Barrack Declares SDF’s Mission Over, Easing Türkiye-U.S. Strains

by Murat Yetkin / 21 January 2026, Wednesday / Published in Politics

U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Barrack stated after he met with Foreign Minister Fidan in Ankara that the original purpose of the SDF has come to an end, and is no longer needed as the primary force against ISIS. This development also helps ease tension in Türkiye–U.S. relations. (Photo: X/ForeignMinistry)

U.S. Ambassador to Ankara and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack said that his country no longer needs the SDF as the “primary ground force” in the fight against ISIS in Syria, and that its original purpose has “come to an end.” In a long message published on his X account (*) following his January 20 meeting with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara, Barrack argued that under the recognition of constitutional, social, and cultural rights by the “new Syrian state,” Kurds would gain “far more than the semi-autonomy offered by the SDF amid the chaos of civil war.”

The End of an Era

Barrack’s statement signals the end of a tense period in Turkish–U.S. relations that began when the United States, at a certain stage of the Syrian civil war that started in 2011, chose the PKK’s Syrian branch rather than NATO ally Türkiye as its partner in the fight against ISIS, starting with the 2014 Kobani battles.

At the time, the Obama administration—then in power in the United States—had the SDF established in 2015 to avoid formally cooperating with the PKK, which it designated as a terrorist organization. This was later publicly acknowledged by then–Special Operations Commander Raymond Thomas. Ankara had recently accused the SDF of being instrumentalized by Israel’s efforts to destabilize the region.

This dynamic became especially visible after the SDF signed an agreement with Damascus on March 10, 2025, and after Israel—supporting the Druze uprising during the summer—also pledged support to the SDF.

The SDF Tried U.S. Patience

Following the fluctuating tensions over the past three days between the Sharaa government and Abdi’s SDF, and after the SDF declared mobilization against Damascus and called on “all Kurds” to fight, Barrack arrived in Ankara around midday on January 20 to meet with Fidan.

After the Aleppo crisis that began the previous week, Barrack had mediated an agreement between SDF leader Mazloum Abdi and Damascus on January 18, based on a ceasefire framework they had agreed upon on January 17 in Erbil, hosted by Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani. The agreement was aligned with Sharaa’s 14-point ceasefire proposal. Abdi stated that he accepted the deal to prevent “further bloodshed,” but during a meeting in Damascus on January 19, the SDF withdrew from the agreement. Subsequently, the SDF and the PKK declared mobilization.

Syrian, American, and Turkish officials interpreted this as evidence that Mazloum Abdi’s influence over the SDF had diminished and that decisions he made without PKK approval were rendered invalid.

Karayılan’s Statement, DEM Party Rally

Meanwhile, the Syrian army increased pressure on the SDF and PKK by surrounding the cities of Hasakah and Kobani (Ayn al-Arab). It became clear that if the SDF and PKK persisted with maximalist demands, they would also lose control of these two cities.

This was followed by a statement from senior PKK leader Murat Karayılan, accusing the United States of abandoning its “allies,” the SDF, who had captured ISIS’s former capital Raqqa and were guarding prisons holding ISIS militants and their families. Karayılan expressed regret, saying, “So it turns out they only look after their own interests.”

Around midday, tensions escalated further during a “Support for Rojava” march and rally organized by the DEM Party in the border town of Nusaybin, when some militants lowered the Turkish flag at the border. Strong reactions came from all segments of society, including DEM itself.

The statement Barrack made in the evening following his meeting with Fidan—seen as a potential turning point in Türkiye–U.S. relations—was then released. After this statement, it was announced that the SDF had once again reached an agreement with Damascus: Abdi would become Deputy Minister of Defense, and he would appoint the governor of Hasakah.

(*) Full Text of Barrack’s X post:

The greatest opportunity for the Kurds in Syria right now lies in the post-Assad transition under the new government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. This moment offers a pathway to full integration into a unified Syrian state with citizenship rights, cultural protections, and political participation— long denied under Bashar al-Assad’s regime, where many Kurds faced statelessness, language restrictions, and systemic discrimination.

Historically, the US military presence in northeastern Syria was justified primarily as a counter-ISIS partnership. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Kurds, proved the most effective ground partner in defeating ISIS’s territorial caliphate by 2019, detaining thousands of ISIS fighters and family members in prisons and camps like al-Hol and al-Shaddadi. At that time, there was no functioning central Syrian state to partner with—the Assad regime was weakened, contested, and not a viable partner against ISIS due to its alliances with Iran and Russia. Today, the situation has fundamentally changed.

Syria now has an acknowledged central government that has joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (as its 90th member in late 2025), signaling a westward pivot and cooperation with the US on counterterrorism. This shifts the rationale for the US-SDF partnership: the original purpose of the SDF as the primary anti-ISIS force on the ground has largely expired, as Damascus is now both willing and positioned to take over security responsibilities, including control of ISIS detention facilities and camps.

Recent developments show the US actively facilitating this transition, rather than prolonging a separate SDF role: • We have engaged extensively with the Syrian Government and SDF leadership to secure an integration agreement, signed on January 18, and to set a clear pathway for timely and peaceful implementation. • The deal integrates SDF fighters into the national military (as individuals, which remains among the most contentious issues), hand over key infrastructure (oil fields, dams, border crossings), and cede control of ISIS prisons and camps to Damascus. • The US has no interest in long-term military presence; it prioritizes defeating ISIS remnants, supporting reconciliation, and advancing national unity without endorsing separatism or federalism.

This creates a unique window for the Kurds: integration into the new Syrian state offers full citizenship rights (including for those previously stateless), recognition as an integral part of Syria, constitutional protections for Kurdish language and culture (e.g., teaching in Kurdish, celebrating Nawruz as a national holiday), and participation in governance—far beyond the semi-autonomy the SDF held amid civil war chaos. While risks remain (e.g., fragile ceasefires, occasional clashes, concerns over hardliners, or the desire of some actors to relitigate past grievances), the United States is pushing for safeguards on Kurdish rights and counter-ISIS cooperation. The alternative—prolonged separation—could invite instability or ISIS resurgence.

This integration, backed by US diplomacy, represents the strongest chance yet for Kurds to secure enduring rights and security within a recognized Syrian nation-state. In Syria, the United States is focused on: 1) ensuring the security of prison facilities holding ISIS prisoners, currently guarded by the SDF; and 2) facilitating talks between the SDF and the Syrian Government to allow for the peaceful integration of the SDF and the political inclusion of Syria’s Kurdish population into a historic full Syrian citizenship.