) on the Turkish border, opposite Suruç.
If the YPG is expelled from Kobani – where Turkish and US paths diverged in 2014 – it would create a continuous corridor from Turkey’s existing safe zone east of the Euphrates all the way to Hatay.
Parliamentary debates on Syria
News of Turkey’s direct intervention west of the Euphrates came from Qamishli. Security sources reported that MIT (Turkish Intelligence) had destroyed 2 tanks, 12 trucks, and 2 ammunition depots seized from the Syrian army.
The situation in Syria dominated the 2025 budget debates in Parliament, particularly in connection with MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s “Öcalan Initiative.”
The previous day, Bahçeli’s applause for DEM Party Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan’s speech and handshake with Parliament’s DEM Party Deputy Speaker Sırrı Süreyya Önder had sparked discussions about breaking traditional political taboos.
Yesterday (December 10), Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s exchange with DEM Party members about Syrian developments drew particular attention. Fidan challenged DEM Party members, stating, “For you, everything reduces to Kurds, and for Kurds, everything reduces to PKK” and urged them to “Consider Syria in its entirety.”
The government’s strategy shows consistency: while intensifying operations against PKK/YPG, it supports Kurdish participation in the HTS-led administration in Syria, while domestically encouraging the DEM Party to reject PKK’s armed struggle and participate in the political system. Whether one agrees with this approach or not, it demonstrates internal logic.
Erdoğan’s directives to Fidan
On December 10, President Tayyip Erdoğan, speaking both at the AKP Provincial Chairs meeting and at a dinner for Ambassadors Conference participants at Presidency, emphasized that Syria’s new administration must have inclusive representation. He specifically mentioned accommodating minorities without retribution – including Alevis, non-PKK affiliated Kurds, Turkmens, and Druze.
Erdoğan’s priorities for the Foreign Ministry during this period of “global systemic deadlock” were noteworthy:
- Overcoming “covert and overt sanctions and embargoes” imposed on Turkey due to its counter-terrorism operations
- Selling Turkish-produced weapons technology primarily to “friendly and brotherly nations” while preventing Turkish technologies from falling into adversarial hands
- Combating Islamophobia through diplomatic and legal channels
- Strengthening cooperation with Turkish investors and businesses abroad
- Ensuring Turkish diplomats maintain close cultural engagement with local populations globally, especially in Africa, emphasizing public diplomacy
Clearly, a challenging period lies ahead.
